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centuries. However, formerly the conflict between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, did not exist in its present day sense. On the contrary, the two parts had a sense of kinship, or even of unity, as may be seen in an examination of the motives for which Bohdan Khmelnitskyj gave himself to Moscow and to Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich (in 1653), after detaching the Ukraine from Poland.

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The conflict[1] between the two Russian nations did not in fact break out until the Nineteenth Century.

Its basic causes were:

1. The efforts of the Ukrainians to create or to revive a language and a literature of their own.
2. A whole series of scientific discussions upon the question as to what were the connections between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, especially from a linguistic and an anthropological viewpoint.

Finally and above all:

3. The actual political and social status of the Ukrainians in the Empire and the general development in these latter years of social and democratic ideas.

/53/ Thus today the conflict is moving more and more from the literary and scientific field into the political field.

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The conflict began in 1798, when J.P. Kotljarevs'kji published in Ukrainian his Aeneid. From that date on there has been a great effort to create an indigenous literature. But these tendencies were quickly opposed by the government, which feared that this literary separatism might be prejudicial to national unity. And upon various occasions, especially in 1847, 1863, and 1876, it was forbidden to print or publish, save for a few rare exceptions, books in Ukrainian. But the result of these prohibitions was completely opposite from that which was intended. The tendencies toward literary emancipation asserted themselves so much the more strongly as they were more rigorously suppressed, and they found favorable soil in eastern Galicia, which belongs, as we know, to Austria.

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On the other hand, the conflict[1], strengthened by the scientific discussions concerning the ties between the two nations, became aggravated. There were arguments about the antiquity of the Ukrainian idiom, especially in the Kiyev region, about the question of

[1] [Between Great Russians and Ukrainians, cf. [illegible] 116, pp.35-37. [illegible]]

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determining who had produced the earliest Russian annals and the first Russian literature in the State of Kiyev. These polemics took place especially between 1850 and 1860; they were marked by the works of Sreznevskii, of Lavrovskii, and particularly of Pogodin, who pretended to demonstrate that up to the fourteenth century /54/ Kiyev had been occupied by the Great Russians, the initiators of the history and the literature of the region, and that the Ukrainians had not come from the Carpathians until after the Tatar conquest. This theory found opponents among the historians of the Ukraine; it was revived later with much greater energy (in 1883) from a linguistic point of view by Sobolevskii, and refuted with no less vigor by the historians Dashkevich, Antonovitch, Grouchevsky, A. Iablonovskii, and the philologists V. Jagić, A. Shakhmatov, A. Krymskyj, A. Kolessa, A. Loboda, etc.

Naturally, no one limited himself to the question of discovering when the Ukrainians first settled in Kiyev. They also studied the degrees of kinship of the two idioms. Was there only a single Russian language with two dialects, or must two different languages be recognized? These debates, in which the principal Russian and Slavic philologists participated, oddly favored the theory which tended to separate the two groups and to widen the chasm which was being dug between them.

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But these theoretical polemics were not confined to the linguistics with which they dealt more and more frequently, and with a constant recourse to scholarly apparatus. Maksimovich had already declared that not only two languages, but two national types must be recognized in Russia; but he did not clearly formulate his doctrine. It was Kostomarov who ventured to do this and /55/ who produced a veritable revolution. He was followed by an entire series of anthropologists.

Maksimovich had not succeeded in formulating a precise distinction: Kostomarov succeeded in this in the article entitled: "The two Russian nationalities" published by the review Osnova (the Basis) in 1861. In this he pointed out the differences of history, of language, of customs, of character, of physical appearance, and he laid down this theory: that there are not only two Russian languages, but also two nationalities which differ completely the one from the other, and which history alone has united into a single unit.

This theory of Kostomarov had great success; it was developed

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T.R. and led to the following conclusion: Of the two nationalities only
814 one, that of the Ukrainians, is purely Slav; the peoples who live to
829 the north and to the east of the Dvina and the Dnepr are not Slavs, but Finns, Tatars, or Turani more or less affected by Slavic influences, whose entire organization, and whose absolutist government in particular, are Asiatic in origin and character.

This conclusion, which the inventors of the theory of the two nationalities had scarcely suspected, found favorable soil, in particular among the Polish victims of the ill-omened revolution of 1863. And it was through their emigration that the doctrine of the two Russias, the one Slavic, the other Turanian, was propagated. Among the propagators of this doctrine, let us mention only the /56/ names of Dushinskii and of his wife Severina Duchinska, of Buszczynski and of the French historian Henri Martin. (1)

1. Several times I have had the opportunity of expressing myself on these theories and on the misuse which Dushinskii and his disciples claim has been made of them. See especially La Revue des Cours letteraires (year 1868) and my Souvenirs d'um Slavophile (pp. 20-25, Paris, Hachette, 1905). Translator.

This theory did not find as favorable soil among the Ukrainians;
S.P. but it has been accepted in various ways, and it explains to us the
T.R. epithet, Khazars, (2) which is sometimes given to the Great Russians;
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2. The Khazars, formerly Kozares, a Scythian people according to the Russian Chronicle said to be by Nestor. See my translation of this chronicle (page 325). Translator.

this epithet apparently came from completely inaccurate ideas as to
S.P. the origin of the Great Russians. The anthropologists have treated
T.R. the question in a more scientific manner by indicating the considerable
144 differences which exist between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians.
829 The Ukrainians are for the most part brachycephalic and of dark complexion, while the Great Russians are generally of light complexion; at the same time it is demonstrated that dark brachycephalic type is the pure Slavic type (Volkov, Taylor). But this theory, although it has a certain amount of data in its favor, cannot be considered as proven. There is another one, which considers the Belorussian and Great Russian type as the true type of the Slavs; and this theory has in its favor at least as many arguments to /57/ make it worthy of belief. And the differences that arise within each of the two groups

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S.P. T.R. 144 829 are frequently greater than those which exist between them. (1)

1. Furthermore, I am quite willing to admit the existence of two pre-European types in various localities within primitive Slavia. In the period when these two types were pure, there were not yet any Slavs in Europe. When the Slavs appeared, the two types had already crossed with each other; one of them predominated in a certain region the other, in another region. But the original one remained predominant; new arguments are constantly supporting this theory. (Note of the author).

S.P. T.R. 668 These, then, are the conditions in, and the influences under which, the conflict burst forth, the result of which we see today. The intellectuals of the Ukraine flatly declare that they make up a distinct Slavic nation: and for this "Ukrainian" nation they demand all of the natural rights which may insure its preservation and development. For them the exercise of these rights should not be confined to securing schools in which the teaching is conducted in Ukrainian, or to the free expansion of their literature, but should extend to the recognition of their political autonomy. The moderate and practical patriots, bearing in mind the existing conditions, are content to demand autonomy within the Empire. The radicals are naturally more exigrent. They think that the present organization of the Russian State will not last. They count upon a dismemberment, they dream of the creation of an independent Ukraine, organized upon democratic and socialistic principles.

000 /58/ Should I venture to express frankly my opinion upon this conflict and upon the probable outcome of these tendencies? I am among those who believe it natural and equitable that the Russian government should satisfy the legitimate demands of the Ukrainians. But I do not hesitate in declaring that, despite the differences which have been exaggerated, there are so many common features in the history, the tradition, the faith, the language, and the culture of the two peoples--not to mention their common origin--that, to a distant and impartial observer, they are only two segments of a single and unique Russian people.

From the Slavic point of view, and even from the Russian point of view, we hope that this unity may be preserved in relation to outsiders and as far as possible in the political, literary, and linguistic life, while at the same time the needs and political demands of the two parties may be respected. We wish this at least in the field of fine literature. Until the close of the eighteenth century the language was a common one and the greatest writers of the nineteenth century have brought honor to the two groups.

[Great Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, cf. cat. 11b, pp. 35-39—Analyst]

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invaders as they fused with the native stocks, the Eastern Em- 177
pire had grafted upon the legacy of Rome the picturesque and 643
flamboyant features of oriental Christianity. Its autocratic sov-
ereigns were the agents of God on earth under a system which
combined in them the attributes of emperor and pope, and this
factor ought especially to be borne in mind, because it not only
explains the autocratic tradition later set up by the princes of
Moscow but also lies at the root of the Russian tendency to
attribute to all their rulers a sort of superhuman status. The
superlative adulation showered on Joseph Stalin in our own
day is in part a remote reflex of Byzantine influence. Then too,
Constantinople before the arrival of the Crusaders was the
greatest center of material civilization in the occidental world.
Its buildings rivaled Rome in its prime. Its highly organized
and stratified society, the splendor of its religious observances,
its military prowess under the more gifted emperors, and its
general atmosphere of wealth could not fail to create a lasting
impression on visitors from less advanced regions.

But Byzantine civilization lacked the punch and the drive 814
which characterized the best days of the Roman Empire or the 829
realm of Charlemagne. In intellectual and literary matters the 175*
Eastern Empire was conservative. It studied the past without
rivaling it with the products of contemporary creative imagina-
tion. It was compilatory rather than original. Byzantine schol-
ars were the most learned men of their day, but their learning
was accumulative, not productive. Byzantine historians com-
posed voluminous chronicles without evolving a philosophy of
history, while Byzantine theologians dissipated their energy
on amenities of dogma argued with a bitterness which we
should nowadays associate only with partisan politics. The
Byzantine Church was more political than the Roman, more
closely affiliated with the state, and hence less fundamentally
spiritual in outlook. The literary tradition transmitted by the
Byzantine Church was stiff and formalistic, and it was the mis-
fortune of medieval Russia that the Byzantine influence was
weakened by political events before it was absorbed by the

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814 younger state in a volume which might have served as a firm
829 basis for the development of a characteristic native culture.
175 The Russians before the Tartar invasion were always pupils; they originated very little that was independent of Byzantine models either in literature or in art.

177 In art, however, this imitation was productive and created
341 an architectural and a decorative tradition which lasted down into modern times. By the date of Vladimir's conversion, the basilica as a type of church architecture in Byzantium had been largely replaced by the cruciform church with one or with five cupolas. This was the type transmitted to Russia and still worthily represented by the great medieval churches of Kiev, Novgorod, Vladimir and even Moscow, though in the metropolis the more exotic forms and the onion-shaped dome derived
177 from wooden architecture prevail. The highly conventionalized
532 art of the icon dominated Russian painting until Western influences began to seep in during the seventeenth century, but this tradition was still vital enough before the first World War to influence the art of nineteenth-century religious and historical painters. For where the Byzantine tradition had taken firm root, the aesthetic appeal was long-lived and enduring.

538 In literature, along with lapidary works of religious implica-
186 tion, the Russian national spirit began to manifest itself in historical compilations during the eleventh century, and literary reflexes of folk poetry had already appeared before the Tartar conquest. But a truly national literature stems from a long educative process, and this process was interrupted in medieval Russia both by domestic politics and by nomadic inroads.

177 Where domestic disorders merely retarded the intellectual
779 advance of medieval Russia, the Tartar incursion brought it to a full stop. It has already been noticed what material impoverishment it had caused. But the Tartar domination was a far more serious factor in the deterioration of cultural and spiritual values. The church, to be sure, was treated with tolerance by the Tartars because it preached submission to

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pictures of the decaying landed gentry. Goncharov composed 538 the classic of Russian imagination paralyzed by inertia. Tolstoi 829 studied the peasant problem, painted the first twenty years of the century on the magnificent canvas of his *War and Peace,* and returned to contemporary agrarian and urban problems with *Anna Karenina.* Dostoevski, after poignantly describing the bitter life of the humble in *Poor People,* acquired still deeper sympathy in his exile, and having expounded his doctrine of atonement through suffering in *Crime and Punishment,* attacked the radicals in *The Possessed,* and revealed the whole scope of his psychological penetration and the breadth of his religious philosophy in *The Brothers Karamazov.* With other authors of scarcely less merit describing contemporary life, these three decades constitute an outburst of brilliance unequaled in any world literature. Russian verse of the period was no less meritorious, and even Russian painters chose subjects which reflected the contemporary state of mind.

While the aims of political and social thinkers expanded, 668 the tempo of the reforms gradually slowed down with dangerous 175* results. Active revolutionary groups had begun to take shape even in the heyday of reform, and strove for rapid democratization in the public interest. Even in the fifties, literature had ceased to be an exclusive perquisite of the aristocracy and was professionally practiced by many young men from the new middle class who were impatient at the slowness of change. Some of the young radicals made unfruitful efforts to form a community of interest with the peasantry. Others attempted to force the hand of the government by acts of violence. Marxist socialism became known in Russia during the seventies and, while it supplied the young radicals with a more aggressive program, it suggested a transfer of their missionary efforts from the peasants to the urban industrial workers who were expanding in numbers with the progressive industrialization of the country.

The rising tide of radicalism stimulated repressive measures 175* by the government, which gradually lost much of the sympathy 656 668

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175* which it had previously enjoyed in more moderate spheres,
652 and even rejected loyal proposals for conservative reforms ad-
668 vanced in order to discourage the repeated outrages of the terrorists. In 1880 the situation came to a head with an explosion in the Winter Palace itself at St. Petersburg in which the whole imperial family narrowly escaped a violent death. Alexander II then called liberal statesmen who enjoyed the public confidence to work out a series of innovations which, though not aiming at a constitution, were at least conciliatory and progressive. These reforms were viewed with apprehension by the radicals, who not only feared to lose their public but also believed (mistakenly, as it proved) that the elimination of the tsar would be the prelude to a great popular uprising. They thus assassinated Alexander II on March 13, 1881.

The results were devastating. Moderate opinion was profoundly shocked, the government relapsed into a reactionary policy which endured until 1917, only briefly interrupted by the revolution of 1905. Political freedom and even political thought were discouraged, and many conscientious liberals were reduced to disillusion and despair by the bitter conviction that progress was impossible. The situation was not helped by the economic crisis of the eighties which followed an inflationary period of hasty industrial overexpansion.

829 This disillusion is most clearly reflected in the dramas of
538 Chekhov, those twilight pictures of a class which vegetates without hope of change, without faith in its capacity to influence events. To this situation the accession of Nicholas II in 1894 brought no cure; since he was largely surrounded by ministers who deprecated even local self-government as only a step toward constitutionalism. But beneath the surface a new
175* spirit was about to break ground. Some of the younger genera-
668 tion could no longer accept the resignation which Chekhov's characters practiced. For them, failure, however tragic, was not an everlasting stop-signal. Marxism gave them a program and a method. It warned them not to expect salvation from the middle class, and preached the virtues and strength of the so

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125* reconciliation with society. The new parliament was never al-
668 lowed to function efficiently, and excessive parcellation of par-
642 ties within it also prevented the formation of a workable
united front against the government, though the fundamental
tone was one of hostility.

The first World War began in this atmosphere of mutual distrust between government and society, and only a brief interval of patriotic *entente cordiale* intervened before official incompetence as revealed by repeated military defeats once more opened the breach, which was further widened by a complete collapse of transportation and economic life. General resentment was intensified by evidence of a total lack of comprehension of the situation by the tsar and his advisers, and culminated in the events of March, 1917, by which the tsar was forced to abdicate and a democratic regime was set up. The vacillations of successive moderate provisional governments played into the hands of the Bolshevik leaders, who could always bank on the support of the urban factory workers and certain sections of the army, and on November 7 they were masters of Petrograd. The subsequent fortunes of the Soviets are so close to our own times as to be matters of common knowledge.

125* The chasm which existed between government and society
829 between 1894 and the first World War did not prevent simul-
538 taneous developments in Russian intellectual life. In spite of
517 government surveillance and occasional restriction of educa-
tional facilities, a highly educated and talented middle class
had evolved in Russia during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. Though literature declined in some degree after the
death of Dostoevski, Tolstoi lived on to combine moral philos-
ophy and creative letters until 1910. Chekhov's later plays ex-
pressed his own prevision that an epoch was about to end. A
younger generation of prose writers revived traditional Russian
realism in a more individualistic spirit without regard to the
political and social aims that had inspired their predecessors.
In poetry, symbolism sought to penetrate and express deeper

5: Thomson S-5 (no date) 1951 E16 Slavic Peoples E16.

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A CENTURY OF A PHANTOM
PANSLAVISM AND THE WESTERN SLAVS

by S. Harrison Thomson

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AMONG the gorgeous phantoms of history, none has had a more rich or variously enticing story than Panslavism. It may well be that more literate Europeans have enjoyed the thrill of frightening themselves by it and more designing political manipulators have used it as a stage illusion than would be true of any other fiction. On the other hand there have been published several serious histories of the spectre.

By 1848 Panslavism was already an old and ripe story. To go back to the empire of Samo in the early seventh century is perhaps to be too inventive, but we can certainly trace the idea of Slavic reciprocity in the plans of Bolesław Chrobry (the Hardy) of Poland, who, around the year 1000, planned a western Slavic empire comprising the Poles, the Czechs, the Moravians, the Elbian Slavs and the western Ukrainians. His obvious purpose was to block further German expansion eastward.[1] Whatever their motivation, those grandiose plans proved ephemeral, as did others conceived by Polish or Czech rulers for centuries thereafter. There is no discernible difference, so far as we can judge, between the territorial and dynastic maneuvering that went on among Slavic princes and that of Austrian, Hungarian and Wallachian rulers in these centuries of the formation of national states. One Slavic people was as likely to be antipathetic to a neighboring Slavic people as to a neighbor who was Germanic or Turco-Ugric. Territorial nationalism or dynastic combination were already the prevailing patterns.

But from the seventeenth century on concepts of a common ethnic and linguistic background begin to grow and take shape. From the Croat Juraj Križanić in the seventeenth century,[2] who spent fifteen years in Siberian exile after proclaiming his Panslav ideas in Russia, to the great Slovak poet, Jan Kollár, in the early nineteenth century, we can trace an unwavering line of western Slavic intellectuals who formulated and reformulated the idea of a glorious Slav race which should of right be united in heart and body, preferably under one paternal Slav ruler.

Somewhat ironically a Baltic German, Johann Gottfried Herder, had contributed much to the most recent upsurge of this Slav feeling by glori-

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[1] On whom the classic study is St. Zakrzewski, *Bolesław Chrobry Wielki* (Cracow, 1925); and cf. more recently, Z. Wojciechowski, "Bolesław Chrobry i kryzys stosunków polskoniemieckich" in *Przegląd Zachodni* IV (1948), 369-383.

[2] Smurlo, E., "From Križanić to the Slavophiles," *Slavonic Review* VI (1928), 321-335; of A. Fischel, *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919), p. 20ff.; P. G. Scolardi, *Krijanich, messager de l'unité des chrétiens et père du panslavisme* (Paris, 1947).

175 fying the Slavic race and treating it as one, from the Moldau to the Urals. He would doubtless have been disturbed to be credited with partial parent-
186 hood of both Pangermanism and Panslavism. Early in the nineteenth
668 century most western Slavs were of necessity romantics. Romanticism was the only recourse left them: Poland tragically partitioned, the Slavs of
● 829 the Austrian Empire barely existing under Metternich, the South Slavs predominantly under the Ottoman Turk. Any voice even faintly suggesting a prouder past, and by implication a comparable future, would be welcome. Their history was their refuge and their hope in time of troubled humiliation.[3]

Philology, poetry and letters, history and the trend of international events in the forties of the nineteenth century all combined to deepen and broaden the feelings but dimly and sporadically aroused a half century before by the wildfire spread of the ideas of the French Revolution. There was now, after decades of scholarship, scientific and historical ground for the concept of Slavic community. The ferment of the Slav Revival, however, romantic it may have been in a technical sense, was a psychological fact of great moment to all the western Slavs, whether living under Magyar repression in Slovakia or Croatia, clumsy Austrian Biedermeier in Bohemia, or awkward Hapsburg pampering in Galicia. The springs of hope and confidence were filling. The single great Slavic state to the east—Mother Russia—was still victoriously radiant from defeating Napoleon, and her very glamor drew irresistibly the yearnings of the Slavic millions enslaved by alien peoples. In many quarters among the western Slavs there was talk of the all-Slavic Tsar, while in Russia there was not infrequently an expression of interest among scholars and publicists as well as among reflective politicians in the possibility of strengthening the natural bonds between Mother Russia and her temporarily estranged children in the west. Pushkin's lines, written after the Polish revolution of 1830-31

> Will the Slavic rivulets pour into the Russian sea,
> Or will it dry up? That is the question.

reflected current Russian thought.[4] A. S. Chomyakov, the Slavophil poet,

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[3] See the illuminating discussion of Panslavism by Wacław Lednicki in *European Ideologies* (New York, 1948), pp. 808-951, particularly rich in literary background. His earlier study, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 128-140, 649-662, can also be consulted with great profit. It is significant that this study of Polish Slavophilism ends about the middle of the nineteenth century. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej w okresie porozbiorowym*, I (Lwów, 1913) *passim*. For the echoes of this current of thought in Polish literature, and an explanation of how and why it took a line divergent from that in other Western and Southern Slavic countries see Zofja Klemensówna, *Słowianofilstwo w literaturze polskiej lat 1800 do 1848* (Warszawa, 1926), *passim*.

[4] See Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 168ff., and Lednicki *passim*. The literature on Russian

in the next year spoke dramatically of "the brothers in fetters, who wait 175
yearningly for thy call and thy protective embrace." There was much more, 186
a good deal of it more effusive, and all of it tinged with theology, from 668
poets, essayists and even historians, but mostly urging the western Slavs,
and particularly the Poles, to recognize their divinely appointed lot as part 829
of a great Slavic nation, naturally under Russian leadership. The Slovak Kollár's "On Slavic Reciprocity" was first published in German in 1837, then appeared in Russian in 1838 and a second time in 1840, but the concept of reciprocity was interpreted by the Russian editor and Russian readers in a Russian sense.[5] It would be difficult to determine whether the Russian espousal of Slavophilism was more or less enthusiastic than that of the western Slavs in the period before 1848, but it is certain that Russian Slavophilism could, even at this early date, be more properly called Panrussism than Panslavism.

We can indeed thus early discern a fairly clear and perhaps radical split in the aims of those who supported Slavic unity. On the one hand the western Slavs thought in terms of reciprocal aid, comfort and support, implicitly and explicitly favoring the independent existence of the several Slavic peoples. On the other hand the Russian Slavophils, from their proud vantage-point of an independent state existence, regarded the lesser Slavic peoples beyond their borders as strayed, lost or stolen children who should return to the mother's heart and hearth, the mother of course being Russia. Their principal concern, indeed, was that Russia herself should perceive her providential mission to carry on the torch of the true Christian faith which was visibly falling from the hand of the weakening West. It was taken for granted that the errant western and southern Slav brethren would accept the new situation with appreciation and even enthusiasm.

Decades of Romanticism, the European enlightenment followed by three-quarters of a century of Slavic renaissance in philology, poetry, ethnography, history and science, has made the dispersed Slavic peoples very sensible of their similarities and their differences, and eager to grasp and hold their own future. The events of February 1848 in western Europe only precipitated these feelings into action. German nationalism had found its voice in the Frankfurt Parliament. It was only natural that the western Slavs should answer with a Slavic assembly. In April the Slovak Ljúdevit Śtur was agitating in Prague for a meeting of representatives of the Slavic

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Slavophilism is tremendous. Of the more recent literature in western languages, see Charles Quénet, *Tchaadaev et les lettres philosophiques* (Paris, 1931); A. Gratieux, *A. S. Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939); Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa* (Bern, 1948); and Bernhard Schultze, *Russische Denker* (Vienna, 1950).

[5] Clementis, Vl., *Panslavism Past and Present* (London, 1943), p. 38.

175 peoples, and Dr. Fr. Brauner received a letter from Ondrzej Moraczewski
186 in Poznań, dated April 23, inviting the Czechs to initiate a Slavic congress.[6] But the first public suggestion to this effect came from the Croat
668 Ivan Kukuljević in the April 20 issue of the *Narodni Noviny*, and a revised call to meet was published on April 30 in the same paper over the
829 signature of Palacký and 19 other leading Czechs.[7] A public statement was issued on May 5 to "our brothers of the Austrian Empire" inviting them to convene in Prague on May 31, in order "to deliberate on our common interests . . . We are resolved to remain faithful to the hereditary house of Habsburg-Lorraine . . . and to maintain the integrity and independence of the Empire by all means in our power. We therefore reject all accusations of separatism, of Panslavism, of Russianism, which might be brought against us by ill-intentioned accusers. . . . Our undertaking is essentially conservative in nature and should in no wise disturb our liberal and justice-loving non-Slavic fellow-citizens." This was the voice of Austro-Slavism.

Of the 340 participants, 237 were Czechs and Slovaks, 42 South Slavs, 60 Poles and Ruthenians, and one Russian. Of the Poles several were from Prussian Poland, and the Russian—Bakunin—did not officially represent Tsarist Russia. The very thought of revolution of any sort was uncongenial to Tsar Nicholas I. The Poles would have preferred to have the Congress declare for a restitution of all of Poland, but there was little support for so revolutionary a concept.[8] The ruling motivation was anti-German and anti-Magyar. It was certainly not pro-Russian. Bakunin, the sole Russian present, a voluble guest, was quite un-Russian in his advocacy of Slavic federation.[9] The enthusiasm was tearful and tremendous, the speeches were moving, the parades, dinners and celebrations were elaborate and mystic. Palacký's speech of June 12, resuming the conclusions of the several commissions, specifically demanded a federalized Empire, with Slavs enjoying equal rights and privileges with the Germans and the

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[6] Tobolka, Zd., *Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby*, I (Prague, 1931), 77.

[7] Published in J.M. Černy, *Boj za právo* I (Prague, 1893), 183 and F. Palacký, *Spisy z oboru politiky* (Prague, 1898), p. 24f. See also F. Roubík, *Český rok 1848* (Prague, 1948), p. 199, and K. Kazbunda, *České hnutí roku 1848* (Prague, 1929), p. 182ff.; Albert Pražák, "Slavonic Congress of 1848 and the Slovaks" in *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 141-159.

[8] Batowski, Henryk, *Współpraca słowiańska* (Warsaw, 1946), p. 53. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej* I (Lwów, 1913) 288-291.

[9] *Bakuninová Zpověď* (Prague, 1926), p. 72ff.; see also B. P. Hepner, *Bakounine et le panslavisme révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1950), pp. 236-284; and on Bakunin's Panslavism and his participation in the Prague Congress see V. Cejchan, *Bakunin v Čechách* (Prague, 1928), pp. 14-30. It seems quite clear that Bakunin had little or no understanding of the orientation of the Slavs of the Hapsburg monarchy.

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Magyars.[10] This was the last plenary session of the Congress. Tumultuous events in Prague, not directly connected with the Slav Congress, made further meetings impossible, and on June 28 it was adjourned *sine die*.[11] An attempt was made to carry on the work of the Congress through a society bearing the name *Lipa slovanská* (the Slavic linden tree), but it did not survive the reaction that set in the next year. There remained, however, for a few years, one insistently free voice. Karel Havlíček, one of Palacký's adjutants at the Congress, refused to be quiet, and through his journal *Slowan* continued, for the two years he was relatively unsilenced, to defend the rights of the Slavs in the Hapsburg Empire, and went so far as to warn Vienna: "If they will not allow the lesser Panslavism in Central Europe they should take care lest the greater crash on their necks."[12] This is especially suggestive in view of the fact that Havlíček had but recently returned from a trip to Poland and Russia completely cured of any pro-Russian sentiments.[13] There was no western Slav who spoke more frankly than this in the early 'fifties.

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Thus as of 1849, Austro-Slavism had apparently had its day within the Hapsburg Empire, and Tsar Nicholas I, after reading the statements written out by Ivan Aksakov in answer to a police questionnaire, wrote in the margin of Aksakov's plaidoyer two comments: "Under the guise of compassion for the pseudo-persecution of Slavic tribes there is hidden a criminal thought about an uprising against the constituted authority of neighboring and partly allied states and about a general unification, which is expected, not from God's will, but from a revolution, which is perilous to Russia." "Only God can determine what is being prepared in the distant future, but if an accumulation of circumstances would indeed lead to such

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[10] Palacký, Fr., *Spisy z oboru politiky*, p. 46ff.

[11] Roubík, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

[12] Quoted in Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 307f. See Karel Tuma, *Karel Havlíček Borovský* (Prague, 1883) who follows the development of Havlíček's thought in these years with extensive quotations from his letters and editorials. In addition to T. G. Masaryk's classic work, *Karel Havlíček* (Prague, 1896), see the more recent work of Jaromír Bělič, *Karel Havlíček Borovský a slovanstvo* (Prague, 1947), especially pp. 27ff. and 180ff. This latter section is particularly illuminating in its analysis of the changes of attitude Havlíček went through toward the Poles, the Russians and Slavism in general.

[13] Jirásek, J., *Rusko a my* II (Prague, 1946), 161f.; Tuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 71ff., 92ff. Havlíček saw no reason to modify his unfavorable opinion of Russia even after the failure of the Congress and the onset of reaction. He wrote in the August 30, 1848 issue of his issue of his *Narodní Noviny* (quoted by Tuma, *op. cit.*, p. 234f.): "If Russia were a free constitutional country the Austrian Slavs (in case Austria were to be broken up), could consider a union with their blood brethren like the Germans, the Magyars or the Wallachs. They would then be a part of one of the most honorable, and perhaps leading countries of the world. But Russia is a land of despotism, and the rest of us free Slavs must, unfortunately, consider this our brother as our worst enemy."

175 unification, it would be for the peril of Russia."[14] Not only did the Tsar
186 disapprove of Slavophilism, but the presence of Russian armies in Slovakia
668 as allies of Habsburg repression in the same year did not encourage Slavophilism among the western Slavs.

● 829 For the better part of a decade, both among the western Slavs and within Russia little is heard of Panslavism or even of Slavophilism. The interest of the Russian intellectuals was taken up, in these years, by the polemics focussed around the question of the relations of the Orthodox to the Roman church. The encyclical of Pius IX to the Eastern Christians set off the sharp dispute.[15] In the Empire the reaction of Bach was severely anti-Slav,[16] and Tsar Nicholas would not hear any talk of Slav federation. But the end of the Crimean war, coinciding with the death of Nicholas I and the end of his absolutism, heralded a change in the Russian attitude toward the lesser Slavic breeds beyond the pale. Russia defeated was more receptive to ideas of Slavic reciprocity than before. But to the western Slavs, for a time at least, the shock of Russia's military vulnerability was a bitter disillusionment.[17] This feeling of despair lasted for a number of years until Austria herself was humbled on the plains of Lombardy. Then hope welled anew. Bach's régime was through and Vienna was a suitor for the support of her Slavic peoples. It is not without interest that at about the same time, 1857 and 1858, a Slavic Benevolent Committee was organized in Moscow,[18] and the Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, gave it his blessing. Its benevolence was preeminently directed toward strengthening cultural and ecclesiastical ties with the southern Slavs, particularly the Bulgars. The Tsarevitch was the patron. The list of the founders of the Committee included all the living Slavophils, of both currents—the romantic Panslavists and those we must henceforth call Panrussians. The significance of the junction of these two currents cannot be missed. This date may in fact be taken as a convenient dividing line between the earlier theoretical, romantic, Muscovite Slavophilism, best represented by the poet Chomyakov, the two Kireyevskys, Samarin and Konstantin Aksakov, and the later political Panslavism which should properly be called Panrussism.[19]

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[14] *Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov v jego pismakh* I, ii (Moscow, 1889), 154-55, 160. I am indebted to Professor Leonid I. Strakhovsky for this quotation.

[15] von Schelting, A., *op. cit.*, p. 147ff.

[16] Denis, Edouard, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche* II (Paris, 1903), 353ff.; Tobolka, *op. cit.*, I, 187ff.

[17] See chapter VI, "Polonia farà da se (1857-1863)" of W. Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilungen (1795-1914)*, (Berlin, 1917). This German work is not identical with the previously noticed Polish work of the same author

[18] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 367ff.; cf. also B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 1937), p. 60ff.

[19] Beneš, *Úvahy o Slovanství* (Prague, 1947), p. 79ff. C. Quénet, *Tchaadaev* etc., p.

Theoretical Slavophilism was influenced by poorly understood western 175
thought—Rousseau, Hegel, and Fichte—into paths of unrealistic and un- 186
historical grotesquerie and then grafted onto Uvarov's threefold motto of 668
nationality, orthodoxy and autocracy.[20]

It is a simple axiom of diplomatic history that a great and powerful 829
state does not interest itself "benevolently" in other and lesser peoples unless it either needs their help or hopes to profit from that "benevolence." The change in the momentum of Russian Slavophilism in the late fifties of the nineteenth century clearly illustrates this axiom. Before 1855 Russia was too strong to need the support or loyalty of the western Slavs, and her leadership reasoned that her strength lay in the centralized autocratic system. As the system was regarded as good *per se* it was proper to support it elsewhere, in Prussia, in the Hapsburg Empire and, with qualifications, even in Turkey. But the Crimean War revealed considerable weaknesses in her state structure, and Vienna's affections had shifted to the enemies of Russia. Under these circumstances help, psychological at least, was welcome. Panslavism, it was obviously reasoned, might actually have its points, particularly since most of the western Slavs were in the Hapsburg Empire anyway, and a little discreet discontent there might pay diplomatic dividends. This period is thus a decisive period in the history of the theatrical property known as Panslavism.[21]

The Benevolent Committee actively wooed the South Slavs with appeals to their Orthodoxy, developing the thesis that West and East were irrevocably separate, that Slav, Eastern and Orthodox were and of right ought to be synonymous with Russia. Then came the January 1863 revolution of the Poles, put down by the butcher Muraviev with brutal ruthlessness. The Benevolent Slavic Committee was able to convince Russian opinion that it was all the Poles' fault, that their Catholicism blinded them to the truth of their Slavic heritage and made them guilty of the "great betrayal,"[22] but after Muraviev the western and southern Slavs were farther than ever from accepting the doctrines of Muscovite Slavophilism.[23]

408, would call this movement "the second slavophilism." See also M. Prelog, *Pout Slovanu do Moskvy r. 1867* (Prague, 1951), p. 4.

[20] See T. G. Masaryk, *Rusko a Evropa* I (Prague, 1930), 406ff. The English edition, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1919), was based on the German text which Masaryk revised for the 1930 Czech edition.

[21] P. N. Milioukov has a chapter in his *Le Mouvement intellectuel russe* (Paris, 1918) p. 377ff., entitled "La décomposition du slavophilisme" in which his explanation of the processes of Russian thought from *ca.* 1848 to the publication of Danilevsky's *Russland und Europa* is treated mystically. Any resemblance between his discussion and the realities of Russia's changed position in European politics after 1855-56 is not even coincidental.

[22] Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[23] Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen*, p. 223ff., and contemporary literature there cited.

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175 Among the South Slavs a considerable element of enlightened opinion,
186 particularly the younger generation,[24] supported the Polish revolutionaries,
and among the leaders there was much openly pro-British and anti-Russian
668 expression. Nevertheless the dominant sentiment, both among Serbs and
● 829 Croats in the 'sixties was one of nationalist aspirations and, as between
other Slavic peoples, benevolent neutrality.[25]

Palacký remarked in 1863 that "Russian Tsardom was not based on Slavic principles but upon an amalgam of Mongolian and German principles."[26] The fact that European opinion had largely turned against Russia finally came home to many of the Russian Slavophils and a natural desire to repair the damage by allaying the suspicions of non-Russian Slavs soon made its appearance. In line with this feeling the Slavic Committee and the recently founded (1863) Society of Friends of the Natural Sciences projected an Ethnographic Congress to meet in Moscow in the summer of 1867.[27] Invitations were broadcast to learned societies throughout the Slavic world. Between the invitation in 1866 and the following summer several events transpired to give the Congress more potential significance. Austria had lost another war—this time to Prussia—and, within the Empire, the Compromise *(Ausgleich)* which divided the Empire into two parts, Hungary and Austria, had become law. The Slavs of the Empire were thus not only split, but put under their enemies, Magyars and Germans. Their long-standing aspirations for an equal share in a federative Empire were roughly dashed.[28] The outlook was black for the western Slavic peoples and it is not surprising that, with the exception of the Poles, the invitations to the Ethnographic Congress at Moscow were eagerly accepted.

In the meantime Ivan Aksakov, enthusiastic over the implications of the visit of so many leading personalities among the western Slavs to the Congress, constituted himself the propagandist of the Exposition, and many editorials in his journal *Den*, beginning with February 1867, concerned the Slav question. He emphasized the bonds between the Russians and other Slavic peoples, and expressed confidence that they had only to know each other to reject foreign, non-Slav control and join forces with their motherland.[29] His line was followed by most of the Moscow journalists. 175

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[24] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

[25] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

[26] Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis* (Prague, 1872), p. 26, quoting himself in 1863.

[27] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 27ff.

[28] Louis Léger recounts the opinion he met on a trip among the South Slavs in 1868, when their participation and hopes in the Moscow Congress were frankly explained to him. See his *Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), p. 232ff., reprinted from *La revue moderne* of April, 1868.

In Prague the *Národní Noviny*, the organ of the Young Czech party, 186 avowed openly the political aims in the minds of the Czech representatives: 829 668

> "We make not effort to conceal the fact that the Moscow Exhibition has for us who are going not only philological or ethnographic interest, but a significance deeply political. We are not responsible for that significance; rather those who have inaugurated dualism in Austria and have endangered the independence of the Czech crown and even of the Czech people... those who have turned the Slovak nation over to the mercies of the Magyars, those finally who are recklessly sacrificing the heroic Croatian people to the greed of the Magyar magnates."[30]

The majority of the Czech delegates, though men of intellectual and often scientific attainments, were yet men active in political life. The delegates of the South Slavs were exclusively non-political. Bishop Strossmayer and Franji Rački, who were especially invited, did not join the delegation, though the Bishop gave the expedition his active support. Ljudevit Gaj, the leading Croat nationalist journalist, went to Moscow, but was unaccountably quiet.[31]

In the realization that the Poles would not be represented, Palacký and Rieger were anxious to show their consideration of Polish sensitiveness and went to Paris to explain their reasons for making the trip when the Poles refused to go. Prince Adam Czartoryski and Andrew Zamojski urged the Czechs not to go, and the son of Adam Mickiewicz wrote them an impassioned letter begging them not to attend the Congress. Another special delegation of representative Polish emigrés waited on them to the same intent.[32]

Opened by the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich on April 23, the Congress was ostensibly an academic and scientific meeting, but railway passes had been given the foreign guests. The western Slavs, on their way to the Congress, crossed the Russian frontier at Granice (i. e. in Polish Silesia) on May 16 and on the 20th reached St. Petersburg.[33] On the way receptions and entertainment were provided by a number of municipalities, though the government took no official action in the matter. Enthusiasm was unbounded. The Czechs and the Serbs were received by Gorchakov

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[29] Aksakov, I. S., *Slavyanskii vopros* (Moscow, 1886), pp. 117-122.

[30] *Národní Noviny*, 1867, no. 11, quoted by Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[31] Fric, J. W., *Die Kehrseite der slavischen Wallfahrt nach Russland* (Prague, 1867), *passim*.

[32] A considerable literature has accumulated on Gaj's trip and activities. See Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 43ff. and literature there cited.

[33] Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 68ff.

175 in separate audiences and greeted with honeyed and unintelligible words. 186 The Tsar received 20 of the leaders of the various delegations in Tsarskoe Selo on May 26. He is reported to have said to them: "May God hearken 829 soon to all your prayers," a hope which thus relieved the Tsar of any 668 further need for action or hearkening. But he called them his "blood brothers here on native Slav soil" and thereby caused a sensation in western Slav capitals.[34] There were copious banquets and eloquent speeches by learned professors and publicists that left no room for doubt that the messianic hope of close Slavic collaboration was well on the way to realization.[35] They were so busy collaborating that there was barely time to visit the elaborate ethnographic and archeological exhibits for which the Congress had been called. The ghost of absent Poland did discreetly appear at several of the more formal occasions, but it was almost dispelled by confident and urbane diplomacy, which naturally deceived no one. The meeting made a deep impression upon everyone present. The Benevolent Committee was profusely congratulated for its felicitous initiative. But very few felt that much had been accomplished. Gorchakov apologetically stayed aloof, save to opine that the Czechs were apparently working for the King of Prussia. General Peter Šuvalov acidly remarked that the pilgrims were pursuing a phantom, and the Austrian minister, Revertera, was told that the Russian court regarded the whole spectacle as foolish.[36] In the western Slavic press reports were, in a slight majority, critical and skeptical. The Moscow Congress may have been the high point in public tribute to the numerous concepts in the center and at the periphery of Slavophilism, but it left much disillusionment in its wake. The Poles were disgruntled at the Czechs for participating against their expressed wishes. The Austrian government had, or affected to have, more than grave doubts of the sincerity of the Czech leaders in their devotion to Austro-Slavism, and even the Catholic clergy saw in the expedition a leaning to Orthodoxy and a defection from Catholicism. Within the Austrian Empire the large Slavic public had lost confidence in the political sagacity of their leaders. There was, of course, after the Congress, not the slightest trace of implementation of all the high-sounding resolutions calling for increased cultural reciprocity between the general Slavic peoples.

About 1870 the vaguely variegated sensitivities and aspirations focussing around the two general concepts of Slavism and Russian expansionism began to coalesce and crystallize. In that year there appeared a small book by General Rostislav A. Fadeyev under the title: *Thoughts on the Eastern Question.*[37] It had passed the censor in 1869. Fadeyev, as a soldier, was primarily interested in strengthening Russia's strategic position and in pointing the way to achieving her natural strategic aims—the control of the Straits. To him the Hapsburg Empire was the principal enemy, and not England and France. As the peoples of the polyglot Empire were mostly Slav, Russia should obviously take them under her wing, and eventually head an all-Slav state. This was Panslavism, clearly put, for Russia's political benefit.

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[34] Kazbunda, K., *Pouť Čechů do Moskvy 1867 a rakouská diplomacie* (Prague, 1924), p. 63, and M. D. Miličević, Etnografska izložba a slovenska sastanak u Moskvi 1867 (Belgrade, 1884), p. 18ff.

[35] The classically bitter report on the Congress is that by Julian Klaczko, "Le Congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste" in *Revue des deux mondes* LXI (1867), 132-181. Klaczko, a native of Wilno, had been the editor of the Paris *Wiadomości Polskie*, which ceased publication in 1861. A much more valid short account is that of Louis Léger in *Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), pp. 211-249.

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A much more radical and thorough treatment appeared by separate chapters in the periodical *Tsarja* in 1869 and, revised, in book form in 1871: Nikolai J. Danilevski's *Russia and Europe.* He was a trained botanist and geographer, and his broad approach covered questions of race, religion, climate, politics, and strategy. Because of its thoroughness and easily comprehensible conclusions, it became immediately the Bible of Panslavism.[38] Danilevski posited a deep-rooted antagonism between West, that is the Latin and the German, Catholicism and Protestantism, commercialism and pointless diversity, and East, that is the Slav, the orthodox and the ordered universal. Russia had a destiny to realize. She should save the smaller and weaker Slavic peoples from the curse of europeanization. The Poles had indeed gone farthest in that sinister direction, hence the great tension between Russia and the Poles. In their case Russia had had to be severe, but it was properly not with their Slavic nature but with its europeanized, Catholic perversion. The Poles should realize that Russia had had to discipline them for their own salvation. To Danilevski Panslavism, so far as it was good, was Panrussism.

It would be difficult to say which of these two works, Fadeyev on the Eastern Question or Danilevski's *Russia and Europe* had the more in-

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[36] Revertera, on the other hand, had been instructed by Beust in May to give the whole matter no unnecessary notice. The two governments affected not to count it as of any political significance. See Kazbunda, *Pouť Čechů do Moskvy,* p. 57. Revertera was recalled the next year by Beust and the Tsar told his successor, Albin Vetsera, that he disliked the whole incident and regretted that it had occurred. "Russia is large enough for me; I want nothing from my neighbor" and disavowed any slightest desire to enitce away from the Emperor any of his Slav subjects. See Kazbunda, *op. cit.,* p. 121f.

[37] English translation by T. Michell (London, 1871), *Opinion on the Eastern Question.* See also Fischel, *op. cit.,* p. 400ff.

[38] German translation by Karl Nötzel (Berlin, 1920), somewhat abridged, *Russland und Europa.* See further Beneš, *Úvahy,* pp. 98-107, and the recent study of Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa,* where the focus is on the relation of Danilevski to the church. On p. 238 he calls Danilevski "der eigentliche Systematiker der panslavistischen Weltanschauung."

176 fluence. Their arguments were so dynamic in their implications that together they are a landmark in European psycho-political history. Panruss- 186 ism now had a divinely appointed mission and a program for political im- 829 plementation.[39] Those whose interests lay in cultural exchange with their 668 western Slav brothers no longer felt unsupported, and those who had before been politically Pan-Russian could not rejoice in the moral support of the intelligentsia. It was a perfect coalescence of ideals and interests. There is no wonder that Gorchakov, the foreign minister, felt very gratified about the jelling of enlightened public opinion. He had shared the distrust felt by the court at cultural Slavophilism, so vocal at the Moscow Congress. It implied equality among the various Slavic peoples. Russian policy would be much happier if Russia's "leadership" and of course "benevolent" hegemony were generally accepted. It is hardly necessary to mention that the acceptance of Russian Orthodoxy—no longer Greek Orthodoxy—was by now assumed as a *sine qua non* of the whole Slavic program. It is not difficult to see how the atmosphere created by the wide circulation of these two sensational books may have convinced Gorchakov and the court that Ignatyev's reports and suggestions from Constantinople correctly represented the proper policy to be pursued—at least in the interests of Russia.[40] We are here far removed from any semblance of the Panslav sentiments of Kollár, or the Austro-Slavism of the Prague Congress of 1848 or even from the implications of Slav cultural reciprocity, so fervently expressed by most of the leaders at the Moscow Congress of 1867. We are dealing with realistic political opportunism which makes use of the slogans and stage illusions evoked by romantic or even philosophical Panslavism. Gorchakov and Ignatyev and certainly—and indeed avowedly—Fadeyev, were quite aware of the political semantics fluttering around the words Slavophilism, Panslavism, Slavic solidarity. The fact that the words sent shivers up and down the spines of western diplomats and at the same time thrilled the Russian people and some western Slavs could only please the anti-western party at the Tsar's court.

In 1874 an Archeological Congress was held in Kiev, under the auspices of the Moscow Archeological Society. It was sparsely attended by non-Russian Slavs, about a dozen in all, out of a total of 206 delegates. Several unpleasant incidents at this Congress showed that the resentments and tensions between, particularly, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, were

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[39] See Lednicki, *art. cit.*, p. 845ff., and Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 73ff. Feldman, *op. cit.*, says bluntly: "Unter den Russen vollzieht sich nach dem Jahre 1870 eine Umwandlung der alten slavophilenBewegung in einen selbstbewussten politischen Imperialismus."

[40] On Ignatyev see Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 73ff., and his article in *Slavic Review* XI (1932), 343- , 569-

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deep and lasting. Slavic solidarity was certainly not advanced by this meeting.[41] 175
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It is true that the Bulgarian atrocities precipitated a resurgence, in 8029
Russia herself, of the emotional index of the Panslav idea, but basic polit- 668
ical realities were not thereby at stake. The participation of Russian soldiers as volunteers in the Serbian army could not obscure the fact that Russia already saw clearly that Turkey was no longer a major antagonist. Indeed the Balkan wars of 1876-78 were only an incident which, if anything, confirmed the political Panslavists (*lege* Panrussians) of the necessity to consolidate their political program and its psychological and moral bases for use in a coming struggle with enemies much stronger than the Ottoman Empire. The Russian campaign of 1877-78 could have been lifted bodily from Fadeyev or Danilevski.

The fact that Gorchakov and Ignatyev had to retire from public life after the Treaty of Berlin has several interesting if not ironic aspects. What must have played a large part in their downfall was the fact that their aggressive Panslavism or Pan-Russism or Russian nationalism had gained less for Russia at Berlin than was popularly expected.[42] Yet they themselves, and here lies the irony, were substantially responsible for inducing Russian opinion to expect so much. The significant fact is the generality of the adoption of the Russian nationalistic thesis, and, in retrospect, the large-scale perversion of the thesis of Slav reciprocity. What, less than a half century before, seen from Paris or London, had been a cloud, small as a man's hand, on the eastern horizon, now seemed a swirling thunderhead, about to loose a torrent and a tempest. This menace bore the label Panslavism. No wonder the west shivered at the word. Yet it was by this time in no sense Panslav but pure Russian expansionism.

It would be of interest to examine the trends of thought among the western Slavs in these years. It was among them that the ideas of Slav reciprocity had first arisen. The great Croat leader, Bishop Strossmayer, had not modified his stand in favor of a South Slav federation and cultural reciprocity with the lands of Orthodoxy. Professor Jaroslav Jagić and George Daničić, the renowned South Slav philologists, both advocated a union of the Croats, Serbs and Bulgars. Nowhere among these leaders do we detect any desire to join a larger Slavic world led by Russia, or any urge to make Orthodoxy the common Slav faith.[43] Their insistence on their cultural and political independence constitutes an emphatic rejection of the

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[41] Léger, *Le Panslavisme . .*, pp. 242-249. Léger was present at the Congress.

[42] Gorchakov's last years have been frequently discussed. See in brief B. Nolde, *L'Alliance franco-russe* (Paris, 1936), pp. 199ff. and 209ff.

[43] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 347ff.; see also R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London, 1911), p. 126ff.

175 so-called Panslavism emanating from Moscow in these decades. The fact
186 that, under Magyar rule, any move by South Slavs or Slovaks to cultivate
● 829 their native language or culture was proceeded against as "Panslavism"
and conseqently regarded as high treason[44] is obviously irrelevant, because
668 erroneous in its factual bases. Palacký in his *Politisches Vermächtnis* observed that he had come to the conclusion that a Russian universal monarchy would mean "violent compulsion, absolute subjugation and enslavement of all civilized Europe, the suppression and suffocation of every free and noble thought and aspiration of the human race." He added that he thought that the enlightened minds of Russia would likewise regard the expansion of Russia westward as a misfortune.[45] He might not have counted Dostoyevski among the enlightened minds of Russia.

The Poles, crushed between Russian and Prussian calculated oppression, sought solace from their dire despair in their own literature and art. It was all that was left them. Memories of the Russian soldiery of Muraviev certainly estopped any warmth of feeling toward the Slavs they knew the most about from personal experience.[46] The less they had to do with the Russians the better. Orthodoxy was Russian and therefore they clung to their Roman Catholicism with deepening gratitude. The Poles were grateful also to Austria for the relative freedom they enjoyed in Cracow and Galicia, and used it to fortify their nationalism in literature and science.[47]

By the end of the century, whether because of absorption into a more potent and definitely programmatic Russian expansionism, or because its vagaries had repelled the western and more rational Slavs, or because the anti-Panslav campaign from Berlin, Paris and London had been effective, or because Russian imperialism was not too successful, the Panslavism of the Prague Congress of 1848, of the Moscow Slavophils, or the Moscow Congress of 1867 or even of Ignatyev, was dead. It might be more exact to say that the ghost had been laid.

The subsidence of the noble sentiments of Slavic reciprocity, of "interslavism," did not mean, however, that the scarecrow of Panslavism was not still usable. Eduard Beneš recently put these developments in urbane terms:

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[44] Cf. the Vakanović memorandum of 1872, quoted by Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis* p. 13; cf. also Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 353f. It would appear that the Magyars were the most consistently fervent believers in Panslavism. At any rate they thought every Slovak was a Panslav. The record contains many instances of such fantasy almost too ludicrous to believe. The most fantastic aspect of this complex is its literal truth. See, e. g. Thomas Capek, *The Slovaks of Hungary: Slavs and Panslavism* (New York, 1906), pp. 47-52.

[45] *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

[46] Kucharzewski, Jan, *Origins of Modern Russia* (New York, 1948), p. 349ff.

[47] Chlebowski, Bronislas, *La litterature polonaise au XIXe siecle* (Paris, 1933), chs. XXVIII and XXIX; and see Feldman, *op. cit.*, chapter IX, "Aufleben der Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen im Zusammenhange mit modernen sozialen Ideen."

"Panslavism then, up to 1905, solved no question fully, it failed to attain 175
its aims, and could not be transferred into the field of politics in any con- 186
crete form. Finally it became a synonym for Tsarist Russian nationalism and 829
as such, in the form of a political doctrine, could only be prejudicial to all 668
concerned: to the Russians, to the other Slavs, to Europe and to the world. It was harmful to the Slavs because, above and beyond the fact that it was in political fact in great measure a fantasy, it was used and misused against them by their opponents to such an extent that not only the Magyars and the Germans but all of western Europe saw in it a real danger and frequently, because of it, opposed them even where the Slavs were in the right. Against us Czechoslovaks it was for instance used during the first world war and here and there one heard echoes of it even during the second."[48]

The year 1905 brought a marked change, not only in Russia's external prestige and her internal constitutional structure, but also in the attitude of the western and southern Slavs toward the whole question of their own future and the relations between them and Tsarist Russia. Whereas for over a half century, since at least the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848, they had consciously or unconsciously looked to powerful Russia for moral or physical support, now, that Russia had been militarily humbled and they found their own strength growing and their interests in their western connections in a more satisfactory perspective, the prospect of a future independent of Russia was not unpleasing. The vestiges of admiration for Russia that remained clouded but did not basically alter the vision of the future that opened out before them.

As for the Poles, who had never accepted the thesis of Russian leadership, the harsh campaign for russification under Alexander III only increased their hatred of everything Russia stood for and their determination to maintain their separate polonism.[49] Among the Czechs and the Slovaks the "realism" of Masaryk, by which he had meant simply that they should trust in their own moral strength and the logic of national development in order to win out over an already corrupt, artificial and doomed monarchy, had made much headway and was destined to capture the dominant place in the people's thought. The South Slavs had not forgotten the disillusionment brought by the Congress of Berlin and had quickly adjusted themselves to the thesis that they should and could make substantial gains in cultural and political autonomy on their own initiative in the Balkan ambit.[50] The coup of 1903 in Belgrade furthermore opened vistas of actual independence from the Hapsburg monarchy. All the western Slavs had sensed vividly for a full quarter century that Russia had been increasingly

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[48] Beneš, *Úvahy o Slovanství*, p. 127f.

[49] Cf. M. Zdziechowski, *Wpływy rosyjskie na duszę polską* (Cracow, 1920), p. 35ff.

[50] Cf. E. Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (Paris, 1920), p. 121ff.

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disinterested, indeed bored, with them and their problems. What fleeting political *rapprochements* took place at top levels did not touch real public opinion save to confirm the general belief that arrangements between dynasts, foreign ministers and such like were cynical and opportunistic. In this case at least it would have been difficult to prove this instinctive judgment erroneous.

On a basis of these psycho-political developments among the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and along her borders the decade between 1905 and the outbreak of the war of 1914 witnessed the rise to dominance of what is usually described as Neo-Slavism.[51] The leading and best known exponent and expositor of this short-lived but significant movement was the Czech politician, Dr. Karel Kramář. The essence of this movement, fundamentally indigenous and unconnected with Russia or the accidental fact that Russia was largely Slavic, was an effort to counterweight Central Europe and the Balkans against the aggressive expansion of Germany in every field of political, economic and social life in that area. Seeing that Austria-Hungary was weakening in the face of the steady pressure from the north, the Neo-Slavs even advocated support of the Empire on condition that it be federalized. If Austria-Hungary could be weaned away from Germany and the Triple Alliance broken up, Russia and Austria-Hungary could draw closer together. Pan-Germanism would then be blocked and the western Slavs could move and have their being in this larger atmosphere. Along these lines there was even, *mirabile dictu*, talk of a Polish-Russian *rapprochement*. Late in 1905 Swiatkowski, an energetic Russian journalist, proclaimed that the German danger made Slavic cooperation absolutely necessary,[52] and he proceeded to beat the drums for a broad-gauged campaign to bring it about—among the Sokols, in the press, by congresses, by cultural and social relations on every level. He envisaged a political union of some sort, but specifically an economic and customs union to which the non-Slavic states of Central Europe should also be invited. In the next two years the idea grew that it was time for all the Slavs to get together again, as in 1848 and 1867, to further their mutual interests. The leader of the movement in Russia was Lt. Gen. Volodimirov, whose recent retirement left him with time on his hands. He enlisted some publicists and men of letters of a poetic cast of mind, travelled to Warsaw, Cracow and Prague, where he found other optimists.

The second Slavic Congress of Prague, which met in July, 1908, was the result of this agitation. It was attended by represenatives of most, though

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[51] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 134ff. The most complete discussion of this movement is the collaborative work, *Slovanstvo. Obraz jeho minulosti a přítomnosti* (Prague, 1912), with a foreword by Dr. Kramář.

[52] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 507f.

175 not all, of the Slavic peoples in Russia, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire
186 and the Balkans.[53] The slogans were unity, solidarity, reciprocity, equality
668 and unification, though few if any of the delegates knew precisely what
● 829 they meant. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Polish delegation, ostentatiously shook hands with Krasowski, the head of the Russian delegation,[54] and the whole Congress echoed for days with the miracle that had been wrought. It all sounded like the ominous approach of peace and good will. But the fact is that the whole idea behind the Congress was based on a completely untenable assumption: that the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary did not conflict.[55] It can only be charitably said that the organizers of the Congress had, in a greater degree and with even less excuse than their predecessors of 1848 and 1867, failed to think through their program, its logic and its practicability. Questions which the literate man on the street in Prague, Belgrade or Warsaw knew had to be faced either did not appear on the agenda or were greeted by bland smiles and silence. Two further facts highlight the absurdity of the meeting. The old Panrussians, now benignly veneered with liberalism, were in control of the Russian delegation and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that all their vocal support of the new Slavism was utterly cynical. Neo-Slavism in general and the Prague Congress in particular never aroused any enthusiasm among the Serbs. Roman Dmowski told Beneš in 1917 that his aims at the Congress of 1908 were solely the independence of Poland, and in no sense Slav.[56]

The roseate aura of Slavic amity and hope engendered by the Congress lasted less than three months. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and the hopes of the western Slavs for an acceptable *modus vivendi* within the then political framework were rudely dashed. The next year it became evident that the promises made to the Poles in Russia in 1905 of modest recognition of their nationalistic feelings were valueless and that reaction was again in the saddle in St. Petersburg.[57]

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[53] Léger, *Le Pansalvisme . . .*, p. 271ff.; Beneš, *op. cit.*, 139ff. A rich source of documentation is the printed (but not published) record of the trial of Kramář, Alois Rašín, V. Červinka and Josef Zamazal, which went on from Dec. 6, 1915, to June 3, 1916. Letters, documents and testimony of all sorts on the whole movement, including the various congresses, are printed *in extenso*. See further Paul Milyukov, "World War and Slavonic Policy" in *Slavonic Review* VI (1927-28), 268-290, particularly interesting in its critique of Kramář's ideas and Beneš' opposition to them.

[54] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 149. Dmowski published this same year his *Niemcy, Rosja i Kwestja Polska* (Lwów) in which he argued that Poland's principal enemy was Germany and that it was to the interest of the Poles and the other western Slavs to support Russia.

[55] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 155f.

[56] Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 154f.

[57] One of the resolutions passed at the Prague congress to which most weight was

175 Yet there were still pleasantly optimistic souls among the Slavic in-
156 tellectuals. Another Congress was called for Sofia in 1910. It makes even
829 more fantastic reading than those that preceded it. Dr. Kramář was fre-
668 quently eloquent. No Pole was present as a delegate. The Russian delegation was almost exclusively conservative. No Ukrainian representative came and the Bulgarian Tsar was ostentatiously absent from Sofia during the Congress. This was the last Slavic Congress before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914.[68] Almost everybody save the leading Czech slavophil Dr. Kramář left Sofia fully aware that he had witnessed the *rigor mortis* of an ailing phantom—indeed a cooling thought. The Neo-Slav movement had had a short life and an inglorious end. If it accomplished anything it proved that Slavism as a gospel, so long at least as there was an Austro-Hungarian Empire, had insufficient grounding in the tissues of international relations to have the slightest influence upon the trend of events in Central and Eastern Europe.

It is a commonplace among German historians and analysts of the origins of the first world war that it was essentially a defensive struggle by Germandom against Slavdom. Bethmann-Hollweg made the statement early, and so weighty a study as Fischel's *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* is avowedly devoted to this thesis. But it will hardly bear careful examination. There were Germans on one side—there was a majority of Slavs on the other. But that is more accidental than essential. Along with many Slavic-German issues there was in fact a greater number of issues completely unrelated to the Slavic-German question which in the inevitable logic of history would have had to be decided completely regardless of ethnics and culture. After the war, out of which arose three new or revised west Slavic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the principal inter-Slav questions were solved and there was hardly a whisper of Panslavism. Bolshevik Russia, emphasizing its multinationality and its supranational foundations, in the early years at least, had no interest in Slavic countries *per se,* and Panslavism, Slavophilism, Neo-Slavism and even Pan-Russism became historical curiosities, objects of antiquarian research.

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attached was to the effect that St. Petersburg should be the meeting place of the next Pan-Slav conference the following year. Léger (*op. cit.*, p. 278) says: "l'on se sépara en se donnant rendez-vous pour l'année suivante à St. Petersbourg. Ce rendez-vous ne devait pas se réaliser." S. B. Fay, *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1929), 401, and B. E. Schmitt, *Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 248, mention the congress in the summer of 1909 and the circular letter sent to Slav organizations in the Balkans. The contradiction is only apparent. There was such a conference and such a secret circular, but very few South Slavs attended the meeting. See dispatch from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (German chargé d'affaires in Vienna) to Bethmann-Hollweg of July 25, 1909, in *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, 844f.

[68] See the *Kramář-Prozess*, pp. 402-407, for interesting sidelights on the meeting.

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This should cause no surprise. Whenever in the past these national groups had existed as independent states there had not been any discernible urge for exceptional collaboration on a basis of their consanguinity. They had pursued their particular needs, in the same way as France, Italy and Spain, also related by history, language, religion and ethnic bonds, had, throughout their history, tended toward particularism and strenuously rejected any centripetal pressures. It would seem reasonable to allow Slavic peoples to act according to a pattern assumed to be rational and even enlightened farther west.

The Little Enente was, quite accidentally, two-thirds Slav. Its collapse was precipitated by the early defection of Yugoslavia, one of the Slav thirds. The Balkan Entente followed no noticeable Slavic pattern.

The aggressive war of 1939 was variously advertised. It was directed against any people that objected to being nazified, Slav, Teuton, Baltic or Latin. The fourth partition of Poland, shared in equally by Russia and Germany, made it abundantly clear that it was not a war against Bolshevism or of German against Slav. It would have been difficult to arouse among western Slavs any enthusiasm for the Slav idea from August 23, 1939 to June 22, 1941.

At this point it is possible to draw some deductions from the history of the variations in Slav feeling. The sense of Slavic community weakened, or perhaps more accurately shuffled into the unrealistic or academic empyrean, in times of peace. Under stress and strain or in times of crisis Slavophilism became again, with the limitations of the moment, an active force.[59] But all wars, the ultimate in national interest, have acted as rapid solvents of these fond dreams. This failure of the idea to stand any real test will explain why we use the term phantom or illusion of the whole concept.

From 1941 on one heard much of Slavic solidarity. There were All-Slav congresses at Moscow in August 1941, April 1942 and May 1943. The Russian speakers emphatically repudiated the political Panslavism and Pan-Russism of the nineteenth century and appealed "for the union of all Slav strength in the struggle against Hitlerism."[60] There was to be a unity of equals with equals, all bound together in a happy family of democratic peoples. Thereafter Slavic committees sprang up and Slavic congresses were held in London, Detroit and Pittsburgh, and in 1945 and following years, in Sofia, Belgrade, Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw. The themes of all these meetings followed the same lines: rejoicing in new Slav unity

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[59] Cf. A. Mousset, *Le Monde Slave* (2nd. ed., Paris, 1947), p. 385.

[60] Vl. Osmanin, Secretary of All Slav Committee, in May, 1943, quoted by Mousset *op. cit.*

175 under the leadership of Soviet Russia. Whereas the pre-1914 congresses
186 were usually gatherings of professors and publicists, and the realist poli-
629 ticians generally abstained, the post-1941 gatherings were almost exclu-
668 sively made up of politicians and poets. The trained professorate was in
a noticeable minority. It would perhaps be superfluous to quote many of these political leaders on the subject of Slav unity, but it would not be difficult to discover a marvelous, perhaps inspired, unanimity.

There were numerous speeches in all the western Slav capitals which emphasized "the Slavic bloc, directed by the great Russian people"[61] "for the protection of their freedom and democracy."[62] There is no room for question as to what was meant. The signing of every new treaty, of commerce, mutual defense or cultural friendship, was accompanied by headlines, radio propaganda and ministerial banquets, in all of which inter-Slavic devotion was lauded with profound conviction. Ceremonial visits of chiefs of state were exchanged, there were many elaborate parades and happy reunions. In between, naturally, there were visits to Moscow. M. Georgiev, the Bulgarian President, remarked, on landing in Moscow on Jan. 7, 1946: "I am happy to be in the fortress of the Slavic peoples which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of all democratic humanity." M. Vishinsky then visited Sofia.

The years 1946 and 1947 brought electoral and diplomatic victories to Russia. As all the Slavs were now safely enjoying their Slavic solidarity, it was no longer necessary to emphasize Slavism. Marxian Socialism was a more comprehensive concept into which Magyars, Rumanians, Austrians, Germans and Balts could conveniently be made to fit. We have therefore to remark upon the relative silence of western Slavic spokesmen on the subject of Slavic solidarity in the years 1947 and 1948. That stage illusion was no longer necessary, at least in so urgent a fashion as before. On the other hand it would be incorrect to say that it had been completely withdrawn from circulation. The enforcement of Russian language instruction in the schools, the extended tours of Russian artists, authors, scientists and athletes throughout all the Slavic countries, the dominant place in areas of cultural expression, education, science, press, radio, screen and stage, given to the products of Russia, all reveal the underlying plan. It should not be overlooked, furthermore, that the Orthodox Church has, with the support of the Kremlin, been incorporated into the program of implementation of the plan with considerable success in at least Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine. Whereas under Tsarist rule the trilogy of

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[61] Quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p. 257, from Zdeněk Nejedlý, Czechoslovak Minister of Education.

[62] Nikolov, President of Slav Committee, at Sofia, quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p 262f.

175 nationalism, orthodoxy and autocracy was the slogan reserved for Russia
herself, one is justified in remarking that Russian nationalism has now be-
186 come Slavic nationalism or Slavic unity, Orthodoxy is being encouraged
829 outside Russia, and of autocracy throughout the western Slavic states there
668 appears to be quite adequate evidence. We have, on the other hand, little
positive proof that thus far the various Slavic peoples love each other more than they did, say in 1860, 1890 or 1935. Titoism rather speaks for itself, and the great popularity of Gomulka in Poland would indicate, if there were any need, the continuity of Polish separatism from time immemorial. A thousand years of determined and consistent western orientation and nationalism are not obliterated in a decade of government by loud speakers, force and fear.

As we look back over the last century of Slav thought, interaction and political mutuality, several broad lines of change strike our notice. In 1848 Slavophil enthusiasm stemmed mostly from within the polyglot Hapsburg monarchy. A century later, not only has this Empire, officially a bulwark of Germanism with all its westward leanings, disappeared, but its place and much more has been taken by the heirs of the Tsars. In 1848 Slavic thought was largely centered on cultural and moral reciprocity. A century later the Slavic nations, under the direction of Russia (excepting, for the moment, Yugoslavia), constitute a solid and ruthlessly integrated political, economic and military unity, more tightly welded with each passing day. But nothing seemed more sure, and indeed necessary, in 1848 than the Hapsburg Empire. Yet that imperial idea was in actuality soon after 1848 rejected by those who had theretofore felt it to be necessary. Under similar circumstances there is every reason to think that the present, stronger than imperial, concept will be rejected. Of their own volition the western Slavs have never in their long history shown any general desire to become part of an inclusive Slav empire. They have at various times experienced the imperial idea only to repudiate it. Nor, in spite of present conditions, is there any evidence that the people of these nations have lost their historic particularism. All the verifiable evidence is in the opposite direction. These peoples have lived long and are wise from bitter experience, a teacher whose lessons last longer than those of ministers of propaganda. Nowhere is the common man more anxious to claim citizenship of the world than in Central Europe, where the western Slavs for much more than this past century have been exposed to the repeated appearances of, only to reject, the phantom of Panslavism.

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186* 178 than that of France, Germany or England. And even the Serbs and Bulgars, while they were affected by Russian influence, yet preferred to go to Western Europe in quest of models for their civilisation and institutions.

Moreover, when their political interests were at variance, the Slavs did not hesitate to make war on each other. Not until the last World War were they to be found in the same camp, during a European conflagration.

That was what gave the Soviet Union an ideal pretext for posing as the animator and leader of Slav solidarity—considered, not as an end in itself, but as the means of creating, in the Slav masses, a wave of feeling favourable to Russian imperialism.

Whilst reviving historical memories well calculated to exalt Russian patriotism, the Moscow Government organised Slav congresses, with united resistance to German oppression as their chief theme: upon the Soviet Union had devolved the role of liberator of the Slavs.

That, again, was only a diplomatic move. Panslav propaganda was the rule from 1942 to 1945. Then Moscow perceived the danger attendant on maintaining a scale of preferential treatment among the various peoples placed under Soviet influence—some of which, such as Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Germany had, in the course of their history, lived in a state of permanent hostility to the Slavs. 'Panslav' slogans disappeared from official oratory. And the 'Titoist' diversion, setting Belgrade in opposition both to Moscow and to Sofia, once more broke Slav solidarity.

[829] With the exception of Poland, all the Slav peoples had desired greatness for Russia, but within certain limits: that of their own independence. When, from being a liberator, Russia became a dominator, the notion of Slav solidarity was purged of its political content, and the ties binding the countries of Eastern Europe to Moscow then depended entirely on Marx-Leninist unity.

[656] The Slav peoples saw the Russians at work in their own countries, replacing the *mystique* of emancipation by a policy of assimilation and force. The progress of 'Titoism' in Bulgaria and in Czechoslovakia is really nothing but a manifestation of the old Slav individualism, rising once more against imperialist hegemonies.

Chapter One

SLAVISM MENACES THE WEST

178 THE collapse of Germany inaugurated a revolutionary era in Europe. In the political domain, it was the prelude to transfers of strength whose full consequences cannot yet be gauged, although we can say definitely that it is the Slavs—and primarily the Russians—who will benefit by them.

[162] In this connection, the war has simply hastened a process to which a relentless impulse had already been given by the demographic rhythm of modern Europe. To-day, out of every three Europeans, one is a Slav. In three-quarters of a century from now, with the differing birth-rates in Western and in Eastern Europe, we shall find this ratio reversed.

563 [161] On the eve of the war, our continent had 454,400,000 inhabitants. The Slavs numbered 145,072,000, distributed as follows: Poland, 27,181,000; Czechoslovakia, 13,611,000; Yugoslavia, 12,017,000; Bulgaria (a Slavicised rather than a Slav country), 6,080,000; Great Russia, 55,548,000; Little Russia, 27,664,000; White Russia, 4,204,000.[1] It should be mentioned, in passing, that Russia, which common opinion (by metonymy) considers as the 'Slav country' *par excellence*, is on the contrary the only one which, within its State frontiers, includes at least an equal proportion of inhabitants of other races. For this reason it is also, whatever its political structure, the country where the national problem is at least easily reducible to a concept of ethnical homogeneity. It is as well not to forget this.

As far as any biological factor can do so, this prospect of demographic superiority in Europe gives stability and solidity to the political advantages which the Slavonic world may derive from the collapse of its age-long enemy—Germanism.

563 • 829 We shall use the term 'Slavonic world' or 'Slavonic community', rather than 'Slavonic race'. It was at the time when science was abandoning its convictions regarding race-discrimina-

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[161] [1] Between 1930 and 1939 the population of Russia rose from 158 to 192 million, i.e. an annual increase of 3,700,000 persons—which constitutes a world record.

563 •829 144 tion that Hitlerite Germany adopted this discrimination as a creed. We have seen whither this folly led. A less dangerous, but more general, illusion leads historians to falsify the time-perspectives of the events they record by giving to the words 'national conscience' a racial import which is, more often than not, simply a gross anachronism. The most one can concede is that 'race' intervened as a disturbing element in international life at a time when the latter had, to all appearances, lost its homogeneity and its original authentication marks. The case of the Slavs is, in this respect, irrefutably eloquent. If we accept what the learned Genevan anthropologist, Professor Eugène Pittard,[2] has written, we lack precise information, and even clarity, regarding the original populations of the Slav countries; the data are too scanty for us to write their history on an anthropological basis and to establish definite relationships. Great Russians, White Russians and Little Russians present rather widely differing morphological characteristics. Neither does the Polish nation constitute a pure race. The Czechs of Bohemia and those of Moravia cannot be placed on the same level as the Russians and the Poles; on the other hand, Lusatians, Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks *do* seem to be the offshoots of one single ethnical stock. According to M. Pittard, the Slovenes would appear to be only Slavicised; a large proportion of them can be attached to the Adriatic or Dinaric race. The Croats and the Serbs used to form one single group; many of them must belong to this same Dinaric race: they are, again, Slavicised people, anthropologically far removed from the Slavs of the North, that is to say, of the districts today considered as the most specifically Slavonic. The same can probably be said of the Bosnians and the Montenegrins. The Bulgars do not represent a pure race, and different origins are attributed to them: Thracian, Tartar, and others; they too are Slavicised. In short, and without forgetting the reserves with which M. Pittard surrounds conclusions which he is very careful not to put forward as final—the Slavs of the South are probably not related to the Slavs of the North, and the identity of race of the former is apparently itself unconfirmed. Comparing this picture with the emotive manifestations of Slavonic solidarity which

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[2] *Les Races et l'Histoire*, in the collection "L'Evolution de l'Humanité," pp. 273 *sqq*.

Europe has witnessed during the past century, one is tempted to 563
wonder whether the modern nations are not groups of human 829•
beings, mainly united by a common illusion as to their origins 144
and an identical aversion to their neighbours.

But history is often only a distortion of the legend concerning 000
the lives of nations. It matters comparatively little if scholars criticise and refute theories which human societies, wittingly or otherwise, have turned into living realities. Up to the sixteenth century the French believed in their Trojan origin, and even today they place an exaggerated faith in their 'Latinity'.

Consequently, as far as the Slavonic community is concerned, we will keep to the idea of it which is held by its component nations, without discussing its basis. Now it is evident that the feeling of this community, existing in embryo in former centuries, has gone on intensifying during the past hundred years, and to-day constitutes a fundamental factor in European life.

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'The first nation to impose its virile will on the invaders, and decree the destruction of the enemy, was a Slavonic nation', said the German novelist, Heinrich Mann, in a letter he addressed to the Association of Soviet Authors, in May, 1942. It was, indeed, the Russian armies which, at the cost of never-to-be-forgotten steadfastness and unheard-of sacrifices, annihilated the most formidable military organisation the world has ever seen.

This victory represents more than the physical balance-sheet of a trial of strength, the settlement of an account, outstanding for a thousand years, between two nations. Regarded from the angle of European destinies, it is an event of quite different magnitude. It is the prelude to a reintegration of the Slavonic world, hitherto split up among the powers and interests which
speculated on its division. For a century, the Western Chan- 186×
celleries used and abused the word 'Panslavism'. We shall 829
see, later, what to think of this word, which is unknown in the 648
Russian language. But it was nothing more than a diplomatic slogan, a scarecrow utilised by the Habsburg monarchy in times of crisis, with a view to mobilising the West against Tsarist diplomacy. It is only today that we can speak of a Slav

186* solidarity capable of disturbing the balance of power in Europe. ● 829 And even so, we have to give an objective definition of this 648 solidarity—a task rendered difficult by the traditional prejudices, the historical misinterpretations which, in the minds of many Westerners, have falsified the laws and motives which govern the expansion of Slavism.

563 829 No need to go far afield to see the effects of this ignorance of Slavonic realities, even when it is not reinforced by a feeling of animosity. In witness, I will simply cite this passage from a speech pronounced in the Tribunal of the French Senate on May 4, 1933, by the Chairman of the Committee for the Budget on Foreign Affairs:—

> 'That is a point to be noted, *viz.*, the awakening of the Slavonic race. . . . The objection is raised that Rumania is not essentially Slavonic; agreed. But there is Poland, there are the Baltic States, and, farther off still, the wholly Slavonic U.S.S.R., which is, so to speak, the mother of all the Slavonic nations of Central and Eastern Europe'.[3]

These few sentences, from the mouth of an authoritative speaker, contain as many errors as there are words. Rumania is not Slavonic, either essentially or in appearance. Still less the Baltic States. Far from being entirely Slavonic, the Soviet Union is hardly more than fifty per cent so. As for considering it the original habitation of the Slavonic tribes of Central and Eastern Europe, to do this is to settle, with an enviable assurance, a problem whose solution the most eminent ethnologists are still seeking.

Such was, however, the idea current in our official circles, on the eve of this War, concerning one of the determining factors of European peace.

186* 829 208 Even so, the honourable Parliamentarian who pronounced these gross untruths before his colleagues of the Senate was not prompted by malevolence when he spoke of an awakening of the Slavonic nations. This was not always the case with our journalists and their supporters. It would be possible to compile an anthology of ill-disposed or apprehensive judgements on the Slavonic world, from the pens of French intellectuals, or of men responsible for pronouncements on foreign policy. Is it necessary

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[3] *Journal Officiel* of May 5 (1933), p. 791, col. 1.

to add that, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century up 186*
to the Sarajevo outrage, Slavonic problems were localised in the 829 •
Balkans, and that this did not help to facilitate their under- 208
standing, nor to procure for them an impartial judgement?

European 'volcano,' or 'rheumatism,' 'nest of vipers'—day in, day out, metaphors such as these flowed from the pens of our propagandists and diplomats when they were reviewing Balkan politics, because they were not prepared to admit that the crises in which these politics involved Europe were simply the repercussions of rivalry and scheming among the Great Powers.

If we leave diplomatic and political circles and pass to the public at large, we find that the word 'Slav' aroused more distrust than curiosity. For some people, it smacked of Nihilism or of Revolution; for others (forgetting that more than a quarter of the Slavonic world is Catholic) it held a menace to the unity of the Church. Slav refugees had fought on all the barricades during the nineteenth century; their names figured largely in the police alien records. In short, this word 'Slavism' suggested a set of psychological characteristics, rather than a geographical or national reality, and these characteristics—or their interpretation—made up a picture which the average Frenchman did not find very reassuring for Latin civilisation.

Whereas the political world adopted the caricature of Slavism outlined by the diplomats of the Ballplatz, the intellectual world, in its turn, often fell under German influence when
dealing with the problems of Slavonic life. There was, in France, [814]
especially after 1870, a brilliant school of Slavicisers, who had studied the question on the spot. But for a long time it was restricted to a small number of enthusiasts, who lacked a sufficiently numerous audience to popularise their teaching.

Moreover, the early history of this teaching was unfortunate. 186*
The first holder of the Chair 'of Slavonic Language and 558
Literature' at the *Collège de France* was Poland's most celebrated poet, Adam Mickiewicz. He was denounced to the Senate as a 'Panslavist'—a vague, but serious offence. For the time being, a well-chosen plural was sufficient to remove this offence: the chair changed its title and became the 'Chair of Languages and Literatures of Slavonic Origin'. Later on, however, Mickiewicz, accused of exaggerated mysticism and eccentricity, was obliged to give up lecturing altogether. The fate

that 'The floating soul of Russia drifts about among all philoso- 186*
phies and errors'. He thought he was speaking as a Cartesian 538
and a Catholic. But he added that this soul was redeemed by charity, humility, and that preoccupation with the universal mystery which haunts Dostoyevsky's heroes. He introduced *The Idiot* as a sort of clinical novel, the reading of which would be more beneficial to doctors and psychiatrists than to scholars. On the contrary, Jules Lemaître maintained that, in the Russian authors, there was nothing we could not find in our own. No doubt his temperament, imbued with the clarity characteristic of Touraine, made him ill-prepared to explore the twilight regions, so attractive to Russian thought. Yet Lemaître was nearer the truth than de Vogüé, in feeling that Russian literature would not impose itself by its 'Dantesque' aspects but by its note of sincerity and by its more faithful rendering of human inconsequence.

But, while awaiting a balanced judgement, which was to come 538
only from the pen of André Gide, the picture of the Russian 829
nation which the French gathered from Dostoievsky's novels was in the form of a fresco of grimacing figures leaning over abysmal depths, and of this picture they retained only the disturbed or less desirable aspects. 'Russia, Sir', says Lebiadkin, one of Dostoievsky's heroes, 'is a freak of nature—nothing more'. The well-read Frenchman's judgement on Russia would have been quite different if our nineteenth century had made contact with that country through the medium of Pushkin instead of through Dostoievsky and Tolstoy. The work of Pushkin, the most national of the Russian poets, would have created heroic, romantic stereotypes, which would have appealed to the popular imagination more than the Nihilist gospel of Tolstoy or the anti-Westernism of Dostoievsky. The 'discovery' of Gorky, translations of whose works were first published by *Humanité Nouvelle* in 1899, emphasised the revolutionary aspect, the reflected glare of incendiarism, through which Russian thought appeared to us; 'right-thinking people', and the conventionalists, followed its intrusion with increasing anxiety; for them, Russian influence or Slav influence meant one and the same thing, the revival, through ideas, of the tendency to 'bogging' under which Asia had submerged medieval Europe.

Russian art, on the other hand, cast around the Eastern world 829

• 829 a nostalgic halo. It was no doubt the manifestation of Russian spiritual life which was responsible for the wildest craze in [535] France. At the beginning of this century, Serge Daghilev's ballets had a pronounced effect, not only on choreography, but [533] also on the decorative arts. Music and the dance were, for a decade or two, the messengers of Russian civilisation which met with the best reception. This means that they reached only an *élite*. Naturally, this is not the place to trace the history of the penetration of the Russian genius into France; we can only note those of its revelations in which, according to current opinion, a specifically Slavonic character could be recognised.

As for the political manifestations, they awakened more curiosity than understanding. The visit of the Russian sovereigns to Paris in 1896 aroused the enthusiasm of a crowd which seems to have seen mainly its exotic aspect. Amusing as it may seem, moreover, what little popularity Imperial Russia enjoyed in France was due to Jules Verne's novel, *Michel Strogoff*. An anthology could be made of the works of pure imagination which have moulded the images under which nations see each other. (*Carmen*, for instance, still sums up all that many French people know of Spain.) The figure which, to the Russians, has long represented the average Frenchman, is borrowed from the younger Dumas and from . . . Paul de Kock, whose novels enjoyed, in Russia, a vogue we have never suspected.

186* Of the other Slav countries—except Poland, the cult of which was kept alive by romanticism and sacred eloquence—we (knew practically nothing. It is in the *Intermédiaire des chercheurs et des curieux* that we find particulars of the two dynasties which disputed the throne in Serbia—just as though these were events taking place in the Antipodes! It was not only the political scene that Russia monopolised; her spiritual brilliance threw into the shade the other Slavonic peoples, whose aspirations—whose very existence even—were revealed to the average Frenchman by the 1914–1918 War. These peoples occupied an as yet unexplored suburb of Europe. To which of them did the famous 'Slavonic charm', discussed in French society, refer? Most certainly, not to the hard-working, rather reserved Czechs, nor to the Bulgars, distrustful and positive. Perhaps to a certain section of Polish society—but, more probably, to refugees who had long since lost all contact with their native soil.

Enamoured of simple concepts and inclined, from his own experience, to envisage nationality only within the framework of the State, the attention the Frenchman paid to the Slavonic element was never proportional to its importance. At a time when the eyes of the Slavonic peoples were turned towards Paris and they were considering our humanism as the complement of their own culture, we were paying scarcely more attention to the latter than to the civilisations of Central Asia. For us it was a distant, inconsistent world, turbulent and archaic, decked with charms and blemishes which it never really possessed. How were we to recognise, under this airy, fanciful image, lacking both geographical contours and historical dimensions, that Cinderella of Europe, whom a calvary of ten centuries' duration had not yet brought to emancipation, and for whom history had meant simply a regular recurrence of injustice and humiliation? Impossible to imagine a more complete misunderstanding between two Christian worlds, separated by a few hundred miles! 829

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Congresses and Assemblies of the time, void of ideas, and absurd'.[1]

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The poet and precursor of the Russian Slavophile current had been the Muscovite, Alexis Khomyakov, who was born in 1804, and died of cholera in 1860. Although a man of very wide and varied general culture (he invented a gun, and a new type of shell), he was deeply attached to national and religious traditions. Moving in literary and philosophical circles, which looked to the West for their standards, he felt a frenzied need for reaction. To the cosmopolitanism of ideas and to the philosophy of Schelling, with whom his contemporaries were infatuated, he opposed a new system, based on the obligation, for any nation wishing to attain its full development, to preserve its original atmosphere of faith, manners, and traditions. Thus, while the Czechs, the Croats, the Slovenes, had at first perceived in Slavism an instrument of joint solidarity and of liberation, Russia began by regarding it as a rampart against the intrusion of Western thought.

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The fundamental idea of the so-called Slavophile school was this: the West was in full decay; it was up to Russia to keep herself free of all contaminations, in order to play the regenerating role assigned to her by Providence. In the history of the universe, it was the destiny of each nation to realise one aspect of human genius and to carry this realisation to its point of perfection. Ancient Greece expressed plastic beauty, Rome's mission was to realise the conception of the State, and of Law. The Christian peoples of Western Europe had developed Rationalism and its applications to actual life by giving special prominence to individualist doctrines; witness Luther's doctrine, English political Liberalism, French equalitarianism.

The late-comers in history, Russia and the other Slavonic peoples, still had a decisive role to play in the evolution of humanity—to define the social value of love and brotherhood. The Slavonic race would find, in its mentality and institutions, the necessary conditions for fulfilling this mission. All it had to do was to foster and develop its original characteristics.

That was the psychological and providential aspect of the Slavophile thesis, in which we find unconscious reminiscences of

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[1] *Confession*, p. 105 *sqq*.

A folk-lore, and an historical myth, are not sufficient to create a community of political interests. Nor, even, is a 'Cultural Front'. As Pypine, a Russian Westernist, remarked: 'Before imposing a Slavonic civilisation, this would first have had to be created'. 186*

For, in Russia itself, there were two opposing currents regarding the problem of the destinies of the Slavonic world. One, with Tchadaiev, saw Russia's past merely as a chaos of historical misunderstandings, and events devoid of meaning. Such was the doctrine of the Westernists, whose chiefs, moving in aristocratic or liberal circles, considered Europeanism as the measure of good and evil. The other, with the Slavophile school, refused to acknowledge the European culture as universal, and maintained that the country's future lay entirely in the development of her own values. 181 829 ●

Between the two schools, Danilevsky, a biologist hostile to the Darwinian theories, about 1860 formulated the problem of the relations between 'Russia and Europe', with all its implications.

He began by stressing the anomaly represented by the notion of Europe—a survival of the *orbis romanus*. There was no real separation between the European and Asiatic continents; the Urals were not a frontier. Now the question of a distinction between Europe and Asia was of prime importance to Russia, placed as she was, like a hinge between these two worlds. 181 829 177

This distinction, although a geographical anachronism, nevertheless corresponded to indisputable facts in the domains of history and civilisation—facts which sufficed to demonstrate that Russia had no decisive bonds with Europe. Danilevsky summed them up as follows:—

The Romance and Germanic peoples had a certain number of features in common, none of which was found in Russia's past.

They divided up the heritage of the Roman Empire, in which Russia had no part.

They were influenced by Germanic institutions, around which crystallised the notion of the State. The West was the patrimony of the countries who succeeded to the Empire of Charlemagne. Now Russia remained outside this community, which the Middle Ages designated under the name of 'Christendom'.

181 Russia knew nothing of Feudalism. She remained aloof from
•829 the intellectual current which began with Scholasticism and
177 ended with scientific investigation. She was untouched by the
Reformation. Whenever she entered into conflict with the Holy See, it was simply as a foreign power.

In short, Russia did not belong to the European family. If she was connected with it, said Danilevsky, it was by adoption, in the manner of a wild stock, on which an exotic branch has been grafted.

781 But had not religion, at least, engendered a spiritual solidarity
829 between her and the West? Was not Orthodoxy a disruption of
771 the Christian community and had not six centuries of
Œcumenism forged indissoluble bonds between the Germano-Roman and the Slavo-Greek worlds?

No, replied Danilevsky. The Western Church was the triumph of Rationalism, differentiated by a positive sign among the Catholics, a negative one among the Protestants. Rome sacrificed internal to external unity, the Reformation sacrificed true liberty to the idea of external liberty. The Eastern Church was neither a system nor a hardened doctrine; it was all love and renunciation. Much more than dogmatic opposition was involved—these were two concepts of the spiritual life which were poles apart. That explained why the Orthodox Christians had come to regard Islam as the involuntary and unwitting saviour of Slavism. By tolerating independent churches under her sway, Islam protected them against the assimilating or unifying ascendency of Latin Catholicism. A Patriarch of Constantinople had said that *Providence had chosen the Osmanlis to defend Orthodoxy against the Western heresy.*

186* So that Russia, according to Danilevsky, saw in Europe
829 nothing to give her a feeling of historical or spiritual solidarity.
Such was, moreover, the point of view of the great Russian novelist, Dostoievsky; to show oneself a true Russian was, for him, *to place oneself on the battleground of all European hostilities.* It was to constitute a unity, not *in* Europe, but opposed to it.

The thesis of the biologist met that of the novelist. A harmful policy (said Danilevsky in his turn), during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, associated Russia with the European balance of power. Now this balance of power affected only the

heirs of Charlemagne. It had no meaning for Russians, who 186
must reject any permanent agreement with the States of the 829
Continent, and keep her hands free, paying no attention to the doctrines by which other governments are inspired.

These ideas found fuller development in the well-known speculations of the Slavophile schools on the decadence of the West. Each civilisation, said Danilevsky, slowly exhausted the sap which had nourished it. There was the time of flower and the time of fruit, and Europe had flowered two centuries ago. She had then passed her maturity, and could but degenerate—so the Russian nation had nothing to expect from her. History, added Danilevsky, showed that spiritual supremacy tends to function 'spirally'; to pass from one human group to another; China, India, Egypt, Greece . . . Europe's mission was completed, he concluded.

These long quotations were necessary, in order to establish the starting-point of the Slavophile movement, and its anti-European aspect, manifesting itself at the very time when one section of Russian thought, and the whole of the other Slavonic peoples, were expecting 'light' from the West alone.

The word 'Slavophile' itself, to designate this specific form [196]
of Russian nationalism, was originally a derogatory nickname, given to Chichkov and his partisans, who were taxed with Obscurantism. In fashionable society, it was always to have an unpleasant ring about it. When Dostoievsky makes the hero of his novel, *The Idiot,* enter a drawing-room, people excuse his strange behaviour by saying, 'He's a Slavophile, or something very like it, but not a dangerous case'.

This movement did not monopolise all the appeals to col- 186
laboration among Slavs. There existed a counterpart, of opposite 668
and revolutionary tendency. In the Polish section of the Congress of 1848, Bakunin had denounced the illusions fostered by Tsarist propaganda. 'I have no doubt they anticipate the time, in a distant, very far distant future, when all the Slavonic peoples will form part of the Russian Empire. Before that happens, all the Slavonic peoples will have fallen into decrepitude. . . . Without Russia, Slavonic unity is incomplete; without her, Slavonic strength is non-existent. But it would be madness to expect help for the Slavs and their salvation from contemporary Russia. . . . Be the liberators of the Russian people

186* 668 648 people, who protested vigorously against Kramár's attitude.

The latter alienated, in turn, the Croats and the Slovenes, by opposing 'Trialism'; in other words, the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia-Slavonia, considered as a step towards the transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy into an Austro-Hungarian-Jugoslav Triple Monarchy—a transformation which, by an entirely unsupported legend, was said to be favoured by Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian Empire. A memorable verbal passage of arms took place in the Reichsrat on this question, between Kramár and the Jugoslav deputy, Tresich Pavitchich. 'One is surprised', M. Benes was later on to say, 'to see how little effectiveness Neo-Slavism had, and how the governments concerned neglected to make use of it during the critical years between 1906 and 1914. This complete lack of influence was fully illustrated by the documents taken from the Foreign Affairs archives of the three Imperial powers'.

In any case, it is certain that the Czechs derived no benefit from it. In February, 1914, Scheiner, the President of the Czech Sokols, went to Russia to sound the intentions of officialdom. 'You are of no interest to us', said Sazonov. 'Do not count on us, you play no part in our plans of campaign'.

In Serbia, Russian Slavophilia found a very different climate in which to survive. The Jugoslav countries constituted an area in which Orthodox propaganda modified the interests of Tsarist 186* diplomacy. The latter, at the beginning of the century, con- •829 sidered the Poles as 'traitors', the Czechs as the fire-brands of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Slovaks, the Slovenes, and the Croats as the outposts of Papism. Out of the fifty million non-Russian Slavs, they were interested in only ten million—the Balkan Slavs. Indeed, the policy of the Romanovs considered the Balkan Peninsula as:—

(1) The approach which should, one fine day, enable Russia to make herself independent of the whim of the 'porter' of the Dardanelles.

(2) A field of competition with Austria-Hungary; in other words, the means of exerting counter-pressure on the Vienna Cabinet when the latter encouraged agitation on the borders of the Empire, in the form of Uniatism, Austro-Polonism, or Ukrainism.

(3) A basis of reaction against Western culture and the influence of Catholicism. 186* 829 •

(4) More generally, a card of introduction to main European politics.

To ensure for herself the mastery of the Balkan Peninsula, St. Petersburg played the Serbian and the Bulgarian cards alternately, without considering the emancipation movements in those two countries as anything more than a trump card for Russian diplomacy in its struggle with Austria. With naïve egoism, Tsarism looked upon the Orthodox Slavs as the natural defenders of its interests, even at the expense of their own!

186* 648 To tell the truth, none of these nations was blind to this political exploitation of a sentimental bond. In their collaboration with Russia they accepted what was capable of forwarding their aspirations but declined to play the rôle of clients. That explains the diplomatic games of general post in the Balkans. The end of last century saw the Serbs relying upon Austria against the Bulgarians backed by Russia; on the eve of the First World War, it was the reverse. Bismarck used to say, 'I am an Austrian in Belgrade, and a Russian in Sofia'. About 1890, the *Videlo*, a Serbian newspaper, expressed what many Balkan statesmen were thinking, but were careful not to admit: 'We have carefully studied the writings of the champions of the Slavonic idea in Russia and among the other Slav nations. These writings contain many phrases about the 'liberty' and the 'unity' of the Slavonic peoples. And amongst us there have been those who, in the inexperience of youth and the enthusiasm of poetry, have believed that Slavonic fraternity was a common temple, in which each of our peoples had the altar of its liberty. . . . The matter would not be very serious, if the Slavonic idea were merely a chimera, but, in actual fact, it is also the unexpected instrument which enables a powerful Slav State to oppress its 'brothers'. The weaker a nation is, the more removed from the form of a State, the more it is attached to the Slavonic idea. It is highly significant that the nation which is most faithful to this idea should also be the one which is the most isolated and the most powerless—the Slovak nation'.

186* 641 829 The movement of the nationalities was indeed drawing the Slavonic peoples towards far less abstract aims. The age of the bards and the philologists was over. They were no longer con-

186* 641 •829 cerned with taking the census of a common patrimony, but with working out their own destiny. It was the question of their future State, and of its frontiers, which demanded a solution, and was becoming yearly more imperative.

Now, if there were two ideas which were foreign to Russian Slavism, they were those two, State and frontiers. Born in an atmosphere of romanticism, the Slavophile school had no constructive views. The forces it had more or less unconsciously set in action were, above all, anti-State. The State meant Austria for the Czechs, Hungary for the Croats, Turkey for the Southern Serbs. And for the Poles it was Russia herself, or else Prussia.

As for what the possible frontiers of the liberated Slav States might one day be, Russian officialdom had not the slightest idea. In the *Memoirs* of President Masaryk, we read a suggestive anecdote. During the War he had a conversation with General Alexeiev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, regarding Russia's war aims. He was astounded to hear the general express the hope that the victory of the Allies would carry the Czechs to Fiume and the Serbs to Uzhorod (Carpatho-Ukraine). Seventy-five years of 'Slavonic fraternity' and Slavophile demonstrations culminated in the formulation of such an enormity!

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186* 829 648 Thus Tsarist Russia left the Balkan Slavs a joint heritage of good and bad memories. She had, by turns, favoured or restricted their emancipation, according to the state of her relations first with the Turks, then with the Central Empires.

The Bulgarians are commonly considered to have been her spoilt children. They speak, with tender recollection, of the 'Liberating Tsar', Alexander II, whose monument stands in front of the Parliament House in Sofia. In 1915, when Bulgaria went to war with Russia, his statue was veiled. But would the 'Great Bulgaria' (still-born of the Treaty of San Stefano) have satisfied the longings of the patriots? Would she not have been converted, by the Imperial diplomacy, into a 'Trans-Danubian Province', such as the Kaulbars government endeavoured to set up? The Russians, it is true, obtained from the Porte the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, which, freed from obedience to the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople,

favoured Bulgaria's Macedonian claim. Yet they refused to 186*
associate themselves with the efforts of the Serbian Government 329 •
to restore the former Patriarchate of Petch. But, if their prefer- 648
ence went to Bulgaria, it was because the latter was one day to open to them the route to Constantinople. So the realism of the Sofia Cabinet practised an intermittent Russophilia. Two-thirds of the governing classes of the Bulgarian nation were pupils of Russia, but their number also included some Russophobes—Stambulov, Marinov, Chanadiev (except at the end of his life), Radoslavov and his associates. The Slavonic idea found an indefatigable apostle in the person of Stevan Bobtchev, a volunteer of the 1877 War, a jurist, professor, and diplomat, who presided over the Slav Congress at Sofia in 1910, when the Neo-Slavism of Kramár and Miloukov triumphed. But currents of [578]
dissension appeared on various occasions, especially in the reactions in favour of Catholicism at the time of Marinov, and in the reminder of the Tartar or Finno-ugrian origins of the Bulgarian nation, every time they entered into conflict with Russia.

The Russophilia of the Serbs often took on the aspect of a quasi-religious veneration. But it did not cause them to forget that the Tsarist government had abandoned them on several occasions. Apart from the pro-Bulgarian attitude it maintained in the Macedonian question, it agreed to the annexation of Bosnia at the time of the Isvolsky-Aehrenthal interview in Buchlau (Sept. 16, 1908) and, later on, its ambassador, Benckendorff, signed the secret agreements in London (April 26, 1915) which, by ceding to Italy the eastern coasts of the Adriatic, bade fair to ruin the plans for Jugoslav unity.

Now this unity had been a fixed idea with all Serbian statesmen since the Battle of Sadowa, which had awakened as many hopes in Serbia as in Italy. As long ago as July 30, 1866, Garachanin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said to Botmiliau, France's representative in Belgrade, 'No matter what efforts diplomacy may make, in reality, the Austrian Empire no longer exists. Three nationalities will arise in its place, the Hungarian, Bohemian, and Slav (Yugoslav). Sooner or later, the Austrian Germans will join the other German peoples. . . . The Turkish Empire will fall, as the Austrian Empire has done. The Yugoslav State will be founded—not without warfare, perhaps, but it

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

186* 829 648 will be founded—because it is in the force of events, because the peoples long for it, because it is the best possible solution to the present difficulties, and because, if it were not founded, these countries would fall a sure prey to Russia; Panslavism would be established in their place'. These few sentences—prophetic ones, moreover—provide the clue to all Serbian diplomatic thought, whether declared or understood, up to the 1914 War. The majority of the statesmen in Belgrade were partisans of a Russophile policy, with the exception of the old-time Progressists, and even so, one of their leaders, Stefan Novakovich, kept his confidence in the Tsarist Government. But, with these men, a Russophile policy never meant a Russian policy. We shall have defined the historical 'Russophilia' of the Balkan States, if we say that it always postulated the greatness of Russia, and was bounded by the determination to eliminate that country from internal affairs of the Peninsula.

186* 829 795 Yugoslav Catholics were inclined to be prejudiced in favour of Russia; this was due, on the one hand, to their geographical situation, beyond the reach of Russian ambitions, and, on the other, to the fact that their Catholicism was much less exclusivist than that of Poland, for instance. No doubt this intellectual liberty must be attributed to an instinctive reaction against the policy of the Vatican, which was then axed on Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, on the two countries whose yoke the Yugoslavs aspired to shake off. The majority of the Croat and Slovene thinkers and poets of the nineteenth century were inspired by Slav traditions; the Illyrian movement was, in their countries, the starting-point [793] of the national Renaissance. But the role of the Catholic clergy in this renaissance, and its connections with Orthodox Russia, is certainly one of the most decisive manifestations of that 'Slavonic conscience' which the politicians of St. Petersburg believed to be the attribute of the Orthodox Slavs. In Slovenia the priest, Jean Krek, the instigator of the Co-operative movement, and later on, Abbé Anton Korochets; in Croatia Bishop Strossmayer and Canon Ratski, were not only apostles of Slav solidarity, they had frequent contacts with the Russians. Strossmayer, who was one of the contrivers of Yugoslav unity, had not only been one of the opponents of the Vatican Council; he protested vigorously against the Holy See's anti-Russian attitude at the time of the 1877 War.

Thus, at the beginning of this century, the Slavonic idea 186
had permeated all the currents of spiritual life of the nations 668
whose historic personality it exalted. In Russia, after having 178
arisen among the intellectual *élite,* it had been relegated to the rank of diplomatic accessories. But it had been rejuvenated by allying itself with Czech Agnosticism, with Croatian and Slovene Catholicism, with the positive sense of the Bulgars, the legendary spirit of independence of the Serbs. It had been an aspect, a 'phase' of the march of the nationalities towards emancipation. From the minutes of meetings of learned societies, it had advanced to the domain of direct action. After having taken stock (academically) of the injustices which formed landmarks in the history of the Slavonic world, it was preparing to achieve reparation for these injustices by conspiracies, acts of violence, war.

While Russia had given the emotional impetus to this movement, and the Czechs had demonstrated the educative elements in a Slavonic science and conscience, it was left to the Yugoslavs to set the ruthless pace which was to precipitate events. It was under their influence that Slavism entered upon its revolutionary phase. In Hungary it found the oppressive atmosphere which provoked this evolution; the beginning of the twentieth century is marked, in Croatia, by a series of trials and acts of violence which revealed to the world the progress of Yugoslav militancy. It was in fact in Bosnia, from a centre of Yugoslav irredentism, that sprang the spark which was to set the continent afire. Starting from the speculative heights of the learned world, the Slavonic idea culminated in shots, fired point blank, by a Herzegovine student, at the heir to the Austrian Empire, in a Sarajevo street. When the President of the Tribunal interrogated the authors of the crime as to the motives for their action, they repeated, with dogged fatalism, 'Francis Ferdinand was the enemy of the Slavs'.

Russian officialdom took fright at this effervescence. It 186*
sought excuses for its passive attitude. To explain why they 829 ●
had abandoned the Serbs at the time of the annexation of Bosnia- 648
Herzegovina, Stolypin stated that Imperial diplomacy had simply had an eye to the future. 'Give the peasants of Kostroma ten more years at the plough'. A second humiliation was inflicted on Russia in April, 1913, when, to please Austria, she

186* was obliged to join the European concert which forced
• 829 Montenegro to raise the siege of Scutari.

648 Russian society took no interest in these questions. Its members were frequently heard to say, 'God bless these "bratouchki"! Wouldn't it be better to live without them? Shan't we be happier when we have abandoned the Slavonic chimera and the dream of providential vocation, and think only of our own immediate interests?'

With the crisis of July, 1914, Russia was, for the third time, faced with the possibility of a renunciation. This time she pulled herself together. Austria was imposing on her a trial of strength in which her rank as a Great Power was at stake. On learning of the ultimatum from the Ballplatz to the Belgrade Cabinet, Nicholas II telegraphed to his minister, 'Tell the Serbs they can count on me'. With this historic sentence, another cycle in the history of the Slavonic world was closed.

186* In fact, under a common denominator of origin, of sufferings
578 and reflexes, the Slavonic peoples were inspired by different aims—independence, territorial expansion, and the acquisition of sovereign rights. Consequently, every event which brought them nearer to their respective goals had, as its first result, the relaxation or removal of their connecting bonds. It was the negative aspect of Slavism, which, having reached the stage of realisation, animated ideals which involved neither the same aims nor the same volitional power. This had been proved during the Balkan War of 1912–1913, when Serbs and Bulgarians fell upon each other, after having jointly waged war on the Turks. It was to be seen even more clearly during the World War of 1914–1918, when, some fighting under the flags of the Entente, others under those of the Central Empires, the Slavs exhausted each other in fratricidal conflict.

186* the Slavs were to split up between the two camps into which
578 Europe would be divided. So that, except in congresses, where
175 ethnography and philology were discussed, this solidarity remained a myth. Russian egoism bore heavily upon the little 'Pravoslav' countries, in which the Tsarist policy affected to take an interest. Much more than that; certain territories, caught between two Slavonic currents—such as Macedonia, the Ukrainian Marches, the Teschen district of Silesia—kept alive the spirit of dissidence within the Slavonic family.

175 What remained of von Moltke's declarations was the
167 obsession of an inevitable reckoning between the two races. Germany, who, from age to age, had extended her sphere of domination at the expense of the Slavs, dimly felt that, one fine day, the latter would grow tired of the role of 'fertilisers' (*Düngervolk*) to which the Pan-Germanic school condemned them. In Merovingian times, a slow but continuous migration, by easy stages, peopled the Eastern Teutonic states with Slavs. These tribes had reached the Elbe and the Oder by the fourth century. To designate the Teutonic peoples, they forged the collective appellation, *Niemtse,* which has remained in the modern vocabulary of the Slavonic peoples, and signifies 'dumb ones', *i.e.*, speaking a language unintelligible to Slavs. But, little by little, the ebb of the Teutonic tribes pushed them back. With the exception of a few descendants of the Pomeranians (the Kachoubes and the Slovinces) and of the Sorabes (Lusatians), the vast group of Western Slavs of the Elbe and the Baltic disappeared in the struggle waged against them by the Germans in the four centuries from the time of Charlemagne to the twelfth century.

829 This withdrawal is explained by the state of dissension—a
167 hereditary defect with the Slavs—in which these populations
181 lived. An Austrian historian of this century, J. Peisker,[1] was so struck by such a large-scale backward drive, that he sought a different explanation for it. The past, he said, shows such a succession of conquests, and establishments of Teutonism in Slavonic territory, that we cannot attribute it to the fortune of war. We are obliged to suppose the existence of some factor which paralysed the resistance of the Slavs. This factor must

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[1] *Die Alteren Beziehungen der Slawen zu Turkotataren und Germanien.* Berlin, 1905.

be sought in the most remote centuries, in the contact of the Slavs 829 •
with the Turanian peoples of the Steppes, who were the foundation 167
of the so-called 'Scythic' Iranian population. From time 181
immemorial, the Turko-tartar peoples, by their pillaging raids, have borne heavily on the Iranians, their immediate neighbours, and, through them, on the Slavonic peoples. The Iranians have been the victims of the Turkomans of the salt Steppes—and the Slavs, by repercussion, have shared their fate. Having thus exhausted their political and social strength, they have become the chronic prey of the conquerors.

This thesis of an original curse, whatever its scientific value, should be borne in mind, for it justifies a conviction that is widespread among the Germans, *viz.* the inferiority of the Slavonic race, and its presumed incapacity to develop from the notion of a clan to that of a State. There have been published anthologies of German thinkers and propagandists on this theme, which is summed up in the well-known witticism *Gute Nacht, Russen, nach Asien!*—which the Germans have invoked, even down to our own times, to justify considering Eastern Europe merely as a contemptible suburb of Teutonism.

Such is the background of history on which was projected 829
the 'reckoning' on which Bethmann-Hollweg and von Moltke 721
had banked. Must we, however, go so far as to say that the War 178
of 1914 was a Teuto-Slavonic war? M. Benes considers this thesis as attractive as it is untenable. He regards this war as a struggle between two political and philosophical conceptions, the logical development of the European evolution which, beginning at the Renaissance, culminated in the triumph of political individualism, of parliamentary and constitutional law. The war, he says, was not Teuto-Slavonic in character, nor in aims, nor in results.

Limited to the strict sequence of facts, this judgement is admissible. While Austria-Hungary threw herself into the war to prevent a rupture of her interior balance to the advantage of the Slavs, deeper and more decisive causes armed the Great Powers one against the other.

If, however, we consider the atmosphere that reigned in 186*
Europe in 1914, when the war found so many inflammable 721
substances in a state of suspense, M. Benes's point of view seems more contestable. The interests of the Slavs were neither

Anglo-Saxon, or Latin nations. The treaties of the earlier war 728
had thus sanctioned a traditional exclusiveness in this respect. 131

On the other hand, Slavism scored a point—the only one— 175
in an acquisition of territory. This was achieved by the clauses [186]
which allocated to the Czechs Sub-Carpathian Russia—an ethnical mosaic, with predominant Russian or Ukrainian elements, which was to form an autonomous unit within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic. This allocation, demanded by the Ruthenians of America, was decided upon chiefly because the signatories to the treaties considered the Prague government as the best mentor they could give to a dangerously backward Slavonic population. Indeed, Czechoslovakia was, within a few years, to improve Sub-Carpathia, that Cinderella of the Slavonic world; at the cost of heavy budgetary sacrifices, she turned this territory entrusted to her into a real 'Civilisation Front'.

As is well known, at the Peace Conference the Czecho- [563]
slovaks intervened—another gesture of pure Slavonic inspiration—to try to secure for the Serbs of Lusatia the benefit of the protection accorded to minorities. These Lusatians are the remnant of a powerful tribe who people a corner of Saxony and Brandenburg, with its centre at Bautzen. Theirs was for long the *terra incognita* of the Slavonic world; they were discovered by the learned circles of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the nineteenth century.

The return of Poland to an independent life, and the 648
Sovietisation of the Russian State, modified the nature of the 829 •
relations between the two peoples. Immediately after the earlier war and the Treaty of Riga, one could not say that these relations had been clarified. It is certain that the Government of Moscow was then pursuing a Eurasiatic policy, which drew it away from European affairs. But no one could imagine that this disinterestedness would last very long. In Moscow they still, as under the Tsars, spoke of the 'Jesuitism' and the 'Jagellonism' of the Poles; in Warsaw, they talked about the hegemonic appetite of Russia, and her propaganda. 'Atheism' and 'Marxism' had replaced 'Orthodoxy' and 'Panslavism' as pass-words.

The Polish-Sovietic War of 1920 complicated inter-Slav rela- 648
tions. The Poles bitterly reproached the Czechs with having refused 578

648 578 to allow the passage through their territory of reinforcements which the Poles were expecting from abroad. They complained no less bitterly at seeing the Czechs, like the Yugoslavs, model their attitude towards them on their own behaviour towards Moscow. It is true that Prague and Belgrade had enthusiastically greeted the resurrection of Poland, following the Allies' victory—a very different result from the changes in 1916, which, for the Poles, had substituted the duty to fight beside the Central Empires, for the right to do so. But in 1920, in these same capitals, they were wondering whether Poland was fighting Bolshevism or the Russian nation, and this differentiation, which inspired many newspapers, was regarded in Warsaw as definitely unfriendly. The ex-Minister of Poland in Yugoslavia, Erasmus Piltz, felt it necessary to address this warning to the Yugoslavs: 'Nothing separates us: on the contrary, everything unites us. . . . There is not a Pole who does not consider the alliance with Yugoslavia as a most highly fruitful and desirable achievement. But, if one of the most popular Serbian propagandists does not hesitate to claim that Polish-Yugoslav relations must depend on our relations with Russia, then I feel I may say, without fear of contradiction, that no Polish government, no Polish party, will accept such reservations, or such a presentation of the question'.

The leader-writer of *Przeglad Wisczorny* mournfully summed-up the origins of this misunderstanding: 'In Warsaw, we have been in the habit of viewing Serbia through Viennese or Budapest spectacles, whilst the Serbs have observed us through Russian spectacles. And the result is that each side has a false picture of the other'.[3]

[829] Finally, a conception of their own greatness, dear to the Poles, helped to foster a feeling of friction between them and the sister nations, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—which the Poles considered as being on a lower hierarchical plane than themselves—for were they not a Great Power? Perhaps we shall not be far wrong in affirming that between the two wars the Poles maintained more regular, if not more cordial, relations with the Rumanians and the Hungarians than with the other Slavonic states.

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[3] Of May 22, 1920.

Nothing is more interesting, more decisive perhaps, for the 186*
history of Slavism than to recall the attitude adopted by the 829 •
Czechs and the Yugoslavs respectively with regard to Russia, 648
immediately after the establishment of Bolshevism.

The Yugoslavs maintained an unshakeable fidelity to the Russian nation. In Belgrade the state of things arising from the 1919–1920 treaties was considered somewhat precarious, owing to Russia's non-participation in these treaties. It was not that the Government welcomed the coming of the Soviets. The hailing of Trotsky by their representative, Spalaïkovich, with the words: 'I spit in your face!' shows the hostility felt, and that hostility was fomented and kept alive by grievances of a dynastic order. But, side by side with this official behaviour, there were numerous manifestations which revealed the instinctive repugnance of Yugoslav opinion to allow the Russian people to suffer the consequences of being black-listed. The Belgrade Government was obliged to take this into account; they bluntly rejected the requests of the Great Allies, who were pressing them to co-operate in Wrangel's campaign against the Red Army. These negotiations and the support given by the Entente to Poland against the Russians, aroused, in part of the Yugoslav press,[4] reactions whose echo never reached France, but which were eminently symptomatic. 'Russia', declared the *Balkan,* 'whether she be Tsarist or Bolshevist, is for the Serbian people, for all Croats and Slovenes, "Holy Russia", the country of our Slav brothers. Where is the Serb who would raise his hand against a Russian soldier?' Or this, from *Progress*: 'It is clear that our future policy will be Slavonic. Russia will gradually abandon both extremes, and become a democratic State. This Russia will be the centre of the Slavonic world, and the Slavonic world will, in the future, make war impossible'. The same note was struck in Zagreb, where the newspaper *Rietch* raised its voice against the possibility of a clash between Russians and Yugoslavs. 'Our people have always believed in Russia. We believed in Tsarist Russia, we still believe in the Russia of today, not because she is Bolshevist, but simply because she is Russia. . . . The West has disappointed us, whereas the Russia of today seems to us more and more Slavonic. . . . We cannot have worse than what the West gave us'.

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[4] Of July 26 and 27, 1920.

186* 829 There was then, in Belgrade as well as in Zagreb, a passing attack of 'Ententophobia'. A Belgrade newspaper which enjoyed a certain authority in foreign policy, the *Epoha*,[5] declared: 'We must see things as they are, and not hide from ourselves the fact that events in Eastern Europe are of capital importance for us, at a time when our Western friends have completely abandoned us.[6] . . . If a fresh policy of eastward trend is to be automatically imposed on us tomorrow, as a logical result of our international situation, we fail to see why it would not be wiser to choose it today'.

186* 668 The semi-official (radical) press had to react in fairly stiff terms against these appeals for a change in foreign policy. The Serbian municipal elections and the constituent elections of 1920 brought appreciable gains to the Communists. The Government suppressed this movement by the 'Decree' of December 30, prohibiting all Communist organisations and activity. It is superfluous to add that they accused Moscow of fomenting this activity, and submitted any person or propaganda coming from Russia to a still more rigorous quarantine.

But they showed themselves no less unshakeably determined to refuse any assistance, direct or indirect, to anti-Sovietic action. They were to be the last Government to recognise the *de jure* independence of the Baltic States, in whose existence they saw an intolerable dismemberment of Russian power. They were to take part in the campaign of assistance organised at the time of the great famine in Russia, in 1921–1922. Inversely, at the time of the earthquake in Herzegovina and Dalmatia in 1927, they were to refuse all aid from abroad, except (out of a spirit of Slav solidarity) that of the Soviet Red Cross.

186* 829 It is true that they were to defer for a long time—until the eve of the Second World War—recognition of the Soviets. But, in the case of Yugoslavia as in that of Bulgaria, this negative attitude, on closer examination, will be seen to be an indirect homage to the sympathies which Russia enjoyed among the common people. In Belgrade, as in Sofia, it was feared that a Soviet mission would find, among the masses, a support which would be dangerous for the security of the régime. The truth is

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[5] Of July 26, 1920.

[6] Allusion to the attitude adopted by the Peace Conference in the Adriatic dispute and the reparations question.

that in neither of these capitals did they suspect that the big Slav 186*
brother would one day re-awaken from the dead, and become 829 •
once more a factor of prime importance in world politics.

Already, at the Genoa Conference, Chicherin and the Yugoslav 186*
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nintchich, had, unknown to 648
their colleagues, held conferences *in camera*, discussing the 829
international situation, not as plenipotentiaries, but, according to Chicherin's own expression, 'among Slavs'.

The question of official relations with Russia was brought forward for the first time in July, 1924, by the ephemeral government presided over by the democratic leader, Davidovich. In his ministerial declaration the latter alluded to the expediency of contact 'with Sister Russia' (*bratska Rusija*). But it was then only a pious hope. This question was complicated by the [563]
presence in Belgrade of a powerful 'white' emigration (to which Wrangel belonged),[7] and of a 'legation', directed by Strandtman (the former Chargé d'Affaires of Tsarist Russia), in his capacity as 'General Delegate of Russian Emigration'.

A few months later, on the orders of Moscow, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, Bessiedovsky, approached Simich, the Yugoslav Minister in that capital. These overtures seem to have been the result of the visit which Stiepan Radich, the Croat agrarian leader, made to Moscow during the summer of 1924. The Muscovites had visualised Radich as the possible artisan of a peasant revolution in Yugoslavia, but he disappointed them by his muddle-headed fluency of speech and his absence of positive views. They dubbed him a 'little Leftist Bourgeois, hopping all over the place'. Nor did they derive more benefit from the Simich-Bessiedovsky discussions, revived shortly afterwards by the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin with Balougdjich, the representative of Yugoslavia. Nothing came of these private talks. It needed the Hitlerian nightmare and the Czech drama to restore—too late—the official relations between Belgrade and Moscow to their historical setting.

On the Slavonic side Czechoslovakia was the State most 829
ready to give prompt recognition to the Soviet State. In this

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[7] Generals, Slavophiles, prelates like the ex-Metropolitan of Kiev, Mgr. Antoine, had fled to Belgrade, where rest the ashes of General Alexeiev and of Wrangel. Philosophers and scholars sought shelter, for preference, in Czechoslovakia.

• 829 connection, the Czech Government had to reckon with the influence of the Socialists, the sympathies brought back from Russia by numerous legionaries, the fact that the Russian emigration in Bohemia was composed of elements with much greater Leftist tendencies than those who had sought refuge in Yugoslavia, and, finally, the needs of a reviving industry in quest of external outlets.

829 648 But these influences were countered by the National-Democrat Party of Dr. Karel Kramár. The latter, married to a Russian, had preserved an inflexible attachment to Imperial Russia. He prevented the acceptance of the proposal for official recognition which had been suggested in the spring of 1922, at the time of the Genoa Conference, during an interview between Benes and Chicherin. On the other hand, economic relations between the two countries were multiplied, despite the ill-will of the Zivnostenska Banka, the banking stronghold of the Kramár Party, which controlled powerful undertakings.

186* 648 And now for the curious phenomenon which differentiates the evolution of Slavism among the *membra disjecta* of the former Austria-Hungary. Just as the Yugoslavs endeavoured to maintain, on a plane of Slav solidarity, their relations with a Russia whose régime their Government persisted in ignoring, so the Czechs endeavoured to clear of all Slavonic ideology the relations they sought to establish with that régime. 'Slavism', in Prague, still had a reactionary sound, whereas in Belgrade they maintained their faith in its emancipating virtue. The contradiction is worth pondering over.

186* 'The fact', says Masaryk, 'that the Slavonic peoples are henceforth liberated and are reorganising themselves politically, involves no increased influence for political Panslavism. Each Slavonic nation receives, in virtue of its liberation, a task which is proper to it and in whose realisation the other Slav states can only be of incidental assistance'. Analysing, with the serenity of the historian, the progress of the Slavonic idea through the centuries, Masaryk discovers in it no constructive virtue; it is a sentimental *leit-motiv* which, while it has inspired the poets with moving strains, has ceased to have any place in the political realities of international life. 'Czech civilisation is founded on the Reformation and on learning; the Yugoslav Messianists, too, are the product of the age of learning (*i.e.*, of the West); the

186* the immanence of the traditional values connected with the Slav ideology. M. Krofta, Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs for Czechoslovakia and intimate collaborator of Edward Benes, reviving the latter's ideas in articles published by the *Prager Presse* on May 6, 1933 and June 9, 1935, declares any positive action by the Slavonic peoples tending to a regroupment to be out of the question, 'unless it should be necessary for them to erect a wall of defence against foreign imperialism'.

186* 668 829 From Belgrade, a former minister and propagandist, M. Lazare Markovich, retorted with a certain vivacity. In his view, Slavism clung to its prospect of action. 'Our attachment to the Russian people and to Russia', he said, 'must positively exclude any intimate liaison between Yugoslavia and Germany. Hitler's speech of May 21, 1935 has so categorically stated Germany's attitude that there is no hope of any Russo-German agreement. . . . Unlike our Czech confrères, we do not hesitate to say that we ardently desire, and will work with all our strength to reconstitute in Europe, a Slav policy based on joint action by the Slavonic peoples'.[10]

So, while MM. Benes and Krofta considered any political construction of Slav solidarity as romantic and out-of-date, M. Markovich considered 'that there can be no real European entente without the participation of the Slavonic peoples, with Russia at the head'. And, when the Four-Party Pact was signed, M. Markovich advocated the drawing-up of a similar pact among Slavonic peoples, 'in order to place the latter on a footing of absolute parity with the Latins and the Teutons'.[11]

This controversy, perhaps, reflects less the opposition of two principles than the contrast between two temperaments, Czech realism and Yugoslav emotiveness. Events appear to have given the lie to M. Markovich's thesis (German-Yugoslav *rapprochement*, Moscow Pact). But what we must look at in international life is not the episodes, but the constants; is it not in forecasting the imminent that one runs the greatest risk of going astray?

186* The truth seems to us to lie between the two positions. Slavism is neither a force nor a leading principle of international

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[10] Lazare Markovich, *Yugoslavia's External Policy*, p. 343 *et seq.*; *Spirit of Belgrade* of May 14, 1933.

[11] *Spirit of Belgrade* of June 11, 1933.

Then there is the 'Balkan fact', with all that it implies of 186*
suspicion and particularities. It is commonly explained by the 133
geographic configuration of the Peninsula, furrowed by valleys 181
which have no inter-communication. No doubt the physical relief tends to perpetuate the clan spirit throughout all the various changes of sovereignty. But the ethnical variety does not give an exhaustive image of the Balkan mentality. Nor does the long practice of the *Divide ut imperes* principle, which was the Alpha and Omega of the Habsburg policy in the Balkans. These States, before becoming the successors to Austria-Hungary, were the heirs of Byzantium, and we may wonder whether the passion-charged atmosphere, the complex of distrust and turbulence which characterise them, are not a survival of Byzantine influence, in opposition to that Roman continuity and that tendency to universalism whose determining effects on Western civilisation have been analysed by Fustel de Coulanges, Dopsch and Pirenne.

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An event of incalculable significance for the Slavonic world 186*
occurred about the year 1933: the reappearance of Moscow on 829 •
the European diplomatic stage—coinciding, if not tallying, with 563
the rehabilitation by the Soviets of national values in Russian history.

In its critical years, the Bolshevist régime had relegated the racial idea to the status of romantic nonsense. 'Slavophilia', frowned upon as it was by the last Tsarist governments, still had about it an odour of reactionary and religious mysticism which would have been sufficient to keep it on the black-list, even had the idea of ethnical solidarity found a place in Marxist terminology. On the other hand, the policy of nationalities pursued by the U.S.S.R. had breathed new life into hitherto inorganic or unrecognised ethnical groups. In the time of the Tsars, who would have dreamed that Russia comprised no less than fifty nationalities or ethnical groups? It would have been ill-timed to give these people the impression that there existed in the U.S.S.R. a privileged race, whose traditions or ambitions dominated the life of the country, relegating the allogeneous republics to the condition of satellites. Decentralisation diluted Russian Slavism, and the plurality of tongues favoured by the Socialist Revolution deprived it of its trump card.

movement in favour of a Green International of Slavonic 186*
Peasants yet merits a place in the chronology of inter-Slav 668
relations.

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At the same period (June 4–8, 1924) a Congress of Slav 186
Geographers and Ethnologists was held in Prague. This 815
too, awakened aspirations, either latent or at least dormant since the era of the great assemblies of the nineteenth century. The very choice of Prague was a reminder that Bohemia had been the 'laboratory' of the Slavonic idea. And it was the occasion of a spectacular return of Bulgaria into the community of peoples inspired by that idea.

But, when the totalitarian States had proclaimed their intention 186*
of attacking the 1919–1920 treaties, it was once more to 829 •
Russia that all these peoples turned. From Moscow alone could come the watchword capable of rallying their energies—on condition that it should not look like an appeal to a Proletarian Dictatorship.

Just as the exaltation of Teutonism, in the first half of the nineteenth century, had had as a reaction the awakening of the Slav conscience, so the National-Socialist drive, a century later, was to bring in its wake a defensive reaction tending to align, if not to regroup, the Slavonic forces.

The essentially anti-Marxist notion of race had been repudiated by Lenin. In internal affairs, it could not but hinder the work of 'mixing' undertaken by the Moscow government. In foreign affairs it had no *raison d'être,* so long as Russian diplomacy practised a Eurasiatic policy, and guided the country's destinies towards the East. But, after fifteen years, the problem of the allogeneous inhabitants had passed the crisis. The Soviet régime was firmly established. German imperialism obliged them to turn their attention towards the West: the repetition of the recurrent drama of which Europe had been the theatre since the era of Wilhelm II once more reminded the Russian world of its destiny.

The first check to Hitlerian arrogance on the part of the 186*
Kremlin was the signing in London, on July 2, 3, and 4, 1933, 648
of agreements for the common acceptance of the definition of the 829
aggressor, as formulated by Nicholas Politis. The U.S.S.R. signature appears at the foot of this document, side by side with

186* those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—although the
648 two latter had not yet recognised the Soviets. The new under-
• 829 takings marked an advance on the part of Soviet Russia towards a policy of interest, if not of action, in Europe. Western opinion, then entirely occupied with the Economic Conference, gave the matter only casual attention; it did no more than manifest its satisfaction at seeing the question of Bessarabia disappear from the list of outstanding disputes. But the importance of the event lay elsewhere; it represented nothing less than an attempt to regroup forces in Eastern Europe. The territorial statute arising out of the treaties was consolidated by the backing of a power, the U.S.S.R., which hitherto had not been thought to be very favourable to it. Henceforth the Slavs of Central and Southern Europe felt morally obliged to consider recognising the Soviets. The defensive reflexes of the Slavonic instinct came
[665] into play. At the seventeenth Assembly of the Communist Party, in January, 1934—the first to take place after the offensive on the part of Russian diplomacy in Europe—Stalin declared: 'Some people think that war must be prepared by the *superior race, i.e.,* the Germanic race, against the *inferior races,* and, especially, against the Slavs . . .'. This language aroused a world of memories, and an ideology which was believed to have lapsed. It was understood far beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.

There was, however, one obstacle which prevented the Slavonic peoples from seeing in it more than a diplomatic gesture. They had hitherto looked to France for security guarantees. In Prague, as in Belgrade, they were anxious, at all costs, to prevent the development of a situation which might put the country under the obligation of choosing between Paris and Moscow. This was the constant, though unacknowledged, preoccupation of all the Little Entente Conferences. The policy of Louis Barthou, which prepared the way for a Franco-Sovietic *rapprochement,* did away with this possibility, and so the Czech Government recognised the Soviets on June 9, 1934. That summer of 1934 was a period of intense diplomatic activity for the Slavonic nations. In Bulgaria, on May 19, a *coup d'état* carried to power Kimon Gheorgiev with his National Union Cabinet. The first item on his programme was the *entente* with the Yugoslavs, the second the resumption of relations with the Soviets. It was on July 23 that the recognition was made official; it was the work

of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Batolov. 'A century-old 186*
friendship has existed between the Bulgarian and the Russian 648
peoples', declared the *Zaria*. 'Russia liberated the Bulgarian 829 •
people, and it is no fault of the Russian people that our country was split up. Bulgaria, like the Soviet Union, desires to develop in peace'. On September 3, Benes met Litvinov at Marianske Lazne (Marienbad). On September 27, the Yugoslav sovereigns paid an official visit to Sofia. King Alexander was to fall, twelve days later, shot down by an assassin. His death was not to interrupt the movement of attraction among the various Slavonic nations. It is true that any reference to racial affinities was still avoided. But there was no denying the evidence: it was chiefly the Slavs who were menaced by the Hitlerian expansion. In March, 1934, an article by von Papen lifted the veil of German foreign policy; it showed that the revision of the treaties, and the struggle against the Slavs, were still the basis of that policy. 'Nobody', remarked the *Slovenets* of Ljubljana, 'can henceforth believe that the Germans have in any way modified their opinion of the Slavs; the latter are still, in their eyes, a fallow territory, awaiting Germanic sowers and Germanic seed'.

This observation on the part of the Slovene newspaper turned up again, a few months later, in the mouth of Litvinov himself, who, addressing the Czechs on January 3, 1935, made use of a suggestive pretermission: 'I will not speak of the ties of race and of language which exist between the most important peoples of our Union and the Czechoslovak people. The reason I will not speak of them is that, in the past, these motives have more than once been exploited for imperialist ends, and further, even at the present time, racial theories sometimes serve to cover barbarian ideologies and régimes. Nevertheless, these affinities do exist . . .'.

Unexpected, and moderate as it was, this reminder of family ties had much greater resonance and efficacy than the 'Panslavism' of which the old diplomacies had made a bogy, although it was only an attempt at hierarchised solidarity between Slavs of the Orthodox Faith. For it was inspired neither by a spirit of conquest nor by a desire for hegemony, but by a doctrine of equilibrium. It contained at the same time more authority, and more disinterestedness.

That same year, 1935, saw the visit of Benes to Moscow (June 8–16) and the conclusion of a Soviet-Czech treaty, parallel

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• 829

with the Franco-Soviet treaty, and subject to the application of the latter. 'The Russian question', said the Czech statesman, 'will always play a large part in our destiny, if only on account of our geographical situation. That is why our conception of foreign policy will never be definitely elaborated until Russia has become an active factor in Central European politics'.

But, in Prague as in Moscow, scrupulous efforts were made to clear the new pact of any Slav ideology. The Czech newspapers insisted on the two events which had rendered possible the conclusion of this treaty—the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations, and the Franco-Soviet agreement, the beginning of a Paris-Prague-Moscow axis. They reminded their readers that, since the beginning of her history, the Czech nation had developed within the framework of the Western civilisation and had, in modern times, bound up its destiny with that of the democracies. 'Nothing inclines us' (said the *Lidove Noviny,* 'to a collaboration with the Soviets which recalls, even distantly, the old romantic Panslavism, the smug dream of the union of all Slavs and the naïve faith in the possibility of a common international policy, peculiar to all the Slavonic peoples, a specifically Slavonic policy, different from that of the non-Slavonic peoples, even directed against the latter'. At the other political extreme, the *Bohemia* affirmed that 'the new Paris-Prague-Moscow policy is European, and not Panslav'. All the newspapers agreed on this point. Would they have needed to be so insistent, had they not foreseen that Czech opinion would naturally be inclined to see in the pact a manifestation of Slav solidarity? When the Soviet journalists visited Czechoslovakia, they were shown round the whole country, except Sub-Carpathian Russia, where they would have found a population speaking Russian and using the same alphabet as they did. . . . Nothing bears more eloquent witness to the Slavophilia of the Czech people, than the care which their Government and their press took to forestall manifestations of it.

France, who had just made an advance in the direction of Moscow, took fright at her own audacity, and thereafter endeavoured to minimise the extent of the steps she had taken. The Yugoslav Minister in Paris, summoned before Pierre Laval, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, bore a note summarising the arguments which his Government opposed to immediate recognition of the Soviets. He expected a sort of ultimatum on the part of the Quay d'Orsay. How great was his surprise at not hearing, during his audience, any reference to the Franco-Soviet pact! On the point of taking leave of Laval, he ventured to congratulate the latter on the results of his journey to Moscow. Laval cut in: 'Don't talk of it! I wish I could cut off the hand that signed the pact. Take great care you don't do the same!' 186* 648 829 •

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But, still more than the Western policy of the Soviets, it was their work of 're-nationalisation' which impressed the Slavonic world. 186* 538 The brilliance with which the commemoration of the death of Pushkin was celebrated, in 1937, was the first manifestation of this 'Russian drive' abroad. No poet was more 'national' than Pushkin, despite his African blood. He re-created three centuries of Russian life in a profusion of dazzling images. He rendered, more expressively than any writer, the escapist fever of the men of his time and the nostalgic tonalities of the steppes of his country. Great Russian Literature begins with him, and one of his compatriots wrote: 'In Pushkin lies our whole patrimony'. The *Izvestia* declared that it was only with Sovietisation that the masses of the people got to know the true figure of the poet and the meaning of his work. This paper heaped scorn alike on the 'vulgar sociologists' who made of him a wild revolutionary, and the 'ignoramuses' who found nothing useful for Socialist culture in his poetry. And the Government had his works translated into all the languages of the Union.

The extent of this homage was a prelude to a general policy of rehabilitation of Russian values. In the first Bolshevist ideology, Russia was represented as the nonchalant and sub-lunary being typified by Oblomov, the dressing-gowned hero of a celebrated novel by Gontcharov. Oblomov is a sort of Russian 'Triplepatte',[*] incapable of taking any decision, and established in the lazy, useless life of a country proprietor. We may say in passing that this picture of the Russian people is not a very true one: it confuses the 'moon-struck' state with inertia. [157] Left to themselves, these people do sometimes lack application, or steadfastness, but if well directed, they are capable of prodigies of energy. For having dared to evoke this classical type, and the mentality to which it has given its name, 'oblomovtchina', Bukharin was accused of having borrowed 'a poisoned arrow

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[*] 'Triplepatte' is the hero of a comedy of the same name, by Tristan Bernard and André Godfernaux. (Trans. note.)

William II for never having acquired new lands in the east. 175
It was not, at that time, a question of fighting Communism, but 648
of 'living space'—a theory which, in Nazi ideology, was directed 721
at the States bordering Eastern Germany and, beyond them, the 'fabulous resources' (*unerhörte Möglichkeiten*) of the Ukraine. Once more the Teuton resumed his age-long vocation of 'consumer of Slavs'.

But, looking closer into the matter, this was not, any more 186*
than in 1914, the essential cause of the Pan-Germanic explosion. 829 •
Hitler's Germany was aiming higher, and farther. Actuated by 721
what she considered to be a prime necessity of her geographical situation and of her 'racial pre-eminence', she regarded herself as the providential elaborator of new syntheses calculated to regenerate the world—but which were, in reality, simply the oldest of hegemonic appetites. It was not upon the Slavs that she declared war; it was upon a form of civilisation made up of Humanism and Christianity which the centuries had identified with the habitable world. The Slavs were the first victims of the *Wehrmacht,* simply because they were considered to be the easiest obstacle to overcome, owing to the inferiority complex which, from time immemorial, the German school had attributed to them. Their geographical position condemned them to be the target for the first onslaught. But the Slavonic world was subjected to unprecedented trials in all the different phases of the war—Czech, Polish, Balkan, Russian. Therein lay the real, the only 'Slavonic' aspect of this war—the recurrence of the periodic catastrophe which crushes these nations as soon as Europe is unleashed against herself.

So March 15, 1939—the date of the occupation of Prague 186*
by Hitler's troops—aroused deep emotion among the Southern Slavs, who realised that the dyke which had hitherto held back the German drive on Eastern Europe had collapsed. There were manifestations of sympathy in Belgrade and in Sofia, especially among the students; messages flowed into Prague from all the Slavonic regions in the Balkans.

Germany herself seems to have had some obscure realisation of 186*
her crime. A curious article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of 829
April 23, 1939—an article whose author foresaw the opprobrium that this 'operation' was to cast upon his country—endeavoured to reconcile the policy of the 'Protectorate' of Bohemia with the

186* conceptions of romantic Germany, and with Herder's 'Slavophilia'. He made every effort to show that a nation's interest
• 829 does not necessarily lie in its elevation to the rank of a sovereign State, but that it may find its development in a subordination of national aspirations to political necessities. 'Geographical and historical facts, and political realities', he said, 'today play their part on an equal footing with the principle of nationalities'.

What the author meant by 'political realities' was to be judged in the light of the volleys of firing which mowed down the students of the University of Prague, guilty of having manifested their attachment to the Czech fatherland.

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175 The subsequent course of events is too recent to need recalling here. The whole edifice of guarantees, built up to support peace, collapsed like a house of cards; twenty years of vague conceptions of security were swallowed up into the abyss that was to engulf the ruins of a world built up by ten centuries of patience and human genius. The Pacts of the Little Entente, gradually voided of their contents,[1] remained inoperative; Article 16 of the Pact of the League of Nations—rendered optional at the request of Poland—did not have to be put into operation; the Polish-Soviet Pact of non-aggression of July 25, 1932, extended in 1934 to December 31, 1945, and reaffirmed on November 26, 1938, remained a dead letter; the 'constant peace and eternal friendship' stipulated in the first clause of the Hungarian-Yugoslav pact concluded on December 12, 1940, and ratified on February 27, 1941, lasted five weeks; as for the 'perpetual friendship' sworn between Bulgarians and Yugoslavs on January 24, 1937, it lasted fifty months, to say nothing of the Salonica Pact concluded on July 31, 1938, between Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente. The multiplication of security-pacts ended in making them completely ineffective. *In corruptissima republica leges plurimae.*

If Germany's designs on Bohemia and Poland were clear—too clear—the same could not be said of her position in the Balkans. At the most she claimed to put an end to what she called 'the state of anarchy created by the 1919–1920 treaties in the Balkan-Danubian region'.

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[1] In February, 1940, the minutes of the Balkan Conference contained no reference to the territorial *status quo*.

numerous Soviet militants, including the composer, Dmitry Chostakovich, member of the Panslav Committee, who, opposing the Pan-Germanic theories, vindicated Slavonic culture. 186* 668 'I am proud to be a Russian, I boast of being a Slav. . . . If we must speak of "superior" and "inferior" representatives of humanity, then we can class the German Fascists in the category of the basest! Have they not profaned Yasnaia Poliana (Leo Tolstoy's house), the most sacred treasure of the Russian nation; trodden underfoot Tchaikovsky's scripts at Klin; destroyed at Tikhvina the house where Rimsky Korsakov was born; demolished immortal monuments of Russian architecture at Novgorod and Istra? . . . May all the spiritual forces, all the intellectuals of the glorious family of the Slavonic nations intrepidly fulfil the great mission entrusted to them by history!'

The philosophy of this Congress was summed up in an article in the form of a programme, from the pen of the Russian writer, Alexis Tolstoy, and published by the *Pravda* of Moscow:

'We must revise the whole history of the Slavonic peoples. [544] [829] Our contribution to European civilisation has not been less than that of other peoples. During the space of a thousand years, our young blood gave life to Byzantium in its decrepitude. It was thanks to the Slavs that Byzantium preserved ancient civilisation, and transmitted it to feudal Europe. The Slavonic peoples, hard-working, lovers of liberty, peace, and culture had as their neighbours, on the east, nomadic Empires which always cherished the chimerical design of conquering the world, and, on the west, medieval emperors whose imposing cavalcades were no less vain. These aggressions from the east and from the west broke against the intrepid resistance of the Slavonic world. The role of the Slavonic peoples in the formation of European Humanism has not yet been appreciated at its true value. . . . Slavs, to arms! Up, for our mutual relentless struggle!'

Would you not take this—except for the religious note—for a page from one of the Slavophiles of the forties, or a speech by the historian, Pogodin, at the 1867 Congress?

Anticipating Tolstoy's hopes, the Congress had decided on 186* 203 the publication of a monthly review (*The Slavs*), the aim of which was to make known the services rendered to humanity by the Slav civilisation and to tighten the bonds uniting its present representatives.

186* In Russia, this same year 1942 saw an unprecedented output
814 of works on Slavonic history and philology. Nicolas Derjavin studied Slavonic palæology, Russo-Bulgarian intellectual relations, the origin and history of the Slavs up to the eleventh century. The literature and history of the Slavonic nations were included in the syllabus of the High Schools; a chair of Slavonic Philology was created in the University of Leningrad; in May, 1942 the chair of Slavistic in the University of Moscow became a 'centre of studies in the history of the Slavonic peoples and of their role in intellectual evolution and in progress'.

186 The Ethnographical Institute of the Academy of Sciences
608 undertook a huge investigation into the origin of the Slavonic
• 829 settlements. A Tass Agency communication of July 4, 1943, announced the first results of this inquiry; the Slavs were aboriginals, not invaders. Professor Gudaltov proved that they descended from tribes settled between the Elbe and the Vistula. He pointed out the direct relationship between the Scythians of the Dnieper and the Polanes who played a decisive role in the formation of the State of Kiev.

186 Literature, the theatre, the arts, vied with each other in
533 contributing to this revival of Slavonic spiritual life. An
536 exhibition of the theatrical art of the Slavonic nations was held in Moscow in July, 1942. Chebalin's *Slavonic Quartet* obtained the Stalin Prize in 1943. The Musicians' Congress, which met in Moscow in January, 1943, praised Victor Belyi's 'Slavonic Suite' (Hymn of Anger, Serbian Guerrilla, To Arms!), the libretto of which, borrowed from Serbian folklore literature, is the work of the Montenegrin poet, Radoul Stiyensky.

186* But the essential task remained a political one. Five com-
575 mittees were formed, for liaison with sympathisers in the allied
668 countries—Panslav Committee, Youth Committee, Committee of Savants, Feminine Committee, Jewish Committee. The Panslav Committee launched message after message to oppressed Slavs, insurgent Slavs, Slavs in exile. They received from the Yugoslav Vetché—a political organisation struggling with Tito for independence—a telegram thanking them for their assistance with a view to the establishment of a 'Democratic Yugoslavia, federal and equal in rights', which concluded as follows: 'Long live the fraternal solidarity of all the Slavs in the struggle against German Fascism!'

Macedonian, Vlakhov; the Slovenes Goustinchich and Ivan Regent; a Bulgarian, Tchernevov. 186 668

Benes, subtle and realistic as usual, in an English newspaper expressed his approval of this propaganda, and the value of this approval lay, not in the personality of the writer, but in the attitude he was long known to have held concerning the problem of Slav solidarity. M. Benes recalled that, 'without the establishment of the Soviet régime in Russia, Poland would never have recovered her independence'. 'The present war', he added, 'is favourable to the settlement of differences outstanding between Poland and the U.S.S.R. as well as between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Whilst preserving their independence and their social institutions, the democratised Slavonic nations—they are democratic by nature—must unite and collaborate in all fields. This union of Slavonic peoples will alone be capable, in future, of neutralising the cruel racial policy consistently pursued by Germany, and thus guaranteeing future peace in Europe and in the world'. * 186 829

In London, the Slavs in exile also banded together, with a view to common action. Early in 1943, the refugee Slavonic Governments (Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav) formed a 'cultural committee'. Seton Watson, the specialist in the problems of South-East Europe, in a public lecture given in London[7] thus defined the importance of the conflagration: 'It is the greatest Slavonic war in history. It may well prove decisive for the fate of all the Slavonic nations and their future relations with the Germanic world. . . . The absorption of these nations by Germany would establish that country's hegemony on the continent of Europe; it is therefore as much in the interest of Great Britain as of Russia to go to their assistance'. * 186 668

A Congress of Slavonic nations met in London on May 25, 1944. The next day a message was read to the Congress from the Slav Committee of Moscow, in which the latter pointed out that Polish troops and Czech military formations were fighting side by side with the Red Army, whilst a Yugoslav unit, trained in Russia, was preparing to join them. They added that the attempts of German propaganda to make the Czechs fall out with the Russians when the latter appeared on their frontiers

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[7] January 12, 1944.

186* Negroids, and of Jews, and that this degeneracy warrants our
648 suspecting American morals'. Remarks which were not very
723 flattering for the Slovaks, the Croats, and the Bulgars, whose Governments were still allies of the Axis. 'Naturally', Radoslavov, a Bulgarian minister was to say, 'we belong to the Slavonic race. But we are, first and foremost, Bulgars. We act in accordance with our own interests and not with the interests of the Slavonic peoples in general'. And the *Zora,* of Sofia, went one farther, reproaching Stalin, a Georgian, who had always rejected racial concepts, for posing as the head of the Slavs, and for rallying to racial theories. 'With God's help', this paper concluded, 'the Soviets will never be able to overthrow the Eastern front'.

Other objections kept polemical discussions alive. M. Benes one day expressed to the Czechoslovak Council his desire to see Poland 'independent, democratic, and friendly', joining the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement. 'This', he said, 'would mean the definite settlement of all the differences outstanding between our three countries and would assure their future by guaranteeing peace in this part of the globe; Germany would never again dare to start a world war'.

186* This declaration aroused unfriendly or sceptical comments
• 829 in part of the Turkish press. For a long time that press had been
204 watching the development of the Slavonic orientation in Soviet policy. 'The new Panslav movement', the officially-inspired *Ulus* had said, 'will be followed with the greatest attention, especially by those non-Slavonic nations which were formerly the object of that policy'.[9]

This time it was the *Tanin* which asked why, since the expression 'Pangermanic Imperialism' applied to the union of Germans, that of 'Panslavonic Imperialism' should not describe the union of Slavs? An article in *Pravda,*[10] an obvious reflection of Moscow's ideas on Slav solidarity, refuted this assertion at great length. The Soviet leader-writer recalled that, for a thousand years, the history of Eastern Europe had been that of the defence of the Slavonic peoples against the German invader. 'The historical atmosphere has changed', he said, 'but the object of the German conquerors is unchangeable—to separate the Slavs by force'. There were, he added (for the benefit of the

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[9] August 13, 1941.
[10] February 19, 1944.

Turkish journalist) some people in Eastern Europe who would like to return to the old policy of oppression of the Slavonic peoples. . . . The new friendship among these peoples, related to each other and bound by century-old ties of a common culture, was being tempered in the crucible of the war of liberation. . . . Their *rapprochement* would displease none but those who dreamed of seeing them dominated once again'. 186* 829 ● 204

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The Orlemanski affair has shown us an attempt at Slav solidarity in the domain of religious tolerance. In the same order of things, but this time in connection with the Orthodox Slavs, we cannot omit to mention the deep impression produced by the restoration of juridical personality to the Russian Orthodox Church (September, 1943) and the elevation of the Metropolitan Serge to the office of Patriarch, abolished in 1721 by Peter the Great and which enjoyed a brief restoration in 1917. With its hundred and fifty million followers, the Orthodox community, placed at the cross-roads of the war, was undergoing one of the most tragic crises in its history. Its suffering was all the more serious, inasmuch as the Orthodox Churches are organised on national lines, in contrast to the hierarchical unity of Roman Catholicism. These churches are bound together by identical doctrine and canons. But, in the course of the centuries, they have progressively relaxed the bonds of dependence which used to attach them to the Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Religious autonomy has advanced side by side with the emancipation of the nationalities. In restoring the rights of the Church, Stalin not only indicated his desire to reawaken the traditions of Russian national life, within the framework of a social renovation; he also tightened the historic bonds between his country and the Balkan nations of the Orthodox religion, thus reinforcing, by new spiritual affinities, sympathies founded on community of race, of oppression, and of destiny. 186* 659 795

Germany tried to foil this policy by summoning to Vienna, on November 5, under the presidency of the Metropolitan of Belgrade, the Orthodox prelates adhering to the Axis cause, and especially the Metropolitans of Berlin and of Paris, who declared the election of the new Patriarch to be null and void. This demonstration was of no effect; the vast majority of the Serbian, Rumanian, Greek and Bulgarian hierarchies either had nothing 648 793 795

'Young Brigade', and by the predominance of the 'social' over 177
the 'political' and even over the 'national'. .64

This revolution was in the logic of events; was there any 177
need to invoke the ascendancy or the presence of Russia to 118
explain it? On emerging from an upheaval unprecedented in 181
their history, the little nations, stupefied by the blow and completely helpless, saw their recent past only as error or treason.

We cannot even reproach Russia with having bound up her action with a policy of patronage or aimed at an ideological synchronisation of the régimes born on the territories she had liberated. In Hungary, for example, she was very careful not to recreate the atmosphere of the time of Bela Kun, whose sinister memory, she found, was still alive.

But, in the Slavonic countries, the parties of the extreme 662
Left, almost everywhere identified with the Resistance, took advantage of the presence and the prestige of Russia in order to get into power and stay there. This led to a misunderstanding which, by associating the Russian authorities with the Governments which they were believed to favour, risked one day exposing the popularity of the Soviet Union in these countries to a turn in the tide of internal politics.

Obliged henceforth to gravitate in the orbit of the powerful 186*
Russian State, the Slavonic nations could not consider the future 829
from the same angle as they had done in 1918. At the conclusion of a devastating war, Russia would never again allow neighbouring States to serve as a diplomatic or military jumping-off ground for a possible adversary. She regarded them as her security ramp.

One might be tempted to see in this Muscovite hold over 648
Eastern Europe a revolution of an international order.. In truth it was a revolution only in relation to an abnormal state of affairs—that of the 1920–1940 period, which rested on Russia's inertia in Europe. It could not reasonably be expected that this state of affairs would last indefinitely. The Europe of 1945 was more logical than that of 1918—at any rate, more in conformity with the classic play of international forces.

The slogan of Slav solidarity, which formed the *leit-motiv* 186*
of the Moscow Congresses of 1942–1944, had galvanised and 648
co-ordinated the movements for resistance to the invader. In 000

mediatisation. In the past, Slavism had mobilised more feeling 186*
than will-power, animated more Congresses than Crusades. It 668
now reassumed the academic, 'poet and professor' form it had
exhibited a hundred years earlier.

So that Russia's first acts as a liberating power were 186*
not particularly Slavonic. In virtue of the ethnical principle, 668
exercised in her own favour, she annexed to the Ukraine 723
Carpatho-Ruthenia, which had been a Civilisation Front for
another Slavonic power—Czechoslovakia. As far as Poland was
concerned Russia drew the logical advantages of her victory.
Poland's annexation of Prussia's Eastern Marches was simply
compensation for the amputations she suffered in favour of the
Ukraine and of White Russia. The support discreetly given by
Moscow to the Bulgaro-Yugoslav claims on Aegean Macedonia
reflected less concern for Slav solidarity than the desire to
liberate the outlet from the Straits.

The award of the Teschen Basin, once more disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided Russia with a very delicate arbitration task, in which the necessity for compensating the sacrifices demanded of the Poles weighed more heavily than the memory of Czech fidelity; had not Czechoslovakia, for ten years, been considered as the 'aircraft-carrier' of Soviet military power?

In reality—and a large dose of ingenuousness was required in order to believe that it could ever be otherwise—the territorial changes over which the Russians presided were all inspired by Russian interests, in the historical and traditional sense of the word.

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Let us briefly recall the evolution of the Slavonic peoples 648
immediately after their liberation. 175

Poland was, during the war, represented by a Government- [829] ●
in-exile in London, which negotiated with the Allies, to whom
they gave valuable military assistance. In Moscow this Govern-
ment was regarded as 'reactionary' and incompatible with a
policy of good Polish-Sovietic relations. So it was constantly
attacked by the Russian leaders and the Russian press.

As long as the war was conducted outside Polish territory, London and Washington classed this dispute with those that are

The English press greeted this news philosophically, emphasising the fact that recognition was subject to the promise 208 829 of free elections as soon as Poland's material situation would allow.

Isolated protests were made; as, for example, that of William John Rose, Professor at the School of Slavonic Studies in London, who wrote to *The Spectator*:—

'The solution adopted is the very one which was rejected by our House of Commons—the co-option of a minority of Poles from London and from Poland to a majority of Lublin Poles, the latter occupying all the chief posts.

'Great Britain and the United States have recognised this Government without any precise information having been given regarding the elections and their nature, though they were the condition on which recognition was granted.

'The renouncing of the principles for which the Allies fought for six years is deplorable. Whatever may be its significance for Poland, it is humiliating for the Western democracies. Obviously, we have an excuse; we are busy with our own elections. Unfortunately, however, while we were inactive others were not. What has become of the anger shown by Mr. Eden and M. Stettinius when M. Molotov exploded the "bombshell" (to use the expression of nearly all the journalists) concerning the fate of the Polish politicians?'

In Washington Senator Vandenberg declared to Mr. Grew, interim Secretary of State, that the settlement of the Polish question was inadequate and unsatisfactory for millions of citizens, himself included. 'This settlement does not appear to give a clear assurance that the Polish people will be able to express themselves freely under this Government, which is imposed on them by the Big Three, within the limits of frontiers likewise fixed by these same powers'.

In Moscow, on the contrary, the solution of the Polish crisis was considered as a victory for the democracies and a guarantee of European peace. The Soviet Government hastened to 648 regularise its relations with the new State. On July 9[1] it signed 175 a commercial treaty with Warsaw, in order to 'develop and consolidate to the utmost the economic relations between the two countries, in a spirit of friendship and collaboration'.

1[1945--Analyst]

648 175 666 The sudden volte-face on the part of the Sofia Cabinet was very easy to explain. Trusting entirely to Russian support, the Bulgarians had never for a moment doubted that Russia would consider the Anglo-American attitude as negligible. They therefore contented themselves with invoking the necessity of consulting the Inter-allied Control Commission, in which the Soviet representative's influence was predominant. Judge of the Government's surprise on learning, from the mouth of that representative (General Birousov), that the Commission had been unanimous in recommending the postponement of the elections!

They had been put off until November 18. The day before, the Washington Government renewed its warning of the month of August, to the effect that the conditions under which the election promised to be held would no doubt prevent it from considering the resulting Government as being the authentic expression of the 'popular will'.

It was difficult to know whether the American attitude arose from the conviction that the Bulgarian electoral law was less 'correct' than the Yugoslav electoral law, or whether the discrimination followed from the fact that Yugoslavia was an allied, and Bulgaria a vanquished, country.

But this time the Sofia Cabinet held out and the elections took place on the date fixed. They gave 75–85 per cent of the votes cast to the Patriotic Front, the Opposition parties having decided to abstain.

However, the Government wisely refrained from giving to this poll the appearance of a retort to the American veto. On the contrary, it advised Washington of its intention to enlarge the basis of the Government on democratic lines.

• [828] It is certain that the rivalry between the Agrarians and the Communists offers prospects of internal crises. But, from the external point of view, Bulgaria's policy is fixed *ne varietur*. It will depend on Moscow's goodwill. The Bulgarian people, profoundly Russophile, will find little difficulty in accepting this new state of affairs. There is more doubt as to whether the same thing will be true of the leaders, who will always find it difficult to resign themselves to having only one card in their diplomatic game.

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186* The Slavonic problem presents quite a different appearance

725 648 175 with 'Great Serbian' and 'reactionary' tendencies. Subsequently a much more serious charge was made against him; carried away by his struggle against the Communist elements, he was said to have parlied with the Occupying Authorites and with the agents of Nedich, the Serbian 'Quisling'. General Mihaïlovich was nevertheless the War Minister *in partibus* to the London Cabinet, where the accusations brought against him were never seriously considered until Churchill[1] echoed them. They were the basis of the case brought against his partisans in July, 1945, and the severe sentence passed against them.

• [829] Then there was, between the London Government and the 'Tito Movement', the psychological opposition between the exiled politicians (except those of Czechoslovakia) and the insurgents, who, remaining within the country, risked their lives day in and day out. The latter were inclined to see the 'London people' as theorists, if not profiteers of the Resistance, who, in assured comfort and relative security, carried out a paid task with the pen or by radio.

[668] Finally, Tito's partisans merged, in many cases, with the Communist or extremist elements, for whom the old Yugoslav political formations and their staffs embodied a régime of despotism, patronage, and reaction, whose return to power would have constituted an historical retrogression.

643 661 648 175 However, the break did not come immediately. Although King Peter agreed, under pressure from the Allies and especially from Russia, to disown Mihaïlovich, he showed greater hesitation in negotiating with Tito, whose republican trend and attachment to the Soviet régime were well known.

On June 16, 1944, he resigned himself, rather against his convictions, to authorising Choubachich to sign an agreement with Tito, which provisionally safeguarded the rights of the Crown. On the following November 1 he agreed to the formation of a National Union Government in liberated Yugoslavia. But he reserved his approval as to the nomination of a Regency and the exercise of political power by one single party, the National Liberation Front, until a Constituent Assembly should have met. On this point he even entered into conflict with his

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[1] 'General Mihaïlovich, I regret to say, has gradually adopted a changed attitude, and certain of his leaders have parlied with Italian or German troops'. (Speech in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944.)

656 204 625 founded on despotism and personal power? The law of August 25, 1945 on the control of the press banned not only the ex-'collaborators', but also the publishers of 'alarmist' news or of news 'contrary to the general interest'—as conceived by the Government, naturally. A well-informed police organisation, modelled on Russian methods, ceaselessly exercised a very close watch over public opinion and, naturally, indulged in arbitrary arrests and acts of violence.

578 175 This policy led to dissension within the Government. The leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, Milan Grol, resigned on August 19[1]; on October 8[1] he was followed into retirement by Dr. Ivan Choubachich and the Minister Chouteï, both Croat Agrarians.

Choubachich's resignation was serious, for it upset a ministerial equilibrium which had been agreed upon among the Allies. Yet what was this agreement worth, since Tito, repudiating the terms of the compromise which had sanctioned his authority, had pronounced against the monarchy? 'Not one of our combatants thought that anything new could be created under the leadership of the King, especially as the Nediches and Mihaïloviches committed their crimes in his name. . . . The point is, whether the monarchy is compatible with the new system of Yugoslav Federal Democracy. . . . For several reasons, I think it is not'.

The next day (August 8, 1945) King Peter replied to this declaration by withdrawing from the Regents the power they held from him.

Tito was not intimidated by this retort. He declared that the Government acted in agreement with all the creative and constructive forces of the country, with all sincerely democratic parties. The masses of the populace had acquired, during the war, firmly-rooted political knowledge which had nothing in common with the electoral catchwords with which they previously used to be taken in.

666 829 ● 175 The Opposition replied that free elections would prove the truth of this assertion, whereas those to which the country had been called were not free. The Americans and the English repeatedly emphasised the reserves they made regarding their attitude towards the régime which would result from this poll.

The elections took place on November 11.[1] They gave to the

[1] [1945-- Analyst]

666 National Front 80–90 per cent of the votes cast.[4] It is true that
• 829 the Opposition abstained from voting (its Belgrade organ,
175 *Demokratia,* was suspended) and that the electoral system favoured the Coalition Government. But the Anglo-Americans took no action. They declared the results of the poll to be 'acceptable'. On these results were based the two Assemblies (Union Assembly and Assembly of the Nationalities) which, following Russian lines, were to control the country's constitutional life.

578 In short, both at home and abroad, Tito was master of the
643 situation. He had armed forces, the levers of control, fanatical partisans, a 'Youth' following, attached to a régime which had radically reorganised the whole staffing of the army, the administrative services, and diplomacy. But certain large sections of opinion were not with him. In the provinces the old parties were still solidly rooted. Those circles criticised the 'personal' and 'plebiscite' character of the régime, which was an unprecedented innovation in Serbian political life. Against the Marshal were the Monarchists, the old army, Serbian nationalism, Croat par-
[659] ticularism, Slovene 'Clericalism'. For a long time he alienated the Catholic clergy; on October 18, Radio-Vatican broadcast a letter from the Yugoslav bishops to the Belgrade Government, accusing the latter of systematically persecuting the Roman Church.

And this was only criticism of internal affairs. Tito was further reproached with having reorganised relations between the Yugoslav populations on anachronistic bases. How would this State turn out—a State of twelve million inhabitants, with six autonomous Governments, capped with a Federal Government? Where would the frontiers of Croatia and Serbia be? And those of Serbia and Macedonia? Could the Macedonian question be considered as settled by the granting of autonomy? And would not the Bulgaro-Yugoslav *entente,* advertised as a victory for the régime, be submitted to a severe test when autonomy gave rise to political disputes in this country which, for a century, had been torn by undercurrents of passion and foreign intrigue? Was

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666 [4] According to official statistics, out of 8,383,455 electors and 7,413,214 votes cast, 6,574,975 went to the National Front. The franchise had been given to women; the electoral age had been lowered to 18, and even lower for those who had fought in the liberation.

642 • 829 Marshal Stalin sent his congratulations to Tito and his good wishes to the 'sister nation' of Yugoslavia. The establishment of the republic was greeted everywhere as a victory for the spirit of democracy. In actual fact it is hard to believe that there is more 'democracy' in the Balkan republics than in the Scandinavian or British monarchies.

000 The real question still remains to be seen—whether Tito's régime ensures a new lease of life for Yugoslav unity or whether it portends, sooner or later, a disruption of that unity, which might this time be irreparable. It is by no means impossible that in the next few years, even months, the evolution of Yugoslav life may be characterised by a gradual weakening of the ties between the Serbs and the Croats and a correlative strengthening of solidarity between Serbs and Bulgars—in other words, by an end of the union of Southern Slavs, and an attraction of part to the East.

On the international scale, the future of Yugoslavia is at the mercy of the super-powers who are the arbiters of peace. So that all depends on the importance which the Balkan world holds in the policy of Russia who, in Central Europe and in Asia, is occupied with interests of far wider scope. And here it is as well not to forget that, during the time of the Tsars, the Balkan peoples always bore the brunt of all efforts at *rapprochement* between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Will they, tomorrow, form the medium of exchange between the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-American democracies, without whose capital it would be difficult for them to exploit their natural resources?

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Of all the liberated Slav States, it was, as might be expected, Czechoslovakia which showed most practical sense. She managed her return to liberty without any unnecessary clashes or violence.

642 643 175 No serious difficulty arose between the London Government-in-exile and the Resistance. On May 8, 1944, Benes signed an agreement with Moscow concerning the administration of the liberated territories. On the following October 29 he declared that, after the war, the affairs of the Republic would be so organised as to avoid a repetition of the events of 1938. 'Czechoslovakia will be a fully decentralised Republic, organised

648 sent to London a military mission under General Svoboda, the
186 Commander-in-Chief, to renew contacts with the British General
175 Staff, and to ask the latter to co-operate in the reconstitution of
643 the Czechoslovak Army.

In short, of all the liberated Slav nations, Czechoslovakia was the one which had most clearly marked out the contours of her independence in the New Europe. She accepted neither 'synchronisation' nor enfeoffment. Without disavowing either her Slavonic affinities or her traditional attachment to Russia, she restored her relations with the West to their 1938 footing.

• [829] An intermediary State, Czechoslovakia is carving out her path between the Russian and the Anglo-Roman worlds; nearer to the former by her security reflexes and her views on the future of Europe, she is nearer to the latter by her spiritual unrest, her philosophy of life and her conception of progress.

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186* The rapid tour which has taken us from Warsaw to Sofia and
829 from Belgrade to Prague is sufficient to clarify speculations
founded on the birth of a Slavonic 'Imperialism'.

Once again, it is official eloquence which has nourished these speculations. There was not a Polish, Czech, Yugoslav, or Bulgarian statesman who did not see, in the issue of the Second World War, the end of the curse which, for a thousand years, paralysed the expansion of the Slavonic world. Not one who did not celebrate the establishment and the benefits of an inter-Slav *entente*. Let us quote a few of these heroic declamations at random.

In the first rank was Poland—no doubt because this was the nation which, from the Slavonic point of view, had the worst memories to atone for. Commenting on the signature of the Polish-Sovietic agreement, the head of the Government of the Polish Republic regretted that his country had not, at the time of the German aggression, frankly taken her stand beside the Soviet Union, in order to form a 'Slavonic bloc'. 'This grave political error', he declared, 'caused a great deal of suffering to the Slavonic peoples and, most of all, to Poland'.[*]

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[*] When, on July 15th, the new Polish Ambassador handed his credentials to the Regent of Yugoslavia, he alluded to 'Germany, the eternal enemy of the Slavs'. This was an undeniable historical truth; but how fail to recall, on hearing it invoked, the importunate shadows of Beck and Stoyadinovich?

To this act of contrition, the Polish Premier added a profession 186* of Slavophile faith that, 'Eternal friendship and mutual 829 • and complete assistance among all the Slavonic peoples not only ensure a happy existence and future for these peoples, but also forge the guarantee of peace in Europe'.

This was the 'bloc of the Slavonic nations' as it had been formulated, on the preceding July 4, at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Polish Socialist Party, of which the Premier was the leader.

More expressive and more balanced was the opinion published in *Dziennik Ludowy* of October 2, by General Zeligowski, who emphasised the historical significance of the return of the Slavs to the Oder and the Elbe, after a thousand years of flux and reflux. 'The Oder frontier is not only a Polish, but also a Slavonic frontier. Its loss is a menace for all Slavs'.

There we have, indeed, the cartographic aspect of the Slavonic problem. It should be completed by the judgement of Count Sforza, who, in *Foreign Affairs,* advocated establishing the new League of Nations at Fiume, because that Adriatic city was 'the hinge uniting the Roman and the Slavonic worlds'.

In Prague it was, as we have said, M. Nejedly who, in more or less measured terms, made himself the apostle of the unity of the Slavonic world. 'We have to opt for the West or for the East. I believe that the Czech nation knows what it must do. We all know that we belong to the great Slavonic bloc, controlled by the Russian nation. Around us there is nothing but ruin. What can the Hungarians, the Rumanians, the Germans do? None of these nations has a future before it. They will be only too pleased to allow themselves to be controlled by us'.[7] On July 15 M. Nejedly presided over a meeting of Slav Committees held in Prague; on that occasion he elaborated a programme for inter-Slav solidarity 'under the direction of the great Russian nation'.

In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito owed it to his Soviet affiliations to plead passionately the cause of the Russo-Yugoslav *entente.* 'Yugoslavia has, as her chief ally, the Soviet Union, to whom she is bound by a treaty. She maintains close relations with all the other Slavonic nations. . . . Those relations will, in the end,

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[7] Quoted by the *Manchester Guardian* of June 8, 1945.

186* •729 create an indissoluble union of Slavs which will be a bulwark against the repetition of catastrophes similar to that of 1941'.[*]

On October 2, addressing a group of Polish journalists, Tito used the expression 'Slavonic era'. But this expression must be understood in a constructive, not an imperialist sense. 'United spiritually, the Slavs form a barrier against medieval [*sic*] ideas directed against culture and humanity. . . . The Slavs will bring peace and security to Europe'.

There were the same oratorical outpourings among the Bulgars. Kimon Gheorgiev's programme included 'a cordial friendship with the Soviet Union and an eternal friendship with the sister nation of Russia'. Nikolov, President of the Slav Committee in Sofia, also protested against the legend of Slavonic imperialism, but announced a 'union of the Slavonic peoples for the protection of their liberty and of their independence'.

[795] In the same spirit the Bulgars, walking hand in hand with Tito's Yugoslavia, affected an ostentatiously detached attitude to the question of Macedonia. They abolished the schism caused by the Exarchate, which had been created solely for the purpose of propaganda on behalf of annexation. Formerly the Macedonians were divided into Orthodox (Serbs) and Exarchists (Bulgars). Once this distinction was abolished, Bulgaria could, according to international circumstances, proclaim her disinterestedness or extend her claims to Macedonia.

[648] The Slavonic Governments backed one anothers' reciprocal claims. Marshal Tito approved the Czech policy with regard to the Hungarian minorities; Poland and Czechoslovakia handed to the London Conference notes supporting the Yugoslav territorial claims, which ran counter to those of Italy. Bulgars and Yugoslavs conducted a joint campaign against Greece regarding Aegean Macedonia.

[668] There was another manifestation of this general fraternisation. A Slav Congress was held in Bratislava in July, 1945. It passed a motion favouring the conclusion of a regional pact of friendship and mutual aid among all the Slavonic nations. The speakers indulged in striking forecasts of the possible effect, in international life, of a bloc of 205 million Slavs, *i.e.*, one-third of the total population of Europe, covering two-thirds of its surface.

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[*] **Speech made at Bela Tsrkva on July 8.**

But had not the geographical dispersion of the Little Entente been its congenital weakness, and was it not obvious that there would never be solidarity or concordance between the interests of, say, Poland and Yugoslavia? Russia had planned to get Poland to adhere to the pact concluded between Russia and Czechoslovakia; this plan was washed away in the undercurrent set up by the Teschen dispute. Bulgars and Yugoslavs were inclined to signify that their future lay in the creation of a Southern Slav federation—and this is, in fact, one of the rare conceptions of Slavonic solidarity that is realisable on the national plane. But it has never passed beyond the stage of a 'pious hope'. 186 829

Is it possible to see in these effusions anything more than oratorical outbursts inspired by circumstances? Do they not tend, in the majority of cases, to drown in a vague, ideological Panslavism the too concrete reality of Russian control over the small Slav nations? Is not Slavism losing its original disinterestedness, to become, in spite of official ramblings, the common denominator of their connection with Muscovite preponderance? Do not assertions of economic and cultural ties overlook the fact that no common interest, apart from that which results from the possession of a common frontier, binds these nations, and that, from the intellectual point of view, it is much more from their contact with Western spirituality than from their common basis that their own culture has blossomed? DOO

What is new in the situation is this. Hitherto, allusions to 'Slavism' were acts of boldness, if not of imprudence, tolerated only at congresses of philologists and folklorists. Diplomats and statesmen were careful not to make them, even if they did not disavow them.

Today the situation is reversed. Slavonic solidarity is an official element in political eloquence. But, in passing from the plane of ideology to that of positive values, this solidarity has lost the clarity and sincerity of its outlines, to become a slogan for toasts, and for ministerial meetings. Slavism has met with the adverse fate of ideals which, after great difficulties, find a suitable ground for their realisation; they are liable to turn into historical myths, academic themes which contact with reality has voided of substance.

6; Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

'In liberating the Slavonic peoples, the Red Army has 186*
accomplished a mission of great historic import, for if they were 648
not freed from the German yoke there could be no question 728
of lasting peace in Europe. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Slavonic countries are based on common interests of defence against the revival of the German forces of aggression which have caused such prejudice to these peoples. And it is beyond doubt that their development on truly democratic bases constitutes the best pledge for peace in Europe'.

On various occasions moreover, Russia, unwilling to place her cards on the table before her great Allies did so, was known to have her views on the German problem put forward by the Poles or the Czechs, while Yugoslavia, more combative or less wary, launched, now against the English now against the Americans, offensives calculated to put them on a false scent, diverting attention from the real objectives of the diplomatic moves.

In all the discussions raised by the peace treaties, at all the meetings of the United Nations and their Commissions, the Slav delegates voted with the Soviet Union or with its Republics, whether in matters concerning general problems (such as the right of veto or disarmament) or in national 'cases', such as the ban on Franco or the Greek question; so much so that it was always possible to forecast, as soon as a debate opened, which way these delegates would vote.

Conversely, where Russia did not herself inspire the claims put forward by the small Slav States, she supported them. She backed the Yugoslavs in the dispute between Rome and Belgrade regarding the fate of Trieste and Julian Venetia, the maintenance of the Polish-Germanic frontiers on the Oder and the Neisse, and the Bulgarian-Yugoslav offensive against the Athens Government.

Ideologically, the joint attitude of the Slav Governments 186*
rested on the theory that they alone were imbued with the real 829 •
democratic spirit and that the Western Powers represented a survival of reaction and of *bourgeois* Liberalism.

This naïve attitude is evident in the speeches of nearly all the Slav diplomats during this period of European reconstruction.

A Polish newspaper, *Robotnik* (of April 14, 1946), took a 186*
census of Slavonic strength on the continent of Europe:— 162

645 Communists, then rejoined the partisans in Bosnia and was
175 elected President of the National Liberation Front.

687 The chief event of this period was the trial of General Draja
175 Mihaïlovich, who had organised the earliest resistance to the invader, but was subsequently accused of collaboration with the Germans and the Italians. Arrested on the borders of Bosnia and Serbia, he was court-martialled on June 10, 1946, by the Military Tribunal of Belgrade, which condemned him to death on July 15. He was shot. Some American airmen had vainly asked to bear witness in his favour. The Belgrade Government had documents published establishing his 'treason'; they reveal undeniable complicity with the enemy in the lower ranks, and, especially, the implacable intention of eliminating the Communists from the Resistance; the role of Mihaïlovich himself is less clearly shown—which explains the emotion his condemnation aroused in England and in America.

● [829] The *Daily Telegraph* thus expressed itself on this condemnation: 'The long perspective of history will enable the truth about the much-discussed figure of Mihaïlovich to be more clearly perceived. His contemporaries can do no more than think that, caught up in the whirlwind of events beyond his control, he was a victim of Fate'.

In the same connection the British statesman, Noel Baker, declared that the decision to suspend aid to Mihaïlovich during the war had been taken as the result of numerous denunciations from various sources, alleging that he was no longer adequately contributing to the war effort. 'Subsequently', he said, 'it became evident that certain of his lieutenants were actively collaborating with the Germans'.

793 No less sensational was the trial of the Catholic Archbishop
687 of Zagreb, Mgr. Aloysius Stepinac. This followed proceedings
175 against numerous members of his clergy, notably that involving
657 some Slovene priests, in December, 1945, at Ljubljana. The bishop of that town, Mgr. Rozman, a refugee in Italy, was condemned to eighteen years' imprisonment.

[208] The action against the Croatian priests accused of collaboration was prepared in January, 1946, by a violent press and radio campaign, denouncing the Archbishop's relations with the *Oustachi* of Pavelich, by whom he had been decorated (in

common with the Croatian Orthodox Metropolitan, Hermogene 793
Maximov, and the German Lutheran bishop, Popov). 687

Arrested on September 18, 1946, Mgr. Stepinac was tried, 175
on the 30th of the same month, not only on the charge of 659
intelligence with the enemy, but also of having, after the liberation, worked with the opponents of the régime. These charges (as well as that of having forcibly converted Orthodox Christians to Catholicism) were upheld by the judges, who condemned the prelate (on October 11) to sixteen years' hard labour, to the loss of his civic rights for a period of five years, and to the confiscation of all his possessions. In vain had the defence recalled the fact that Mgr. Stepinac had protested against the racial laws and collective reprisals, and that the allied press had, while the war was actually in progress, rendered homage to his courageous stand.[3]

Pope Pius XII, in a public speech, protested against this $\boxed{829}$
verdict, denying the compulsory conversions—which, moreover, are contrary to canon law. And, although Tito had declared that the proceedings were by no means the prelude to a campaign against the Church in Czechoslovakia, Christian circles throughout the world protested against what they called a 'religious trial'. The 115 Catholic archbishops and bishops of the United States, assembled in Washington for their annual Assembly, described the verdict as 'an outrage on justice'. The Archbishop of Westminster declared that, during the war, 'in Croatia the only voice raised against Nazism and its works had been that of Archbishop Stepinac'.

The Vatican, in an unofficial note, recalled the Church's 793
sanctions against members of the laity sitting in judgement on 794
a bishop, or guilty of any act of violence upon his person; it 648
nevertheless continued to maintain its Nuncio in Belgrade—Mgr. Patrick Hurley, a priest of American nationality, who had entered upon his office at the beginning of the year. In October, 1946, it appointed a co-adjutor to the Bishop of Maribor and another to the Bishop of Ljubljana. (In the absence of a

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[3] A Catholic Agency announced, at the end of February 1947, that the President of the Croatian Government, Dr. Bakarich, was said to have invited the prelate to sign his appeal, giving him reason to hope that he might be liberated and, with American support, go abroad. Mgr. Stepinac refused, not wishing to leave either his people or his diocese.

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These periodical misunderstandings revealed, rather than created, an unfriendly atmosphere. The truth is that the United States had never ceased to regard the established régime in Yugoslavia as a totalitarian organisation, on Russian lines, in which no civil rights or individual liberty existed. And this impression made itself felt in the peace negotiations, without—let us repeat—Tito's diplomacy making any serious effort to dispel it, thereby taking its share in responsibility for the failure of Yugoslav claims on Trieste.

The diplomatic tension between Belgrade and Washington was reflected in the recall (in March, 1947) of Mr. Patterson, United States Ambassador in Yugoslavia, when America rejected the demand for cereals formulated by Marshal Tito's Government. Mr. Patterson was replaced, but his severe judgements on the Yugoslav régime fixed the policy of the State Department towards Tito.

Although less full of incident, relations between London and Belgrade were scarcely more gracious. An English note of May 20 protested against the attitude of the Yugoslavs in Julian Venetia and the 'unfriendly policy' of their Government. British newspapers did not conceal their bitterness on finding that, despite Anglo-American sacrifices made in order to assist the populations of the new Yugoslavia to get on their feet again, the press of that country had nothing but suspicious or damaging comments to make on the Western Democracies.

Yugoslavia refused, for instance, to take part in the Victory Parade held in London on June 8, 1946, bluntly stating that the relations between the two countries did not justify such participation.

The attitude of the Yugoslav delegation at international conferences or Commissions, and in the United Nations, was not calculated to dissipate prejudice. This was fostered by exchanges of subacid notes—particularly those of January 10, 1947, in which the Yugoslav Government protested at the slowness of the British authorities in handing over war criminals of Italian nationality, and of January 29 regarding the murder of the Yugoslav consul, who had, on 25th of the same month, visited a *tchetnitsi* camp in the Naples district.

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On the other hand, relations between Belgrade and the other Slav States gave rise to demonstrations of confidence and

claim with more zeal than skill, threatening at one time not to 648
attend meetings, at others, not to sign, and finally submitting to 175
the *fait accompli,* having presumably over-estimated Russian support, or having forgotten that, for Moscow, Trieste was only one card in a game covering the whole world. It was at one time thought that Yugoslavs and Italians were going to come to a direct arrangement after the visit to Belgrade of Togliatti, the chief of the Communist Party, on November 3, 1946, and his talks with Tito. It would appear that the latter suggested exchanging Trieste (in reality already lost) for Gorizia—a proposal which the Italian Government promptly rejected. Since no arrangement was reached, the Great Powers had to arbitrate; general agreement was concluded between them on November 27.

In reality, it was not a question of deciding whether the [829]
Yugoslavs or the Italians should prevail in Trieste; the Russians feared that the Western Democracies would use the town as an economic and political bridge-head for their action in Eastern Europe, while the Anglo-Americans feared that the Stalin-controlled 'Slavonic bloc' would make Trieste the basis for its expansion in the Mediterranean. Such were the real factors in the dispute, notwithstanding the flux of historical, ethnographical, and economic arguments under which they seemed to be submerged.

Yugoslavia abandoned Trieste, but she nevertheless obtained an important part of Istria and Julian Venetia (except the part that was to form the Free Territory of Trieste), as well as Zara and the Isles of Pelagosa and Lagosta. On the other hand, her claims to the Slovene part of Carinthia (which she had lost in the plebiscite of October 18, 1920), as well as to the 'Canalthal' to the north of Gorizia (region of Tarvisio) were rejected.

On January 14, 1946, she was elected a member of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

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Bulgaria, during the pre-constitutional period, was a prey to the objurgations of the English and the Americans, who reproached her with disregarding the political conditions laid down by the Conference of Moscow in December, 1945, by refusing to call two members of the Opposition to power. Gheorgiev's Government was prepared to accept these representatives, but wanted first to see them adhere to its internal and external policy

were unwilling to go would not be forced to return to Poland, 648
but their right to remain in England would be considered 175
individually.

It goes without saying that the 'Polish Government in London' protested against this decision, on which they had not been consulted. On June 1 General Anders bade farewell to his troops. 'We must', he said, 'leave Italy on the eve of the peace treaties. We have traversed this country from South to North, waging against Germany a battle for the liberty of the nations. Polish hearts will never forget that we have fought also for the liberty of the Church. . . . Tomorrow, by an unknown road, we shall go to Poland—to a Poland for which we have fought, and which no Polish heart can imagine without Lwow and Wilno'. At the end of October he left Italy for England, where he joined the unarmed Resettlement Corps.[16] Shortly before (on September 28) and as the result of this incorporation, a decree of the Council of Polish Ministers had withdrawn his nationality, as well as that of seventy-four other officers, of or above the rank of general.

The exact figures of those who were voluntarily repatriated have never been given. But it is certain that a large number of Poles, especially among those whose home district had passed under Soviet control, preferred the risks and the misfortunes of exile to returning to their birthplace.

Relations between Warsaw and Moscow were maintained on the lines laid down for them by the Polish-Sovietic pact of August 18, 1945—of which instruments of ratification were exchanged on February 7, 1946.

But, as M. Cyrankiewicz himself had remarked, 'Many [829] •
Poles still suffered from an anti-Russian complex'. This persistence of hostility towards Russia was, according to him, attributable to the memory of the Tsarist oppression and the anti-Bolshevist propaganda which had been ceaselessly carried out between the two wars.

The visit of President Bierut and the Polish statesmen to concerned, and executive agents for Prague for Czechoslovak affairs. This was the solution found for the dualism previously existing in Czechoslovakia. 642 175

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[16] A British M.P. having asked (on February 18, 1947) why the general's salary figured on the army budget, Richard Stokes, a Labour M.P., divulged that the military authorities admitted that, without the collaboration of the Anders Army, the Italian campaign might have ended in disaster.

In virtue of this system the Slovaks have institutions which enable them to settle their own problems, while at the same time participating in the general control of the country. Hence the current joke about the 'Slovakisation of Czechoslovakia'.

Thus did President Benes succeed in adapting the spiritual heritage of Masaryk, and his own tendencies, to an internal and external situation very different from that which, in 1918, had shaped the rebirth of the Czech nation. And yet Benes took pains to safeguard signs of independence, and to maintain bonds of spiritual solidarity with the West, in order to attest his faith in his country's mission as a mediatrix, her role as a stabilising factor between the East and the West of the Continent. But the new Czechoslovakia no longer reflected the image that Masaryk had popularised—that of a European Slavism formed in the school of the Liberal Democracies. [186] [829]•

The first elections carried out after the liberation—those of May 26, 1946—gave a slight majority to the Marxists, who had 153 seats out of the 300 of which the National Assembly was composed.[19] 666 175

This shift in the majority had little practical effect. The internal policy, based on nationalisation,[20] and the realisation of a very advanced social programme, underwent the fewer modifications, inasmuch as the Communists, anticipating their electoral victory, had already secured possession of the principal control levers.

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[19] The results were as follows:—

	Votes	*Percentage*
BOHEMIA-MORAVIA		
Communists	2,205,658	40.17
National-Socialists	1,298,967	23.66
Populars	1,010,920	20.23
Social-Democrats	855,771	15.59
SLOVAKIA		
Democrats (Christian)	988,275	61.43
Communists	490,257	30.48
Liberty Party	67,575	4.20
Labour Party	49,983	3.11

As will be seen, the majority was reversed in Bohemia and in Slovakia. 471

[20] The nationalisation programme which took effect on March 13, 1946, placed the majority of the key-industries under State control. Commenting on this event, the Minister of Industry declared: 'This day marks a date in the history of the world's industry'. 175

the Prague Government that the sufferings inflicted on the Hungarians did not compensate for those the Slovaks had endured; they simply increased the total amount of suffering.

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Negotiations between the two Governments were resumed in January, 1947, following the visit of the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gyöngyösy, to Bratislava, where he met the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Clementis, and had with him a preliminary discussion in view of a general settlement of the problem. At that time a total of 11,655 Slovaks (as against the agreed figure of 40,000) had returned to Slovakia from Hungary; of these 3,535 had not been officially transferred, but had simply fled.

Exchanges of population were resumed from April 11 to 18, but on a very small scale, while settlement was taking place, in Bratislava, of the financial problems raised by these operations.

[829] In the whole matter, Czechoslovakia had had Russia behind her. 'We have the support of the Soviet Union in the question of the minorities', said M. Gottwald. But we should fall short of the truth were we to omit to mention that Czechoslovakia's conduct was rather severely judged in the Anglo-American countries, where people were not very familiar with minority disputes, and attached too much importance to respect for the individual, to approve of these mass exoduses—at least in Europe.

The case of the German minority had been the object of Czechoslovak declarations, even before the end of the war, and on this point the Potsdam agreements had merely had to sanction the decision taken by M. Benes and his Ministers to create a homogeneous national State. Consequently, the expulsion of the Germans from the Sudetenland did not give rise to any disputes—eliciting, at the most, humanitarian recommendations on the part of the Western Allies. The 'ceiling' for the expulsions had been fixed at 2,500,000 by the Potsdam agreements; in October, 1946, 750,000 had been sent into the Russian zone, 1,415,135 into the American zone, and 310,000 were authorised to remain on Czech territory; these were skilled workmen, miners, anti-Fascists, relatives of Czechs, old or sick people.[24] There is no influence in Eastern Europe. President Truman's resounding message to Congress on March 12, 1947, marked, in this respect, a decisive attitude in connection with American politics in Europe. This message announced material and moral assistance to the two Balkan countries which eluded Moscow's ascendancy. 648 175

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[24] It should be noted that Czechoslovakia adopted a special treatment for Germans of Austrian nationality residing or temporarily domiciled in her territory. She did not class them with the Sudeten Germans as necessarily to be expulsed, unless they had been members of the Nazi Party.

This simple outline of the new situation in the Balkans shows that the peninsula has, in fact, again fallen under the régime of spheres of influence which was its customary status between the Peace of Berlin and the Treaty of Versailles.

Between the Balkan nations and the Slavs of the West, Hungary and Austria gravitate in the political orbit of Russia (Hungary's neighbour for the first time in modern history), but nevertheless see the West as the supreme defence of their historic and cultural individuality, not to mention the opposition movements discernible among the Croats, in whose ears still ring the words of Sufflay, one of their political philosophers—*Occidentem appello!* 186* 829

But it is not from this territorial reshuffling that there emerges the real physiognomy of the Europe of tomorrow.

This results essentially from the division of the Continent into three sectors—the Western world, the Teutonic world, the Slavonic world; the second being doomed to oscillate between the first and the third until it feels it has attained the conditions of its own development.

Assuredly, all the official manifestations of the Slavonic world avoid the words 'race' and 'bloc'. But facts speak more eloquently than men. On the diplomatic plane Slav solidarity is a reality of international life, though on the psychological plane its outline is less clearly defined. In Yugoslavia, the official press regards the new state of affairs as a complete emancipation, and the very role of France in the Balkans, so long considered as liberating and humane, is often referred to simply under the aspect of a defunct 'colonising' enterprise. Yet in Czechoslovakia they take pains to maintain, with the West, those spiritual connections calculated to preserve for the country its role of intermediary between two civilisations. Poland remains bound to the West by powerful historical and sentimental affinities, strengthened by the desire to safeguard her ancient faith. Bulgaria, more subtle in her politics than Yugoslavia, likewise takes great care not to give the impression of a definite rupture with the West.

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Being unable too openly to call itself 'racial' (owing to the discredit that Germany has brought upon this term), Slav solidarity entrenches itself on another plane—that of social progress. The nations grouped under the Soviet ægis see Western Europe as the bulwark of reaction, the survival of an outmoded capitalistic world. The Slav nations of today oppose the spiritual and political primacy which, until the last few years, was the almost undisputed privilege of the West, the social primacy of Russia, the proletarian hegemony, the system of governments set up on the strength of a 98 per cent plebiscite, the sychronisation of politics, culture, and economy, and a Pan-State *mystique*. To re-read the accounts of journeys in the Balkans a century ago is to measure the distance travelled in the opinion held by the Balkan peoples concerning the stage of civilisation which they have reached.

There lies the real cleavage in the New Europe—a cleavage comparable to that which, during the early Middle Ages, opposed the pagan to the Christian world. The rest is accident, episode, or, as the philosophers say, phenomena.

But this dividing line could be more distinctly marked on the map if, between these two new worlds, Germany did not constitute the terrible unknown quantity which might very well, one day, reunite them, by herself deriving advantage and power from their rivalry.

186* 659 with Bulgarian national life to be neglected by the new régime, which will continue to subsidise it, and counts upon its co-operation in rallying the masses; in which, moreover, it is assured of the goodwill of Mgr. Stephan and his clergy. On August 28, at the Bachkovo pilgrimage, Mgr. Cyrille, Metropolitan of Plovdiv, made a speech urging the faithful to vote, at the referendum, for the Republic and against 'the abhorred monarchy, whose role', he said, 'has been as fatal in the history of the country as in that of the Church'.

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185 Whereas, in the Balkan countries, the religious problem lay in getting the clergy to forget that they had, for some centuries, been the support of the monarchical institution, it had a quite different aspect among the Western Slavs, where the problem was, first and foremost, the liquidation of Uniatism.

175 795 648 As the reader will know, the 'Act of Union' (hence the word 'Uniat') was concluded three and a half centuries ago, in 1596, at Brest-Litowsk, where the Metropolitan of Kiev acclaimed the renewal with Rome of the Union of Florence. As a result, since that date there had been flourishing communities 'of the Oriental rite', which recognised Papal supremacy while keeping their national liturgy and their discipline—which, among other regulations, permits (as the Orthodox Church does) the clergy to marry. These communities today number in all about two million followers, especially in territories formerly incorporated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

[829] Uniatism had always been regarded by the Russians as a 'turning movement' on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, supported first by Poland, then by Austria-Hungary, to detach the Orthodox from their traditional faith. Urban VII's apostrophe: 'Ruthenians, the East will be conquered by you!' has obsessed the Muscovite Church, which has never ceased to endeavour to recapture its positions.

After the fall of the Tsarist régime this Church's efforts were paralysed by the crisis she was herself experiencing, and by the official atheism professed by the Soviet State. The Holy See sought to take advantage of this crisis to restore the 'seamless robe of Christ'. It gave repeated proofs of solicitude, placing the Uniats on a footing of complete equality with their brethren of the Latin rite. It cherished the hope, thanks to these Uniats, pursued on parallel lines, in Slav and non-Slav countries alike. 177 .18

On the instigation of Moscow, these countries entered into 186
treaties of friendship and mutual assistance. These were so 648
worded as to give the impression, at first, of being designed to 175
wipe out long-standing heritages of hatred or distrust between
peoples hitherto antagonistic to one another. Passed for a period
of twenty years, and all on the same lines, these treaties were
signed on the following dates:—

November 27, 1947: between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
December 8: between Hungary and Yugoslavia.
December 16: between Bulgaria and Albania.
December 19: between Yugoslavia and Rumania.
January 16, 1948: between Bulgaria and Rumania.
January 24: between Hungary and Rumania.
February 4: between the Soviet Union and Rumania.
March 18: between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.
April 23: between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

The commentaries which accompanied the signing of these [829] •
agreements spoke, with ever-growing emphasis, of the 'peril'
to the peace of Europe involved in the attitude of the Western
powers. Centred at first on the German menace, they subsequently referred to fresh risks, clearly indicated. Thus the Soviet radio declared that the pact between Bulgaria and Moscow acquired significance from the fact that 'certain Western powers have, under the patronage of the United States, taken the creation of military blocs as the basis of their policy'.

Even the idea of a 'Balkan Federation', which in 1944 had found partisans in Moscow, was gradually pushed into the background, for fear that the essential core of this federation, the Bulgarian-Yugoslav bloc, might create a Slav community, which should one day grow strong enough to adopt an attitude of independence in regard to the Soviet Union. So, although it was originally inspired by Russia, this project for a union was later to be denounced by the Kremlin as a ruse of 'Western imperialism', and Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Premier, was to be disavowed by Moscow, in January, 1948, for having made an untimely allusion to it.

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The standardisation of Soviet policy in Europe was to take 648
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its definite shape in the conference held in Warsaw in September, 175

In a motion published on June 28, 1948, the Kominform, 186*
which met in Bucharest from June 16–24, approved the 665
sensational resolution of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party, 648
denouncing the policy of the Yugoslav Communists and the 175
errors of Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovitch, 'who have embarked on a road leading to treachery towards the international solidarity of the working classes'.

Thereupon began the struggle between Moscow and Belgrade, which was to grow more acute as the months went by. And the organisation of the offensive against Tito and the progress of 'Titoism'—in other words, 'national Marxism'—in the popular democracies, headed the agenda of all the meetings of the Kominform, especially the one held in Hungary in November, 1949, when a resolution passed at the conference invited even the Yugoslav Communist Party to get rid of the 'spies' and the 'assassins' who were governing the country.

One of the consequences of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture has been the revival of the old Bulgaro-Serbian quarrel over Macedonia: the Balkans are again being plunged into hatred and irredentism, as we saw them at the end of the nineteenth century, during the Balkan Wars, and in the First World War.

Such were the events which, between 1946 and 1948, transformed the general physiognomy of the Slavonic world. A rapid review of the internal policies of the different countries concerned will show how they evolved.

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Until 1947 the Belgrade Government's policy remained based 648
on complete solidarity with the Soviet Union. The agreements 175
reached on June 10, 1946, during the Stalin-Tito interview, formed the basis for the commercial agreements of July 25, 1947.

The starting-point of the rupture between Stalin and Tito [665]
is to be found in an exchange of letters (in March, 1948), between the (Russian) Bolchevik Party and the Yugoslav Communist Party, regarding the conduct of Soviet officers in Yugoslavia.

But that was only a pretext. In reality, the Soviets could 186*
not forgive Tito for being the only head of an Eastern European 648
829 ●
Government to pride himself on having been an armed leader 175

186* 648 •829 175

in the fight for liberation, at a time when Russia could not intervene. His dictatorial attitude, his personal prestige, aroused distrust on the part of the Kremlin. On the Yugoslav side, they were shocked by the conceit of the Russians, who lavished instructions and counsel on a nation which considered its own political experience superior to that of the Russians, and who, in the course of history, had won and rewon its independence entirely by its own efforts. Serbian pride, wounded by the demands made by Moscow, precipitated the rupture.

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On the other hand, Yugoslavia is peopled by an emancipated peasantry; it has made its own agrarian reforms, and has not had to suffer the yoke of political dynasties (as has been the case with Rumania), nor (like Hungary) that of a landed aristocracy. Communism could not get a footing there, either in the same form or at the same speed, as in the other 'popular democracies'.

Finally, the systematic enslaving of the economy of Yugoslavia to Russian interests was bound, one way or another, to provoke violent reaction in Belgrade.

186* 665 648 175 687

It was nevertheless a surprise for the world when, on June 28, 1948, the Kominform communiqué pronounced the condemnation of Tito and his collaborators, accused of desiring to establish themselves by a régime of terror, of over-estimating the possibility for their country of safeguarding its independence without the assistance of the other Communist Parties; finally, of seeking the support of the capitalist States.

Dr. Pijade, the theoretician of Tito's régime, felt able to reveal[1] that the Kominform's resolution simply reproduced a text prepared in Moscow: he stated that the hands of waverers had been forced by a lying assurance that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party contained spies on behalf of England and the United States.

175 648 [439]

Then began a diplomatic battle between Moscow and Belgrade: at first it took the form of a criss-cross exchange of notes, then that of an economic boycott and, finally, of a vast scheme to detach Yugoslavia from the other popular democracies and reduce her to isolation.

The diplomatic notes at first (July-August, 1948) dealt with the fate of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia; then (August-

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[1] Speech made on July 8, 1949, at Novi Sad.

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September) the role played by the Soviet Union in international 175
conferences regarding Yugoslav claims to Southern Carinthia. 648
In one of these notes (August 11) Moscow accused the Belgrade [186]
Government of acting 'not as an ally, but as an enemy of the
Soviet Union'.

'We can establish Socialism without the U.S.S.R.', Tito 186*
had declared. 175
648

For a few months the Belgrade press attacked the Komin- [665]
form, without going so far as to mention its real promoters. On May 30, 1949, for the first time, *Borba*, the organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, openly attacked the Soviet Union, which it accused of seeking to foment the Yugoslav people against the Government. And Pijade denounced 'Russian nationalism', cloaked under the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy, 'which does not allow any other Communist Party to consider itself the equal of the Bolchevik Party, or any other State to raise itself above the level fixed for it by Moscow'. He accused the Soviet Union of recruiting traitors to form a 'pro-Stalin, anti-Tito front' in Yugoslavia.

The friendship and mutual assistance pacts concluded by the [829]
other popular democracies with the Belgrade Government were denounced during the same week: on September 28, 1949, the Kremlin gave the signal for these notices of termination. On October 1 Bulgaria annulled the pact of November 27, 1947, and was followed by Rumania in respect of the pact of December 19, 1947, and by Czechoslovakia (on October 4) in respect of the treaty of friendship of May 9, 1946, and the cultural agreement of April 27, 1947. The Warsaw Government had anticipated matters by declaring, as far back as September 8, 1949, that Tito's Government had 'trampled on and destroyed' the Polish-Yugoslav pact of March 18, 1946.

The heads of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Moscow, 648
and of the Soviet mission in Belgrade, were recalled during the 687
autumn of 1949, and the majority of their collaborators declared 175
'undesirable', on charges of espionage or sabotage. The cases brought, in Hungary and Bulgaria respectively, against Rajk, ex-minister (September) and Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the Council (December)—cases involving Yugoslavs—were so arranged as to bolster up the Soviet accusations against Tito and his role in the Balkans.

tions due for the exactions made by Bulgarian troops who occupied Serbian Macedonia during the war. 648 175

Yugoslavia's relations with the other Slav States followed the same lines as her relations with the Soviet Union. In June, 1949, negotiations in view of commercial exchanges with Czechoslovakia came to a standstill. In July, the two Governments exchanged subacid notes: Belgrade accused the Czechs of inspiring a campaign of press hostility towards Tito; Prague replied that any criticism tending to unmask Titoist treachery was 'a mark of appreciation and friendship towards the Yugoslav people'. Such arguments prepared the way for the formal denunciation of the pact of friendship and assistance. The Czechs, like the Poles, accused the Yugoslav diplomats of carrying on subversive activities: there were numerous recalls of diplomatic or consular agents, on the now customary charge of espionage on behalf of the 'capitalist powers'.

On the other hand, Yugoslavia endeavoured to renew commercial ties with the West. Her negotiations with Washington resulted in the agreement of July 19, 1947, liberating 47,000,000 gold-dollars and 220,000 dollars accruing from other Yugoslav credits in America, subject to the settlement of various arrears and repayments under Lend-Lease. The United States granted Yugoslavia the necessary licences for the delivery of materials destined for the equipment of a steel-plate factory; on November 3 they removed the prohibition on the supply of military equipment to that country. 648 457 439 175

And, on December 22, 1949, President Truman, confirming an assurance given by George Allen, his ambassador in Belgrade, declared: 'An act of aggression against Marshal Tito and Yugoslavia would be regarded by the Government of the United States as being just as serious as any act of aggression elsewhere'. [829] •

This change of attitude shows the road travelled in Washington since the declarations made, on November 1, 1945, by Secretary of State James Byrne, recognising 'the special security interests' of Russia in Eastern Europe, and affirming that the United States 'would never associate themselves with an intrigue directed against the Soviet Union . . .'.

Indeed, the United States and Great Britain decided to grant economic aid to Communist countries which were 'really independent', and resolved to fight the Kominform. In London,

648 in August, 1947, a Yugoslav delegation opened negotiations for
457 a commercial agreement. These negotiations were prolonged,
439 but in September, 1949, the British Cabinet decided to open a
175 credit of £9,000,000 for Yugoslavia.[1]

A parallel change of attitude was shown in the relations between Belgrade and Rome: after rather lively incidents in Julian Venetia, the two Governments drafted, in December, 1948, a reconciliation, which was to be recognised by the commercial agreement of August 4, 1949, in which press commentators saw a political significance. The question of Trieste, which had been settled by the agreement of April 27, 1947, between France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, henceforth became of secondary importance, although Yugoslav claims to the Trieste zone (as to Slovene Carpathia) were never formally renounced.

On October 20, 1949, Yugoslavia was admitted to the Security Council by thirty-nine votes (out of fifty-eight voters) to nineteen for Czechoslovakia.

To sum up: Yugoslavia is seeking to reconcile her fidelity to Marxism with economic collaboration, on a footing of equality, with the Western States. Her attitude is defined in these two declarations made by Tito: 'While remaining solidly in the Socialist camp, Yugoslavia will regard as her enemy any one who interferes with her Socialist construction'. 'With the East we maintain economic relations, without any political set-off. When we sell copper to buy machinery, it is the copper we sell, not our conscience'.

* * *

648 As for Bulgaria, she has maintained with the Soviet Union
696 ties which the Soviet-Yugoslav crisis only served to strengthen.
929 The Government dealt the opposition a mortal blow by con-
175 demning to death the Agrarian leader, Nicolas Petkov, who was executed on September 23, 1947. This execution called forth a declaration of disapproval from the American State Department; on September 29 a speaker on behalf of the Foreign Office

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[1] On July 2, 1949, General Ivan Gochniak, Vice-Minister for Defence, affirmed that, in 1944, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed upon their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans: the Russians were to have a 75 per cent predominance in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania; in Yugoslavia they were to be on an equal footing with the English, in whose sphere of influence Greece was left.

described it as a 'crime against European civilisation', and on 648
October 1 it was brought up at the Security Council by the 696
French delegate, Parodi, during a discussion on Bulgaria's 829•
candidature for the United Nations. 175

In January, 1948, on the occasion of the signing of a treaty [185]
of mutual assistance with Rumania, the Bulgarian Premier,
Dimitrov, risked an allusion to a project for the federation of
the Balkan States, but this was immediately disavowed by the
Kremlin.

Dimitrov died on July 1, 1949; he was replaced as leader of the Government by Kolarov, and at the head of the Bulgarian Communist Party by his brother-in-law, Valko Tchervenkov.

The sentencing (March 8, 1949) of four Protestant pastors, accused of espionage, to life imprisonment, and the imprisonment of eleven others for a term of years, called forth vehement protests in the Christian world, and justified the sending of a diplomatic note by Great Britain, on March 12, in which these proceedings were described as a violation of Art. 2 of the peace treaty concerning 'fundamental liberties'.

The year 1949 was marked by progressive tension in the 648
relations between Belgrade and Sofia. In September the 687
Bulgarian Government denounced the treaty of friendship and, 175
on October 6, the frontier agreement with Yugoslavia. This
antagonism, which revived the Macedonian Question, reached
a crisis at the trial of Traitcho Kostov, ex-Vice-President of the
Council. Accused in March, by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, of 'flagrant errors' (the most serious accusation
being that of having invoked the principle of State secrecy
in order to withhold information of a commercial nature from
representatives of the Soviet Union), Kostov found the charges
gradually extended, until he was involved in a plot against the
safety of the State, with the complicity of the Anglo-Americans
and the agents of Tito. He was condemned to death, and
executed on December 16. The Yugoslav press considered this [208]
charge as having been trumped up entirely with a view to
compromising and discrediting Tito.

The municipal elections of May 15, 1949, gave the Com- 666
munist-controlled Government of the 'Homeland Front' 175
92.1 per cent of the votes cast (370,000 blank votes); the
legislative elections of December 18 raised this percentage to

659 798 175 Congregation of the Holy Office, forbidding the publication and diffusion of Communist doctrine.

648 829● 659 So the *Kulturkampf* was waged, now energetically, now quietly. The Prague Government was accused by the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, of violating 'human dignity and civilisation'; once more the conflict passed from the national to the international level, symbolising the ideological antagonism which exists between the Soviet world and the Western democracies. Neither the Government nor the clergy showed any signs of weakening. On November 17[1] the bishops again asked the civil power to abandon the laws relating to religious teaching, as conceived by the State, and the interference of lay authorities in the nomination of priests and the administration of Church property.

661 175 The end of the year 1949 was marked by waves of purges in Communist circles, and by fresh trials on charges of treason, incriminating, like those of Budapest and Sofia, Tito's 'agents' or 'accomplices'.

* * *

178 659 686 175 During this period politics in Poland were somewhat less sensational than in the other Slav countries. There again, however, the régime of 'popular democracy' evolved in the direction of Stalin-Marxism. The struggle against the Church was less open, and did not, as in Czechoslovakia, go to the length of making the clergy civil servants. The Government concentrated its efforts particularly on increasing exports, on economic reconstruction, and on exploiting the German lands brought under its control—and these efforts, it must be admitted, were attended with remarkable results.

648 728 175 The German Question was its chief external problem; in its view, it was France's policy in respect of the Reich which prevented the renewal of the Franco-Polish treaty of alliance. What Warsaw particularly feared was lest a change of attitude on the part of the Allies towards Germany should reopen the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier, which the Poles considered sacrosanct, but which transferred to them territories whose final allocation was, legally, postponed until the making of the peace treaty for the Reich.

177 64 175 The most sensational event was the nomination (on November 7)[2] of Rokossovsky, the Soviet Marshal (of Polish

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[1] [1949--Analyst] [2] [1949--Analyst]

XXII

PANSLAVISM

By

WACLAW LEDNICKI

1. The Slavophils

186* IN CONNECTION WITH the Panslavistic trends which appear within
829 the frames of modern Soviet foreign policy it seems justifiable to begin this study with the definition of Panslavism found in the works of Engels and Marx. This is the indeed striking formulation of the Panslavic doctrine, if this word may be applied, which Engels gives: "In the works of several Slavic dilettantes in the field of history there arose an absurd anti-historical current the aim of which was to subordinate the civilized West to the barbarian East, the city to the village, trade, industry and education to the primitive agriculture of Slavic serfs. But behind this comical theory there stood the terrible reality of the *Russian Empire,*—of that Empire which by every movement manifested a pretension to consider the whole of Europe the property of the Slavic tribe and, in particular, of its only energetic part—Russia. That Empire which, with two such capitals as Petersburg and Moscow, is unable to find its center of gravity until the *City of the Tsar* (Constantinople is called in Russian *Tsargrad*), in which every Russian peasant sees the true focus of his religion and nation, becomes the residence of the Russian emperor. . . . The intrigues by which Russian diplomacy supported the recently invented Pan-

slavism are well-known in central Europe—a doctrine which could 186*
not better have corresponded to its aims."[1] 829●

Engels and Marx, to whom I shall have occasion to refer later, 186*
fought against this doctrine, led by a clear knowledge of prob- 175
lems connected with international policy. And indeed the time of the Crimean War—the period when Marx wrote his brilliant articles devoted to the Eastern Question—was a time when the Panslavic conceptions became particularly timely. In the definition quoted above one finds the most important characteristics of the Panslavic doctrine. However, this definition does not exhaust the whole of it, and simply in order to be faithful to what we call an objective approach I should like, before showing the actuality of Engels' and Marx's opinions in the light of the Panslavistic trends of our days, to present the genealogy of this movement and some of its most important aspects.

Without going as far as Thucydides who, when speaking about the Slavs, whom he designated generally under the name of Scythians, said that "if these peoples ever unite under one chief and one idea, no power neither of Europe nor of Asia will be able to resist them," one may say that, in general, the historians of Panslavism consider the Croatian Jury Križanić (1617-1683) the creator of this doctrine. Whether or not this genealogy is correct is a question in itself, but what remains doubtless is the fact that the Križanić episode has its special picturesqueness and flavor. Indeed that zealous Catholic, carried away by his Slavic sympathies, by the idea of the re-establishment of religious unity, and by admiration for the power of the Muscovite tsar, made his way from Italy via Poland to Moscow. There he tried in vain to organize the Muscovite tsardom against two foreign influences—Greek and German—and to incite Moscow to a struggle for the liberation of the Slavs from under a foreign yoke—a struggle which would unite the Slavic nations under the Muscovite scepter. The enthusiastic propaganda of the learned Croatian did not

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[1] Quoted by Vasily Gippius: cf. F. E. Tyutchev, *Polnoe Sobranie Stikhotvorenii*, Leningrad, 1939, pp. 10-11.

same problem—she was to become eventually *the* liberator, *the* 18C+
protector, *the* unifier. For this reason these two expressions of the 175
Panslavistic idea differ not only in their aims but also in their historical origins.

From the modern point of view—from the point of view of the political implications which the Panslavistic doctrine contains—the Russian aspect is, of course, much more important. Let us, therefore, devote our attention first of all to Russian Panslavism.

The direct ancestor of the Russian Panslavistic conceptions be- 18C+
longing to the second part of the nineteenth century is to be found 829
in the famous school of the Muscovite Slavophils and Messianists. 812
The formation of this school resulted from different sources, and here again one finds interweaving ramifications of Slavic and Western European thought.

If one were to enumerate the different germs of ideas, programs, currents of thought, sometimes divergent and contradictory, which brought about the actual birth of the Slavophil idea in different Slavic countries, one would be obliged first of all to stress the fact that it took place in the nineteenth century and that it was in harmony with the political atmosphere of the rest of Europe. We find its ultimate sources in a variety of places. There was, for instance, the tenet of universal brotherhood which the Masonic Societies in particular had spread at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. To the same period belong the works of the German-Russian scholar August L. von Schloezer, the philosophies of Herder, Rousseau, and the Romantics. From the Christian standpoint a kind of Messianism came to the fore with the sentimental attachment of the Romantics to the Bible and with Bossuet's reliance upon the Hebrew prophets. Mention must also be made of the German philosophers Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. Along with the conception of the unity of the Slav world which arose out of the studies of the European ethnographers and philologists, went the demand for the freedom of the oppressed nations—a demand proclaimed and strengthened by the French Revolution. The movement toward

186* ● 829 812 a Slavophil philosophy was fostered by the propaganda of Czechs like Dobrovský, Kollár, and others who championed the claims of freedom for people of good will—propaganda based on affection for the national past and on Catholic conservatism which saw in the Slav world, and particularly in Orthodox Russia, a bulwark against Western Jacobinism. Finally there were many political factors to be taken into account: on one hand, the role of Russia in the Napoleonic Wars and the growing political power of Russia, which was held to be the only power able to win freedom for the Slavic nations; and on the other, the anti-Russian tendencies voiced in the Polish risings, the leaders of which considered the enemy a nest of political reactionaries and a stronghold of violence. All these elements, various and even contradictory though they were, contributed to the establishment of the Slavophil doctrine and at the same time indicated the goal which it might ultimately attain.[3] As far as the purely Russian Slavophil and hence Panslavistic doctrine is concerned, some other factors must also be taken into consideration.

186* 175 [648] I must start *ab ovo*. For several very important historical reasons the Byzantine political influence in Moscow, in the Muscovite ideology, became particularly potent. I have in mind the fall of Byzantium and some other events bound up with this great catastrophe. In connection with the more and more imminent Turkish menace, in order to save Byzantium, in order to organize a coalition against the Turks, men in the Roman Church began to consider with even more urgency the already existing concept of a possible union of the two churches; and at the Council of Florence in 1439 the union of the churches was accomplished. The whole Greek world accepted this union. The representative of the Muscovite Church at the Council, the Metropolitan Isidor, also adhered to the union; but unfortunately his adherence did not conform to sentiments at home. And when he reached Moscow, after celebrating masses in Cracow, he was confronted by com-

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[3] This follows my articles, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea" published in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. London. 1928 29.

175 centuries passed during which these lands were living in completely different political and social conditions. The regime of freedom, religious tolerance, and local autonomy became so strongly and solidly established in the Polish-Ruthenian-Lithuanian commonwealth that even Pskov and Novgorod, those peculiar republics accustomed to their freedom, menaced by the Muscovite despotism, made efforts to join the commonwealth. They paid very dearly for these desires; Ivan III and later Ivan IV uprooted these political dreams by the most terrific terroristic acts.[5]

186* Returning now to the Muscovite Slavophils, one thing must be
● 829 stressed—that the first period of their activity was connected with more or less Russian historical problems. According to Herzen the moment of the precise formulation of the Muscovite Slavophil doctrine was the year 1836, when the famous *Philosophical Letter* of Chaadaev appeared. Of course it would be possible to find ties between the Muscovite Slavophils and the Shishkovists of the beginning of the nineteenth century, but Chaadaev's Western doctrine, Catholic in its conception, became a kind of catalyzer which crystallized the Slavophil program.

However, it would be difficult to give a precise analysis of the Russian Slavophil doctrine without taking into consideration the so-called *ofitsial'naya narodnost'* (official nationality). This term was originated, I believe, by the famous historian of Russian literature Pypin and applied by him to the official Russian ideology elaborated at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I by certain high dignitaries, among whom the most prominent was S. S. Uvarov, minister of education. His system was based on three principles: autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality. Although it is possible that the first two elements of this system may raise no doubts, the third appears less clear. But for Uvarov and his followers it was not so. The concrete significance of the word "nationality" for Uvarov was "reduced," as justly stated by Professor P. N. Sakulin[6] “to the conservation of serfdom and of forms of life tied with it. Besides, Uvarov realized very well this spiritual relationship between serfdom and absolutism, and he definitely expressed the view that autocracy and serfdom, having the same historical source, must have the same historical fate.” When the Chaadaev scandal exploded, Count Benckendorff, head of the Russian police and the closest collaborator of Nicholas I, expressed the following opinion: “*Le passé de la Russie a été admirable; son présent est plus que magnifigue; quant à son avenir il est au delà de tout ce que l’imagination la plus hardie se peut figurer.*”[7] 186* 829 ●

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[5] Cf. W. Lednicki, *Life and Culture of Poland*, New York, 1944, p. 41.

The establishment of this ideology was not confined merely to official interviews, proclamations, and manifestos. The government had in its hands powerful means with which to imprison the thought of the country within its official ideology. The most efficient weapon was censorship and interdiction of foreign travel. The aim was not only to impose respect for the “three whales” of that ideology but also to eliminate any disaggregating Western influence. I need not mention the fact that in the eyes of the representatives of the *ofitsial’naya narodnost’* the West was considered a source of all kinds of mischievous and dangerous ideas. Strong echos of slogans launched by the official ideology often resounded in the writings of people who from a certain point of view might be considered independent. The most striking example is to be found in the works of a man who, by the way, was one of the closest friends of the Russian Slavophils—I have in mind Nicholas Gogol. [656] / 186* 829 538

One remembers certainly Chichikov’s troika “flying like a whirlwind” on the last pages of the first volume of *Dead Souls*, and one recalls perhaps that the writer compares that troika to a Russia “flying onwards like a spirited troika that nothing can overtake.” “The road is smoking under thee,” writes Gogol. “The bridges rumble, everything falls back and is left behind. . . .

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[6] *Istoriya Rossii v xix Veke*, Izd. A. I. Granata, vol. II, p. 445.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 445.

186* What mysterious force is hidden in this troika, never seen before? . . . Russia, whither fliest thou? Answer! She gives no
● 829
538 answer. The ringing of the bells melts into music. The air, torn to shreds, whirs and rushes like the wind, everything there is on earth is flying by, and the other states and nations, with looks askance, make way for her and draw aside." Is it possible to read this astonishing "lyrical digression" without being indeed profoundly amazed, especially when one remembers whom Gogol's troika is carrying—Chichikov, Selifan, and Petrushka? This is the Russia for which "other states and nations" must "make way" and "draw aside!" From this point of view Gogol's passage is very characteristic and representative not only as far as the official ideology is concerned, but also the Slavophil. One cannot without amazement see cultivated Muscovite Slavophils like the brothers Aksakov, Khomyakov, Samarin, and many others absorbed in their idealization of the primitive Muscovite institutions and in their disdain for Western civilization.

The Russian philosopher, Vladimir Solov'ev, when criticizing this unjustified Russian messianism and pretension to obtain a privileged situation in the world, asked what benefits Russia might be able to secure to the world. Gogol, of course, had no doubts about this. His *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends* gives a very eloquent answer: only the Russian Church "like a chaste virgin has been preserved since the times of the Apostles" in her original immaculate purity, and this Church, "changing nothing in the state," might give power to Russia and become a leader of other nations because of the inefficiency of the Western Church. The tsar is the image of God on the earth; the organization of the Russian State awaits the same state of grace: "The more one scrutinizes the organization of the administration of the provinces, the more one is amazed by the wisdom of the founders: one feels that God himself was invisibly building with the hands of the monarchs."

It is true that some of Gogol's assertions were too strong even for Slavophils, and his book awoke consternation not only among people like Belinsky but even among some of the Slavophils. 186* However, some of their own texts, which I shall quote later, and 829 texts of writers close to them are not less eloquent. This, for in- 538 stance, is the case with Nadezhdin.

We may find very similar items in a treatise written immediately after the scandal provoked by Chaadaev's famous *Philosophical Letter*. True enough, Nadezhdin wrote his treatise in order to rehabilitate himself after the unfortunate Chaadaev adventure; nevertheless the text remains striking. Here the author stresses particularly the power of Russian unity under the tsar's leadership, Russian health compared to Western disease, and the patience of the Russian people, which brought to their historical development a special character. "Who was the only one who thought and worked exclusively for us? The tsar! When did we write even one line in our history without the order of the tsar? . . . Our history must not be divided into periods of the life of the nation as Europeans divide their history, but into reigns which represent an unbroken stairway of beneficent activity of the tsars and religious humility of the nation. . . . Our spiritual life is not our achievement but the achievement of our wise and protective monarchs. . . . We have populated a space on which there would be room enough for ten and more Europes. Not in vain have we long been separated from the small corner called Europe. Our destiny is not to be the echo of the decrepit dying civilization whose death convulsions we witness, but to develop among ourselves a new, young, powerful, truly Russian civilization which will renew the old Europe." "The tsar is a father and Russians his children." "We are children, and childhood comprises our happiness. Our history has until now been a great poem in which there is only one hero, only one acting character. . . . Remember with religious humility and with noble pride that your existence is concentrated in your holy master. Without him you are only a line of zeros—with that monarchical 'one' these zeros make a billion."[8]

[8] Lemke, *Nikolaevskie Zhandarmy*, quoted by Jan Kucharzewski, *Old Bialego Caratu do Czerwonego*, vol. I, Warsaw, 1923, pp. 301-302.

186* ●829 538 What is particularly striking is the arrogance of this constant comparison of Muscovite Russia with not only Europeanized Russia, but the whole of Europe. The later Panslavists such as Tyutchev and Dostoevsky will continue to drive in a Gogolian troika. Gogol himself knew Europe and was, I think, very fond of it—especially of Italy. In his *Dead Souls* he showed even a kind of Ukrainian hatred for Muscovite life; yet in his lyrical digressions he sang his peans to the greatness of Russia. There is an element of duplicity and insincerity in this attitude. The same, as I have said, will appear in the case of Tyutchev, for instance, a highly cultivated and profoundly Westernized man. Similar will be the case of Dostoevsky. Both knew the Russian reality, and in spite of that both constantly sought to announce, proclaim, and greet the "coming" of Russia into Europe.

186* 829 Equally characteristic is another fact—that all these Russian nationalists fought with foreign weapons in their hands. This is a trait which appears continually in Russian nationalistic and imperialistic doctrines. Such was the case of the famous doctrine of "Moscow the Third Rome" and also of the Slavophils and their successors the Panslavists. It is well known that all of them were students and pupils of German philosophy—of Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. They readily accepted and applied to Russia the German teaching that in different periods of history the universal life reaches its culmination now in one nation, now in another. In their opinion the historical moment for Russia's mission was about to arrive. The teachings of Schiller's *German Greatness*, which may be considered a kind of preamble of Fichte's speech to the German nation, could not but impress the Muscovite dreamers. Schiller explained that the greatness of the German nation is based only on its cultural and moral character. The German spirit is the only one for which "holy things exist." ~~This spirit~~ alone communicates with the spirit of the universe, which has elected the German spirit to work at the imperishable task of culture. "The English look only for riches," says Schiller, "the

French are imbued only with their vain glory, the Germans were 186*
called to realize an integral humanity."[9] 829

The dizzying speech of Fichte in which he launched the metaphysics of Germanism and the identity of Germanism and universalist messianism became, of course, a source of particularly appealing inspiration for the Slavophils. But here again some reservations should be made. Fichte's speech, absurd as it was, was a reaction against Jena—the defeated nation was looking for an ideological compensation. The Slavophils did not need any compensation, but they very quickly used the whole German armament of arguments in their fight against Western Europe and for holy Russia. German philosophical imperialism was directed primarily against the Roman nations. The Muscovite Slavophils expanded that aggression and mobilized themselves against the whole of Europe. Very soon their slogans began to appear. Kireevsky in 1829 compared Europe to a dammed up river which transformed a fertile land into mud. Prince V. F. Odoevsky came to the conclusion characteristic for a Slavophil—that the West needed a Peter the Great who should "innoculate it with the powerful juices of the Slavic East."

The main arguments of the Slavophil program were as follows: the world is divided into two contrasting civilizations: the Eastern—Greek-Slavic, and the Western—Latin-Roman. The Western civilization is a product of the Catholic Church, of the traditions of ancient Rome, and of conquest—the Western states were based on the law of conquest. In the opinion of the Muscovite Slavophils these three factors represent the three original sins of Western civilization. The Roman Catholic Church fell away from the Eastern Ecumenic Church, and since that time it lost its true faith. Rationalism which found its expression in Western Protestantism and atheism developed, the Church lost its universal freedom because of the papal supremacy, and conquest brought the struggle of the classes, political parties, and revolutions.

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[9] J. E. Spenlé, *La pensée allemande de Luther à Nietzsche*, Paris, 1934, p. 85.

186* ● 829 Quite different was the development of the Eastern civilization. Orthodoxy preserved the purity of Christian faith and teaching, which is established and confirmed by ecumenic councils. The Orthodox theology is the true Christian theology because it is based not on reason but on the revelation of the superior truth. The Russian state originated not by violence and conquest but by a voluntary invitation of the rulers by the people. Russia did not know feudalism, the Russian land never belonged to a feudal aristocracy but to the community, and the Russian people never knew inequality. The tsar was bound to the people by a union of love, and the *Veche* (Popular Assembly) expressed the will of the people. Providentialism and national exclusiveness were at the base of this doctrine.

It would be impossible within the frames of this article to enter into all details of this system, but what was particularly characteristic in the teachings of Khomyakov and the Aksakovs was their conception of freedom which needed no guarantees. They considered treaties, contracts, agreements—in other words any legally established guarantee—evil. In their opinion the Russian people were repelled by juridical norms, and the Russian laws represented an inner truth. They did not care for any external usefulness or formalism. "All classes and groups of the population are penetrated by one spirit, by one faith, by the same opinions, by similar ideas, and by the same need or desire for common happiness." (Constantine Aksakov). [156] Another trait was the complete reduction of the role of the individual which appears in their conception of the Russian land community. The agricultural character of the Russian civilization brought the Russian people to an humble subordination, which, by the way, the Slavophils praised enormously. That choral, primitive, and purely Christian character of the old Russian civilization was what they wanted to preserve. Connected with this was the argument of Russian simplicity. The same Constantine Aksakov stresses the fact that neither did Russian history have any theatrical episode nor did the Russian people like beautiful poses. "Nothing dis-

tinguishing in that history," says Aksakov, no "beautiful effects," 186*
"bright array," no role for the individual; and because of that, 829 ●
no pride and no memory for individual deeds. Every calamity is considered a punishment of God—every triumph an act of the grace of God. Thus "they do not erect monuments to their heroes, as there are none; but they build churches. . . ." "The history of the Russian people is the unique history in the whole world of a Christian nation which is Christian not only by religion but by its life—at least by the tendencies of its life."[10]

This was the idyllic picture of the Russian past as depicted by the Muscovite Slavophils. They considered that Peter the Great had ruined that beautiful past and brought Russia onto false roads of historical development. They were false first because they betrayed Russian national tradition, and secondly because they brought Russia to the West, which was in a state of decadence. I need not enter into too many details connected with the famous legend about the "rotten West"—a few examples will suffice. One of the leading Slavophils, Shevyrev, compared the West to a man spreading by his breath a terrible contagious disease. For Constantine Aksakov "West" meant violence, hatred, and enslavement; Russia—union, freedom, and peace. In his opinion even Russian paganism had been superior. This was why Russia, deserving it, had obtained a better Christianity; the Russian pagans had a *chayanie* (hope, expectation) of Christianity. The Russians accepted Christianization easily, without any struggle, like a child.

Now and then the Slavophils failed to confine themselves to 186*
Russia. They were looking for regeneration, for the restora- 829
tion of that shining, luminous past, but they were generous enough 177
to spread the benefits of this regeneration outside of Russia too. .18
These benefits should be shared first of all by the blood relatives of Russia, the Slavic nations—and after them by the whole West-

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[10] S. A. Vengerov, *Ocherki po Istorii Russkoi Literatury,* St. Petersburg, 1907: chapter on "Peredovoi Boets Slavyanofilstva Konstantin Aksakov," especially pp. 465-469, 470, etc.

186* ern world. The Slavs, organized around the holy Orthodox faith
● 829 and under the leadership of Russian autocracy, based on the strong
177 foundations of the Russian land community, would become a
.18 powerful political organization strong enough to bring the Western
world to the Russian pale.

186* Here we are already in the center of the Russian Panslavistic
178 doctrine. And this is, by the way, the picture of the whole He-
829 gelian road of the Slavophil philosophy of history: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Chicherin in his profoundly interesting memoirs, mocking the Slavophils and especially Constantine Aksakov, says: "He (Aksakov) conceived Russian history according to all the rules of Hegel's logic; the old Russia represented the statement, the new—the negation, and the future announced by the Slavophils was to be the restoration in a superior form of the original statement. This formula could be successfully applied perhaps only to the beard: the beard existed in old Russia, in the new it was shaved, in the future it would be restored."[11]

As long as the Slavophils were busy with their national costumes, traditions, orthodox theology, and glorification of the Russian past, they might be considered more or less independent, distinguished, and inoffensive satellites or offshoots of the official national ideology—but satellites and offshoots who confined themselves to the worship of what they considered Russian national
186* traditions. But when they extended their love to other people and
829 their hatred embraced not only Peter the Great but the West, they
668 became involved in political problems. And at this point some of them degenerated into Panslavism; besides, some new adherents, acting in the purely political field, joined the Slavophil group. Here again we must take into consideration certain other sources of influence and tradition—this time purely political.

Some of the political conceptions adopted by the Slavophils appeared earlier—even at the time of Peter the Great and Elizabeth. From time to time conceptions of the liberation of the "Slavic brothers" emerged, but they developed especially strongly, of course, at the time of Catherine II when Russia began the "liberation" of White Ruthenians and Ruthenians from the Poles through the partitions of Poland and finally "liberated" the Poles from themselves. At the time of Alexander I the same conceptions reappeared. V. N. Karazin, a well known liberal of the times of Alexander I, wrote in a memorandum: "Is it possible that the sovereign ruler of free Slavs, the unique protector of the Orthodox Church, can look indifferently upon the sorrow of nations close to them by blood and by religion?" "It is true," says Pypin through whom I quote Karazin, "that Karazin suggested cautious action in order not to offend Austria. But his dreams went very far: he dreamed of the establishment of a 'Slavic Empire' with one of the brothers of Alexander at its head: this empire was, with time, to be extended to the Adriatic Sea in Albania and Macedonia, and on the other side to embrace the southern 'Serbo-Croatian' lands of Austria. . . . This Empire, which would very soon develop and organize, would be bound to the Russian Empire by ties of religion, blood, and thankfulness, and would become Russia's 'storehouse' and natural base for all her activities and relations with Europe and Africa." 186* 829 668

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[11] *Vospominaniya B. N. Chicherina*, Moscow, 1926, p. 236.

The same were the conceptions of other political writers of that time—Bronevsky and General Chichagov. (cf. Pypin, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79). These conceptions were also discussed in Masonic lodges and even in several lodges of Slavic Unity which had been established in Kiev and in Petersburg. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828 again galvanized these feelings of Slavic solidarity, but this was the time when there began in Russia the great discussions between the Slavophils and the Westerners—in other words, the time when the Slavophil doctrine started its period of crystallization.

I should like to stress the fact that we must have in mind several important historical dates around which the Panslavistic discussion became especially animated. These historical events and dates are: first of all, the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31, the Cracow Insurrection of 1846, the Slavic Congress in Prague in 186* 175

186* poet over the heads of Russian politicians, writers, and poets.
668 From this point of view it would be difficult to evaluate the enormity
648 of the moral disaster achieved by Pushkin. And, as I mentioned
538 before, the fact that it was just the great European Russian who assumed the responsibility for this makes it particularly painful. One has the right to say that had Pushkin taken a different attitude, the fate of Russian-Polish relations and therefore partly of Russian-European relations could have been different. It is possible, however, that my point of view is too idealistic and that I evaluate too highly the importance of poetical texts in the life of nations; nevertheless I am not at all certain that I am wrong. When examining the works of the Russian Slavophils and Panslavists—the Aksakovs, Khomyakov, Samarin, Pogodin, Leont'ev, Katkov, Danilevsky, Dostoevsky, and even Vladimir Solov'ev (whose opinions were in many respects opposite to those of the Slavophils and especially the Panslavists), whose views are so actual for our own day, one sees how completely Pushkin's poems were in accord with the basic tendencies of Russian nationalistic historical and political thought, and particularly with its anti-Polish aspects. As a matter of fact, the sources of the historic, philosophic, and religious inspirations of the Slavophils were quite different; Pushkin had nothing to tell the Slavophils in this sphere. Yet it is sometimes difficult to resist the impression that they had him in mind and that his "anti-Polish trilogy" was a sort of poetical noose cast over Russian political thought, the coils of which bound even the most courageous and the most spirited.[13] It appeared that the Muscovite Slavophil system was unable to find any solution for the Russian-Polish problem which would harmonize
186* with the general conception of Slavic unity. The Slavophil
668 systems, both Russian and Polish (to which I shall come later),
648 failed to produce anything positive and creative: the Russo-Polish
● 829 antagonism in these systems could be dissipated only at the expense of either Russia or Poland; there was no other alternative. This applies especially to the Russian side—to Aksakov, who in

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[13] Cf. my article "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," as mentioned above.

the presence of foreigners preferred not to speak of this "family 186*
quarrel," and to Pogodin, who, forgetting the ethnographic fron- 668
tiers of Great Russia, attempted to enclose Poland within eth- 648
nographic and "democratic" lines. In Pogodin's opinion the lat- 829 ●
ter boundaries were soon destined to disappear, since the only obstacle to an alliance with Russia lay in the Polish gentry, of "mixed Celtic and Latin origin," which should be destroyed by the Russian government with all possible speed. Aksakov used similar arguments in regard to the old Polish frontiers, while both Strakhov and Katkov attacked these frontiers even more vehemently.[14] Samarin saw in "Latin and Catholic Poland" "not only a historical contradiction of Russia but of all the Slav world." According to him Poland, "having become a poisoned sword and an instrument of destruction in alien hands, has received the same poison into her own flesh and blood." Her only salvation lay in union with Russia, which should become "the historical representative of the Orthodox and Slavic element." This would, in Samarin's view, be the triumph of the one cultural view over the other, although he admitted the possibility of Poland's separation from Russia. Aksakov admitted this separation in the same way, prophesying that in such case Poland would be eaten by Germany. But even here we see the break of the Slavophil conception: the Slavophils indeed did not know what to do with Poland. However, the most characteristic speculations were connected with the analysis of possibilities as to how a real union between Russia and Poland might be realized. The Slavophils were sure that the only obstacle between Poland and Russia was the Polish Latinism and Catholicism—in other words the Polish Western civilization. They thought that this civilization did not penetrate to the masses and that only the Polish inelligentsia—the gentry—represented that civilization. Consistently enough, they advocated the liquidation of this class—a liquidation which would bring into the Russian pale the amorphous masses of the Polish peasantry. This was

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[14] The case of Strakhov, however, was less simple in this circumstance. Cf. my article "Russian Polish Cultural Relations," *New Europe*, New York, 1944.

186* the liberation and regeneration which the Muscovite Slavophils
668 were trying to secure to the enslaved Polish nation. The whole
648 armament of their arguments and weapons may be found in the
● 829 writings of Aksakov, Pogodin, Samarin, Leskov, Danilevsky, and Dostoevsky. In the light of the present Slav movements organized by Soviet Russia and in the light of the present extermination of the Polish intelligentsia under Russia's "liberating protection" one may see that the most audacious dreams of the Slavophils and Panslavists of the nineteenth century are now being realized. The Russian autocracy was not able to use all means of extermination against the Polish spiritual culture because some of the elements of it were attached to a social regime which the Russian autocracy was bound to protect and preserve in Russia itself. From this point of view Stalin's hands are more free, and his policy of Russification might become more efficient in its destructiveness. However, even at the time of Alexander II and Alexander III, in accordance with the plans of the Muscovite Slavophils and Panslavists the Russian government began certain reforms aiming at the gradual liquidation of the Polish landed gentry through the emancipation of the peasants and through measures favoring the latter at the expense of the former. These reforms would have been entirely justifiable if they had not followed the principle *divide et impera.* Russia was usurping the role of a liberator of the peasants, because the Polish revolutionary national government of 1863 proclaimed the emancipation of the peasants and promised them land without any compensation for the landlords. At this time the Slavophil school became indeed a political one.

And here something very important should be stressed: the Russian democratic and radical groupings were sympathetic to the Poles just because of the democratic character of this insurrection. Such was the attitude of the society *Zemlya i Volya* and of Herzen in his *Kolokol.* They were even trying to prevent the Russian soldiers and officers from fighting against Poles. Herzen at that time published eloquent articles in which he attacked the

"patriotic syphilis" which was raging in Russia. The whole of 186*
reactionary and nationalistic Russia launched its offensive pre- 668
cisely at this point—the slogan was that the Polish Insurrection 648
was not a national one and that presumably the Polish masses 829 ●
had nothing in common with it. This point of view became the leitmotif of all Katkov's writings, but very soon Aksakov's *Den'* (the organ of the Slavophils) joined Katkov's *Moskovskiya Vedomosti*. The Slavophil phraseology followed that of the government, and Aksakov as well as Samarin explained the Russian-Polish War of 1863 as a war of Slavs against Latinism, as a war of Russia against the Polish landlords. We may see that history indeed repeats itself. The same slogans were used during this war when it was necessary to abolish the legitimate Polish government in London. Herzen understood this situation very well. On January 1, 1864 he wrote in his *Kolokol* as follows: "Having grasped here and there some vague ideas about the social mission of Russia and about her lack of any solid aristocratic principle, our sweet dreamers preach that Russia represents some sort of democratic empire, some sort of kingdom of *equality* and masses, that *she* fights with Poland in the name of the freedom of the peasants against the landlords, etc. Do not be mistaken. . . ."[15]

Sumner in his excellent book *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 186*
1937) brings very correct comments to this development: "The 175
Polish revolt of 1863 unleashed century-old hatred and fears. In 648
the years which followed, the old 'Congress Poland' was mercilessly dragooned within the framework of the administration common to Russia proper while the 'Western Lands' Lithuania, White Russia, and the Western Ukraine were subjected to every measure of Russianism. Meanwhile a campaign was initiated of the same nature in the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia; and, to show without mistaking that Russian meant Great Russian alone, the Little Russian or Ukrainian cultural revival of that time was successfully attacked by Moscow, above all by the prohibition in 1876 of the use of the Ukrainian 'dialect' for any academic or

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[15] *Istoriya Rossii v xix Veke*, vol. 3, Z. Lensky, "Polskoe Vosstanie," p. 322.

186* Russian people" as a guarantee against the dangers of European
812 rationalism.

3. Goldmann, Pogodin, Stur

186* The above mentioned remarks of Sumner about the role of
829 men like Samarin and Cherkassky illustrate the fact that although in the beginning the Slavophils were not always in *odore sanctitatis* in the official quarters in Petersburg, that situation changed; the government appeared ready to use some of their conceptions. However, similar arguments and weapons for the fight against Poland—sometimes even sharpened ones—were offered to the government from other sides also. We may find a fascinating example of this in the Goldmann episode.

Charles Edward Goldmann, a German and a paid agent of the Russian government, wrote two books: *Die Europäische Pentarchie*, published in 1839 and *Europa's Cabinette und Allianzen*, published in 1862, and several memoirs which he presented to the Russian government. In his writings he tried to prove that the original religion of the Poles was the eastern Greek religion, that this religion had been uprooted by the Latin priests, that the oldest Polish Christian cathedral in Gniezno had been transformed from a Greek into a Catholic one. He attacked and derided the Polish emigration: "Polish emigration?—Does not England hang it *en masse* in Canada, while it dies from starvation in the hospitable England and the French throw it as a prey to the Bedouins, to the roulette, or to the *rouge et noir?* Russia knows very well that England and France in their nobleness and magnanimity would put the emigration next to the lackeys in their state carriage."

Goldmann also gives very valuable advice to the Russian government on how to eradicate the Polish spirit. First of all, Poland must be cut from the West, and Polish scholarship must be submerged in the Russian, the Latin traditions must be uprooted, and above all the Napoleonic Codex which rules Poland must be liquidated; the other Latin institution which must be destroyed is the

Catholic church. Goldmann elaborated a very systematic plan for 186*
a consistent and gradual weakening of the Catholic church and 829
its prestige in Poland. I have no space to enter into the striking details of that program which Kucharzewski revealed in his book; enough to say that it was indeed a diabolic program of systematic spoliation of faith through, first of all, confusion of the minds of the faithful. His[1] aim was not only the Catholic Church but also the Uniate Church. Poles, White Ruthenians, and Ukrain- [795]
ians were to become, as Russian subjects, members of the dominant church of the Russian state. In his cautiously elaborated strategy not a single weapon has been forgotten: the building of Orthodox churches, the substitution of Orthodox crosses in the countryside for the Cahotlic ones, the institution of the Greek calendar, the organization of a press of Orthodox propaganda for the people, the appointment of only Orthodox directors and inspectors in the schools, etc. The Catholic priesthood must be weakened by the favoring of sectarianism and material spoliation. "It is difficult," he says, "to secularize one monastery; but the annihilation of 194 monasteries and the refusal of any noviciates in order to create from the unused wealth larger funds for the clergy will find many advocates among the clergy themselves. In general, the state should not hinder but help the clergy to surely and freely ruin and prostitute itself."[17]

This was, in broad lines, the program for eradication of all Polish ties with the West. One is justified in asking if this system which was adopted by the Russian government in Poland was not very close to the main ideas of the Slavophils and Panslavists as far as the problem of Russian-Polish relations is concerned. As was mentioned before, at the time when Cherkassky and Samarin were active in Poland Slavophilism degenerated into Panrussianism. Parallel to this there developed, especially during the time of the Slavic Congress in Moscow in 1867, Panslavic conceptions of the Slavs united under Russian leadership. The most complete and consistently developed program for the sub-

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[17] Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 281-297.

1 [Charles Edward Goldmann ---Analyst]

186* jugation of Slavs to Russia was formulated in 1867 by the Slovak, ● 829 Ludevit Štur, in his book *Slavdom and the World of the Future.* His book, which was republished in 1909 by such modern Russian scholars in Slavic as Lamansky, Grot and Florinsky, who, primarily because of their Slavophil and Panslavist tendencies, considered Štur a "genius of his nation," represents indeed a quite exceptional tribute to the cultural, moral, and political forces of the Russian empire. Štur had, however, predecessors not only in the above mentioned Slavophils but chiefly in the person of the famous Russian historian, politician, and journalist M. Pogodin, who himself represents a bridge between Slavophilism, Panrussianism, and Panslavism. I shall not enter into an analysis of all the voluminous works of Pogodin; sufficient will be his memorandum written in 1838, in which we find items already known to us from Nadezhdin and Gogol and which will reappear in almost similar phrasing in Stur's apology of Russia.

Pogodin writes: "Russia! What a wonderful phenomenon on the world arena. . . . Russia is a population of sixty million people whom it was possible to count in addition to those of whom there is yet no account, a population which increases by a million every year and will soon reach a hundred million. . . . And let us add thirty millions of our brothers and first cousins, the Slavs scattered throughout all Europe from Constantinople to Venice and from Morea to the Baltic and the North Sea, the Slavs in whom flows the same blood as our own, who speak the same language and therefore, by the laws of nature are sympathetic with us, who in spite of geographic and political separation, form one moral unity with us, by origin and by language! Let us *subtract* this amount from neighboring Austria and Turkey, and later from the whole of Europe, and let us add it to ourselves. What will remain with them, and how much shall we represent? One's thought and breath are stopped! A ninth part of the entire inhabited earth, and almost a ninth part of mankind! Half of the equator, a quarter of a meridian! Russia is a state which includes all soils, all climates and is rich in all indispensable products. . . ." Further he enumerates gold and silver, which Europe no longer has, mountains, bread with which they will feed Europe, and forests with which they will rebuild Europe should it be destroyed; they will clothe Europe. He stresses the fact that because of the cheapness of labor and the moderate needs of the workers there is no other place where trade might develop so successfully as in Russia. But all these physical powers of Russia are nothing in comparison with her moral powers. These are common sense, daring, intelligence, patience, military virtues. All these powers form "one enormous machine, organized in the most simple and successful manner, ruled by the hand of one man, by the hand of the Russian tsar, who at any moment, by one gesture may put it in movement and give to it any direction and produce any speed." "I ask, is there anyone who would be able to compete with us and whom we would not be able to bring to obedience? Is not the political fate of Europe and therefore the *fate of the world* in our hands if only *we desire to decide it?*"[18]

The first part of Štur's books is a ferocious attack against Western Europe. He throws himself against Catholicism with Lutheran violence, against Protestantism with perhaps less ardor; he vehemently criticizes European political life, European aristocracy, European bourgeoisie, the spoliations of morals, luxury, demoralization, and economic structure and comes quickly to the Slavic village community, which in his eyes appears to be the magic secret of historical success, prosperity, and happiness. Another factor guaranteeing success and prosperity is a strong government, the lack of which seems to him to be the essential vice of Slavic states other than Russia. Russia represents a glorious exception: "Having taken away from the nobility all political rights, the Russian government by its autocracy rendered an immeasurable service in its time not only to Russia but to all Slavdom"[19] I

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[18] A. N. Pypin, *Panslavism v Proshlom i Nastoyashchem*, 1878, "Knigoizdatelstvo Kolos," 1913, pp. 87-88.

[19] *Slavyanstvo i Mir Budushchago, L. Stur*, St. Petersburg, 1909, p. 192.

186* 829 can not quote all his declamations spread over many pages about the *tsar batyushka* and the love of the Russian people for him.

After these statements he turns his attacks against Austria and destroys the conceptions of Austroslavism. He also demonstrates that Slavs, because of their geographical situation, their religious differentiation, cultural differences, and so on are unable to organize any federation. They are weak, they are simply fragments of one nation, and because of that "the concept of federative states has no sense."[20]

The conclusion is obvious: "There remains a third road, the only one which is sure and has a future—the union of all Slavs with Russia."[21] Then come all kinds of apologetic epithets, comparisons, in which Russia appears as a lighthouse in the dark night, assertions that the Slavs must not start their new life with the declining West but with rising Russia. "Russia . . . is the mother and the leader of all our national family." He is aware, however, of some difficulties as far as the attitude of other Slavs toward Russia is concerned. But he solves them easily according to his assertion that the only Slavs who hate Russia are Poles. By their whole civilization they are opposed to Russia. Poles did not want, as did the Russians, to subordinate themselves to one monarchical will. They did not know how to organize their life, and they had been defeated by Russia, to the great and lasting benefit of all of the Slavs. Had Poland resisted, Russia would have been far away from Europe and would not be able to help the Slavs; and of course the Poles never had any qualifications for leadership among the Slavs.

186* 829 517 With the Czechs the situation is less complicated: "In their present prosaic conditions they only weakly attract other Slavs. Although literature is diligently developed, in higher learning, in philosophy and history, nothing outstanding appears, with the exception of Palacký's *History of Bohemia*. And in arts and poetry the Czechs do not possess, with the exception of Mácha, a single

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

7: Lednicki S-4 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

creative talent . . . material prosperity is the idol toward which the whole nation tends."[22] The Czechs cannot remain in their seclusion or create anything great—therefore they must join a greater entity. The so-called Illyrians and Catholic Croatians—"flabby," "seduced by Austria," "coaxed by Czechs," will be "inspired by the Slavic idea as soon as they rightly understand it." Of course Serbia and Bulgaria will agree. The end of the book is a kind of glorious finale. He brings an enumeration of all the great battles in Russian history. He stresses the fact that the main power of Russia is in the union of the people with the tsar, that the learned people are work-loving and conscious of the greatness of Russia; that the army is deeply devoted to the tsar and to the fatherland; the clergy, "pious and zealous"; the people, "kind, strong and obedient." 186* 829 517

Then comes the "Russian Geography"—"Russia represents nine Turkish empires, twenty-eight Scandinavias, twenty-nine Austrias, thirty Germanies, and thirty-six Frances. The power of Russia is spread from the north-eastern corner of Asia, from Kamchatka, to the distant north of America, from the distant European North almost to the Carpathians, Danube, Black Sea, and farther to Ararat itself." Then follow figures concernings export and import, enumerations of Great Russian names, and so on. He concludes that everything works to the advantage of Russia—"Friend and enemy, war and peace, revolts and quietness;—Russia cast off the whole of Europe. She had the decisive voice at the Vienna Congress. . . . With one arm she embraces Asia, the second extends to America; inaccessible to Europe, she is a neighbor of the rotten Austria and the dead Turkish corps." Russia is the agglomeration of great and small things, of things divided and united; she is full of contradictions—Christianity, paganism, Islam, Byzantine churches, mosques, Catholic cathedrals. "She combines Europe with Asia, East with West, the dawn with the sunset, in other words, in the Russian kingdom the sun never sets."[23] 186* 829

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 146-150.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 150-152.

186* The final conclusion is that the "immense Russian power pushes
● 829 ahead, it cannot be quieted, it constantly must look to new arenas for its activity. The Slavic consoience strongly awakens in Russia . . . and it can not longer allow its relative tribes to remain in serfdom and shame. . . . To make of the whole of Slavdom a base is the only natural goal of Russian policy."[24]

4. Danilevsky (1822-1885)

The most radical Russian formulation of the Panslavistic program in its two directions—Constantinople and the Western Slavs—unified by a violent anti-Europeanism, was given by N. Ya. Danilevsky whose book *Russia and Europe* appeared in its first edition in 1871 and in its second in 1888 with a preface by another Panslavist, N. Strakhov. I cannot quote here the five hundred pages of this book in which the most fantastic idealization of the Russian past is married to the most vehement disdain and hatred for Western Europe and finally organized into a cynical political theory whose aim is to elaborate a system which would secure to Russia
186* a permanent political supremacy in the world. Danilesvky's starting
829 point is the denial of the conception of humanity and civilization
814 as a whole, to which he opposes a conception of struggle between different cultural historical types based mainly on language groupings.

This conception of cultural historical types deserves special
[177 attention. Danilevsky combined the theme of Hegel, according to
181] which various nations appear in succession on the historical stage as consecutive and ever more complete incarnations of the universal spirit, with the idea of the German historian Rückert about the existence of separate cultural historical types. "For Danilevsky such a cultural historical type is realized by every tribe or every family of peoples characterized by a separate language or group of languages sufficiently near to each other . . . if that tribe or family of peoples is in general, by its spiritual disposition, capa-

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

ble of historical development and has already risen from infancy. 186*
However, not all nations are equally capable of historical de- 829
velopment. There are some whose destiny is to serve as ethno- 814
graphical material to other stronger and more stabilized nations. Those others are God's whips whose mission is to smash from the face of the earth the outlived cultures and nations. Danilevsky gives a series of historical cultural types: Egyptian, Chinese, Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician, Indian, Iranian, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, New Semitic, German-Roman or European, and finally Slavic with Russia at its head. Each of these types works out its own culture, and the principles of the civilization of one type are not transferred to another. Various types differ by the degree of versatility of their culture. Danilevsky sees four spheres of cultural-historical activity: the religious, the strictly cultural, the political, and the social-economic. No one of the listed cultural-historical types developed all of these four spheres of activity at once, with the exception of the Slavs and Russians, whose mission will be to accomplish a complete 'four-principled' culture."[25]

The road to that Russian predominance is a purely nationalistic 186*
one; and, neglecting any declamation on Russian religiosity and 829
other well known features of the Russian character as presented 668
in the writings of the Slavophils and abandoning all ideas about brotherhood and universal love, he brutally opens the door into the great future of Russia. Russia is destined for that future, but the road to it leads first of all to Constantinople and secondly to the emancipation of the Slavic nations. I shall not bring to the fore all his violent criticism applied to "rotten Europe." The Russian anti-Westernism here reached its climax. The book is supported by quasi-scientific arguments taken from anthropology, zoology, geology, geography, and the social sciences. It might be considered one of the most important scientific manifestos or rationalistic Panslavic theories. However, the most important implications of the book are, of course, the political ones. "Being

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[25] Danilevsky, *op cit.*, and article by V. Myakotin on Danilevsky in *the Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'*, T-A Granat, vol. 17, pp. 552-557.

186* foreign to the European world because of its internal structure,
● 829 and in addition being too strong and powerful to occupy the place
668 of one of the members of the European family, to be one of the great European powers, Russia cannot occupy a place worthy of herself and of Slavdom in history other than by becoming the chief figure of an independent political system of states and by being a counter balance to Europe in its entirety. These are the advantages: the utility and the significance of the Panslavic alliance in its relationship to Russia."[26] And this is another programatic assertion: "Sooner or later, whether we want it or not, the fight with Europe (or at least with the greater part of it) is inevitable, and it will be a fight because of the eastern question, that is, for the freedom and independence of the Slavs, for the possession of Tsargrad—for everything which in the opinion of Europe represents an object of illegitimate Russian ambition and which in the opinion of every Russian worthy of that name represents the inevitable demand of Russia's historical mission."[27]

186* Of course, on his road, Danilevsky fatally met Poland. His
829 fight in this case was very simple. He liquidated Poland with the help of all kinds of historical accusations and political insinuations. In the same way he destroyed every spiritual cultural tie between Russia and Europe. His formula was not at all complicated, and one cannot really deny that this formula is the key to Stalin's present policy. When referring to the theory of political balance he says: "It is not at all difficult to be convinced that between Europe and Russia in this as well as in other respects there exists a direct and complete contradiction. It is precisely the balance of political forces in Europe that is harmful and even fatal for Russia; and the disturbance of this balance, from what ever side it may come, is advantageous and beneficent."[28]

After several historical examples, Danilevsky gives the following formula: "At every disturbance of balance Europe is naturally divided into two parties—one, the disturbant with those who *volens nolens* are on his side, and the victims of the disturbants who seek to restore the balance. Both parties naturally try to bring to their side the only one strong neighbor who is, by the nature of things (whatever, by the way, might be the forms, words, and appellations applied), outside of their family, outside their system. Therefore both parties flatter Russia. One seeks help from her for the conservation of the obtained predominance; the other one for liberation from the power, influence, and danger coming from the side of the disturbant. Russia may choose of her own will. On the contrary, during the existence of balance the political activity of Europe is directed outside, and its hostility against Russia is given free march: here, instead of two parties one after the other flattering Russia, Europe flows into one entity openly or secretly hostile to Russia. We must therefore abandon the thought of any solidarity with European interests, of any ties with one or the other political combination of European powers, and first of all acquire a complete freedom of action, complete possibility to unite with every European state, on only one condition—that such an alliance should be advantageous for us without any consideration as to what kind of political principle is represented at a given time by this or that state."[29]

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[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 437.
[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 474.
[28] *Op. cit.*, p. 486.

It would not be arbitrary to assert that if for the contemporaries of Danilevsky his book was a "catechism" or codex of "Slavophilism" (words of N. N. Strakhov), for us it might be considered the bible of Stalin's present foreign policy. In the light of Russia's present play with England, America, and France, not to mention Germany and China, the guiding ideas of Danilevsky become particularly significant.

From the historical and moral point of view this book cannot resist any critique. Danilevsky followed the Slavophils in their fanatic admiration for the Russia of the Muscovite period. Even from the point of view of Russian imperialism that Slavophil pre-

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[29] *Op. cit.*, pp. 488-89.

186* dilection for the Ivans of Moscow and hatred for Peter the Great
● 829 were not justifiable. As far as the territorial expansion of Russia is concerned, the Russia of the Petersburgian period did not acquire or "liberate" fewer nations and lands than the tsars of Moscow.[30]

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538 Besides, for every unprejudiced historian one thing is quite clear—that the universal achievements of Russia in the field of spiritual culture were genuinely connected with her collaboration with Western Europe. The Russian national genius was silent or inarticulate for centuries, and only when the magic wand of the West touched the Russian soul did the voice of Avvakum become the melody of Pushkin's poetry. How can we imagine all the great accomplishments of Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Tschaikowsky, and Rimsky-Korsakov—in other words the Russian culture of the nineteenth century—without Europe and her inspiration? This point of view has been strongly stressed on many occasions by Russians themselves, first of all by Vladimir Solov'ev.

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829 From the moral point of view the ideology of Danilevsky is essentially immoral. Where messianistic arguments are adduced in support love changes quickly and easily into hatred. Danilevsky pays some official tribute to the slogans of "brotherhood" and "Slavic reciprocity" brought to the fore by the first Russian and non-Russian Slavophils. But the essence of his doctrine is pure national selfishness. "Life and theory," says Solov'ev, "somehow very easily and unnoticeably replace the just and human formula of the national idea by the formula of violence and national murder. Not by any means do all the advocates of this idea directly preach subdual and destruction of foreign nations; but there exist roundabout means, softer in appearance although just as murderous in spirit. 'Our nation, by its historical march and by the natural succession of national culture, replaces all other nations who have passed away and are passing away.' This 'replacement' also is not without a cruel, bloody struggle and various national murders, but the final result is attained as if by itself. Such a

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[30] This point, by the way, was stressed by Pypin and by Sumner.

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softened formula of national selfishness was taken from the Germans by our Slavophils, who applied to Russia that which their teachers applied to Germanism; this view was systematically worked out among us by the author of *Russia and Europe*. Between him and the former Slavophils there is, however, a difference which he himself points out although he does not always observe it. The latter affirm that the Russian nation has a universal historical calling, as the bearer of the final international enlightenment; Danilevsky, rejecting every international task, considers Russia and Slavdom only a special cultural-historic type,—however, the most perfect and complete (four-principled in his terminology), containing within itself the advantages of former types. Difference of opinion, therefore, appears only in abstract terms which do not change the essence of the matter. It must be noted, however, that the orthodox Slavophils (Khomyakov, Kireevsky, the Aksakovs, Samarin), not rejecting universal history and admitting, although only in abstract principle, the solidarity of all mankind, were nearer than Danilevsky to the Christian idea and could affirm it without falling into obvious external contradiction."[81]

I think that there is nothing to be added to this essentially correct critique of Danilevsky's system. One must indeed recognize that from a certain point of view Danilevsky finds himself very far from the first generation of the Muscovite Slavophils who were trying to marry their Russian nationalism and Slavophilism with universal humanitarianism. They had a mystic idea of the nation and a respect for it as for a person, a religious entity. (True enough only for the Russian nation.) Danilevsky lost all these things. There is no spiritualism, no idealism in his approach—just as in the case of another man, Constantine Leont'ev, who was very close to Danilevsky's conceptions and who might be considered the ultramontane of the whole school. Without any great enthusiasm or admiration for the Slavs, but simply guided by a fanatical fear of revolution, liberalism, and Europeanism, stress-

[81] Solov'ev, *Works*, vol. v, pp. 85-86.

186* ing the fact that Byzantinism was the most definite historical type
829 ("for the state it means autocracy, for religion—Orthodoxy, for the moral world—contempt for earthly things, repugnance for the dreams about the earthly happiness of people, humility") and that the "Byzantine spirit with its principles and influences, like the complicated tissues of the nervous system, penetrated he whole Russian social organism," he proclaimed that: "Russia should be frozen so that she may not decay," as every living process ends in death and decomposition—the state in which Western Europe now finds itself. Although there are no universalistic elements in the Russian past, the Russian civilization must be preserved as it is.

For Leont'ev all means are good as "politics are not ethics." He calls for courage, for people who will not fear the words "reaction" and "reactionary," who will understand "that nothing can be achieved without violence" and that in order to stop the "defrosting" of Russia "retrogressive reforms" are indispensable, first of all "the fight against public education because if Russia has succeeded in her resistance against the spirit of the times, she owes it to the ignorance of the Russian people."[32]

5. Tyutchev (1803-1873)

186* Perhaps from the purely chronological point of view Tyutchev
648 should have been discussed before Danilevsky. Indeed some of Danilevsky's most essential views were first brought to public opinion in 1869 in the review *Zarya*, in which he said that: "Europe not accidentally but in her very essence is hostile to us. Therefor only when she is in conflict with herself might she be safe for us."[33] In a letter to Aksakov on the second of October, 1867, Tyutchev said: "Civil war in the West is our best political ally."

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[32] K. Leont'ev, *Vostok, Rossiya i Slavyanstvo*, vol. I, vol. II, Moscow, 1885-1886; vol. I, p. 81; vol. II pp. 86, 109-120, 78-152, 180, 24-27; quoted by P. N. Milyukov (Milioukov), *Le mouvement intellectuel russe*, Paris, 1918, pp. 400-410.

[33] K. Pigarev, F. I. "Tyutchev i problemy vneshnei politiki Rosii" in *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, vol. 19-21, Moscow, 1935, p. 206.

the poem of 1831 gives a rather peculiar consolation to the Poles 186*
—this is what Tyutchev says to them: "Believe the word of the 649
Russian nation: we shall sacredly preserve your ashes, and our common freedom as a Phoenix will find its birth in them."

In the recent works devoted to Tyutchev such as those of Pigarev, Gippius, Stremoukhov, Lezhnev, one important detail has been revealed. Both the Slavophils and Tyutchev representing the landed Russian nobility, were deeply impressed by the revolutionary movements in Europe. Tyutchev in his anti-revolutionism, became a kind of Russian Joseph de Maistre and he very soon came to the conception that in Europe there existed two powers: Revolution and Russia. He developed this conception in his articles and poems and for many years he was busy with the organization of Russian propaganda in Europe for the spreading of his political ideas.

One of his[1] most significant poems in this respect was the poem 186*
The Sea and the Rock, in which he gives a picture of how the 829 ●
gigantic foot of the rock will appease the stormy waves of the 538
sea. The idea which was symbolically presented in this poem was developed in a political language in his article *Russia and Revolution* written in 1848.[87] His conception of the greatness of Russia developed as a function of the mission which he attributed to Russia; and here his imagination becomes boundless. In his famous poem *Russian Geography* he mentions Moscow, Petersburg, and Constantinople as the *capitals* of the Russian empire, in which he sees "seven interior seas and seven great rivers from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian empire."

This was written by a poet who, although he revealed in his lyrical poetry his tenderness for the "original charm" of the "poor villages," "humble nakedness," "boring nature," of the "land of everlasting patience," did not himself care at all for the Russian landscape. This is what he wrote in a letter to his wife:

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[87] Pigarev, *op. cit.*, *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, pp. 195-196.

1 [Tyutchev's --- Analyst]

7: Lednicki S-4 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

186* "An immense plain—the Scythian plain which you didn't like on
● 829 my relief map, where it spreads out like an enormous spot, is
538 not more pleasant in reality."[38]

186* Not less striking than his[1] *Russian Geography* are his his-
829 torical views and the formulation of the Russian mission which
814 we find in his two French articles *Russia and Revolution* and *Rome and the Roman Question*, and in a large work which he was preparing — *Russia and the West.* In all these writings he draws an apocalyptic picture of the destruction of the Europe of Charlemagne, of the Europe of the Treaties of 1815, of the destruction of the Papacy, Catholicism, and Protestantism. He demands a definitive formation of a great Orthodox empire, "the legitimate empire of the East, which will be realized by the absorption of Austria by Russia and the 'return' (*sic!*) of Constantinople to Russia and by the union of the two churches." The conclusion of these events will be symbolized by the Russian tsar as the Orthodox emperor in Constantinople, as the master and protector of Italy and Rome, and by an Orthodox pope in Rome as a subject of the emperor.[39] In his article *Papacy and the Roman Question* he constantly attacks all kinds of "usurpatory" tendencies of Western thought and seems completely unaware of the fact that his own conception represents the most fantastic historical usurpation—although not at all unreal in the light of our days. This is the way in which he ends his article: "Permit me to recall in conclusion, an incident connected with the visit which the Emperor of Russia made to Rome in 1846. One may still remember perhaps the general emotion with which the Emperor was received upon his appearance in the Church of St. Peter,—this was the appearance of the Orthodox Emperor who returned to Rome after several centuries of absence—and the electric flash which went through the crowd when it saw him going to pray at the tombs of the apostles. This emotion was legitimate. The prostrated Emperor was not alone; all Russia was prostrated with him.

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[38] Leshnev, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[39] Pigarev, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

*[Tyutchev--Analyst]

Let us hope that he did not pray in vain before the holy relics!"[40] 186*
The *Revue des Deux Mondes* published this article and prefaced 829
it with a small and rather melancholic note: "Charlemagne is no 814
longer in Paris or in Aix-la-Chapelle, he is in Moscow or in St. Petersburg. And one must above all keep in mind the fact that the new Charlemagne coming to Rome clearly pretends to bring, as the former one, a great material power, but he has no intention of coming there to find a spiritual, a moral consecration of his power. Far from that; it is he who, so to say, comes to consecrate the papacy. . . ." "One might make many other reflections upon this subject, and give some peculiar details on the march of ideas in one part of Russian society, and show how the school which formerly had Monsieur de Maistre as its chief and which made its gospel from the doctrines of *Du Pape* arrived gradually, by a kind of national logic, to find that the real pope was the tsar."[41]

But what is especially striking here is that Tyutchev appeared 186*
able to marry in his thought and in his heart this conception of a 829
Russian Charlemagne in Constantinople and Rome with his own formula of Russia, a land of "officers, barracks, *chin* and *knut*." Justly asks Lezhnev: "In the name of what is the 'humble Russia' to obtain 'the thunder of earth and sword of heaven?' . . ." "Tsarist Russia spreads like an enormous spot over the map of the world—this is Tyutchev's 'Russian geography'. . . . What is Russia promising to those innumerable nations which she intends to subdue? Nothing but the quietness of the cemetery or of a northern desert."[42] Indeed this whole transformation of "barracks" into St. Sophia and St. Peter is a terrible fairy tale and on this occasion Lezhnev says that the theocratic tiara suits Nicholas I as "a saddle a cow."[43] As we know there are some other candidates for the same saddle. In his poems launched against the Vatican Tyutchev attacks the Pope because of his "fatal word": "the freedom of conscience is delirium." And this was written by

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[40] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January 1, 1850, p. 133.
[41] *Op. cit.*, p. 118.
[42] A. Lezhnev, *Dva Poeta* . . . Gos. Izd., 1934, pp. 13-14.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

186* 329 a Russian of the time of Nicholas! Certainly the most deceiving trait in the whole Tyutchev episode is his hypocrisy—that play of his with love and hatred. Repulsive indeed is this Tartuffe who so much resembles Saltykov's Yudushka Golovlev, constantly spreading around him his ointment of sacred hatred. The starting point of all his conceptions, as I showed before, was his fear of European revolution. This also explains in part his attitude toward the Polish insurrections and toward the Hungarian Insurrection of 1848. Russia had to be strong in order to be able to save the world from the catastrophe. We see here the presence of his former altruistic conceptions—Europe is in a state of ideological disaster, the world is in danger—the "Russian rock" of legitimism will save it! However, this was not quite so. Russia's tragic days during the Crimean campaign brought our political Tartuffe to some different views. He consoled himself by the following significant consideration: "In this ultimate fight we should perish if the West were one, but it is two: the red one and the one which must be absorbed by it. We have been opposing it for forty years, and now here we are on the border of the precipice. And now the red one in its turn will save us."[44] This is the best revelation of Tyutchev's universal historiosophic conceptions.

Merezhkovsky once justly observed that "one" of the traits of Russian Slavophilism was its "softbodiness," bonelessness and inability, lack of desire to carry its thought to the end. And Tyutchev "puts bones into the body and dots the *i's;* his logic is merciless." . . . "Tyutchev is clever, and his politics are not stupid; but as far as his conscience is concerned it enters least of all with his politics."[45] Not only hypocrisy but really a complete lack of human loyalty characterized him. During the whole of the life of Nicholas I this "bishop of Russian imperialism" did nothing but spread incense around Nicholas. But as soon as the latter died, after the Crimean War, Tyutchev shouted: "Thou wert not a tsar but an actor" and expressed his indignation about "the monstrous stupidity of this ill-fated man." 186* 829●

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[44] Pigarev, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

[45] Lezhnev, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

This was one missionary of holy Russia, a prophet who appeared before the world with "a crucifix and a dagger" in his hands. Let us now meet one who for the triumph of his Russian truth was ready to change his crucifix into a dagger.

6. Dostoevsky (1821-1881)

Without entering into a detailed description of Dostoevsky's well-known messianic conceptions about the "God-bearing nation" and all his speculations about Russia and Europe, which he develops in his novels and short stories as well as in his *Diary of a Writer*, I shall confine myself to his general philosophy of history. The first thing I should like to stress is that the book of Dostoevsky is a book almost as much about Europe as about Russia—if not even more about Europe. His "Russian boys" are constantly busy with the Russian God—but even more with the Catholic God—with the Inquisition, with socialism, European rationalism, atheism, revolutionism, and so on. And this is so in spite of the fact that in his novels we remain in Russia, constantly in Russian monasteries, taverns, St. Petersburg apartments or streets, or in some provincial Russian towns. Another thing which should be remembered is that Dostoevsky from his very childhood and youth was a pupil first of all of European literature. If one should try to discover in the texts of Dostoevsky any proof of genuine and real sympathy for that European civilization which formed his art and thought, one would undoubtedly be unsuccessful. He very often declaims his enthusiastic love for Europe, but that love is addressed only to the "holy stones" of the "European cemetery." On the other hand the types of Europeans who appear in his novels—French, Italians, Poles—as well as the pictures of Europe taken either from the gambling casinos, London streets, French railways, or Parisian department stores, are deeply repulsive—with some few exceptions: Mr. Astlee in *The Gambler* and

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186* Dostoevsky's feeling for Germany, especially for Bismarck. 538 This obvious antipathy, if not hatred, appeared in Dostoevsky ●829 after his Siberian exile. One would be willing to explain this by the negative impression which Europe made upon Dostoevsky when he visited it. However, I think that the motives of his feel- 186* ings were of a different nature. Dostoevsky was sent to Siberia 829 because of his European infatuations. We know how deeply he suffered during his exile and indeed how unpleasantly he denied his former opinions and appeared ready to embrace less dangerous and less politically compromising roads of thought, although in his situation it was difficult to be heroic to the end. Dostoevsky suffered because of Europe, and I think that this personal motive has to be taken into consideration. It would be useless here to quote all Dostoevsky's astonishing and fantastic conceptions of what he thought to be the real historical relationship beween Russia and Europe. We know that Dostoevsky was always ready to say that "to be a real Russian means to be a real European," and that some of his heroes felt when abroad that they were the unique Europeans among Europeans, that French were French, English English, Germans German, but only Russians besides being Russians were also Europeans, and have I to recall his really incredible and almost absurd speculations about the "Russian seekers"—Onegin and Aleko—in his Pushkin speech? Only an aberration of mind could bring one to assert that Onegin killed his friend and Aleko his wife perhaps because of their longing for universalistic ideals. Dostoevsky's deep belief was that only the Russian thought was able to embrace universalistic goals. By these trends of his beliefs he certainly closely approached the Slavophils and later the Russian *narodniki* as well as the Panslavists; and in his political articles he very often waved the banners of Slavic brotherhood, of a Panslav union under Russian leadership. And one easily remembers his piercing and hysterical shouts: "Constantinople must be ours!" But not all these slogans which, after all, in Dostoevsky's time had become trivial clichés, should interest us here. More significant, as I mentioned before, is Dostoev-

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sky's general philosophy of history, and this has been brilliantly studied and presented by L. Grossman in his study *Dostoevsky and Europe*. Dostoevsky likes to hide the horrible truth about man and mankind with the help of a Russian ikon which miraculously allows him to escape from responsibility. His heroes very often act in the same way, and Dostoevsky usually insinuates that their monstrous moral degradations are due to Western European influences. He constantly uses the method of substitution, attaching European labels to the most ferocious manifestations of his own thought. He very freely uses the author's privilege of disclaiming responsibility for the opinions of his heroes. Shestov, however, seized Dostoevsky in his elusive jumps of thought and brought him to trial. As far as the purely political historiosophic conceptions of Dostoevsky are concerned, Grossman did the same. These are the general conclusions which the "complex philosophy of Dostoevsky" implies: "The mission of the Slavs is to decide and finish the thousand-year old internal conflict of the Roman-German world to the advantage of the Germans and to the mutual domination of the Slavs and the Germans in Europe."[46] Ancient Rome was the source of European civilization; gradually losing its pagan character the Roman idea of universal monarchy was transformed into the European ideal of universal union in Christ. With centuries this great historical conception split— in the East appeared the Slavic idea of union based on the gospel, in the West—the Roman Catholic idea of a universal monarchy with the Pope at its head. The Papacy yielded to the third temptation of the devil and "sold Christ for earthly domination." The next phase of the development of the Catholic idea, and this means the next deformation of Christian ideals, is to be found in France which created Socialism. In this period the definite triumph of materialism over spiritualism was achieved.

To this extreme historical formulation of Western conceptions was opposed the German idea which, from the time of Arminius

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[46] L. Grossman, *Tvorchestvo Dostoevskogo*, Moscow, 1928, p. 198. All of Dostoevsky's political system is to be found in the *Diary of a Writer* and in novels like *The Possessed* and in his letters. I follow Grossman for lack of space.

186* 829 to Bismarck, represented only a negative idea of protest against Rome. This negative "idealism" was the main source of national German inspiration. But at the moment of the final German victory Germany, lacking its object, will be also lacking inspiration, and this will bring her to spiritual death. The final course of this worldly struggle will take on an apocalyptical character. The Pope, having lost his allies in the persons of emperors and kings, will throw himself into the arms of the proletariat, trying to become a socialistic vicar of St. Peter. Against this will rise Germany for the ultimate battle. But the last word will be said by the united East. In alliance with Germany, Russia will destroy the "two-headed monster" of Catholicism and Socialism, and then will be established the domination of the Germans, now inspired by Russia, in the West, and the domination of Russia in the East.[47] As I mentioned before (and Grossman brings many proofs of this), Dostoevsky had a great admiration for Bismarck, the "iron chancellor." He hoped that the creator of the formula of "union in blood and iron" would split Europe with his powerful sword, and that "after rivers of blood and hundreds of millions of heads" the world would accept the new word of the Slavic gospel. And this was to be what Dostoevsky called "The free Panslavic union of Europe."[48] The Franco-Prussian war became a source of inspiration for his conception. "Just like the most aggressive German professors he calls for a march against France" and "wants to enlighten Europe by the light of the gospel, by Bismarck's formula, and by the direct help of the German armies." France will be broken by "blood and iron," "Tsargrad" will be in the hands of Russia, England and France will be defeated by the Russian-German armies, and so the triumph of Russian Christianity will be achieved.[49] In other words he follows the reasonings of his Raskolnikov: "*vive la guerre eternelle*—till the new Jerusalem."

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[47] Grossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-203.

[48] Grossman, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-208.

[49] Grossman, *op. cit.*

It is true enough that in the very last period of his life as if 186* ● having lost his hopes for Russia to achieve that universal mission 829 he suddenly called: "To Asia! To Asia!" "To that great mother of all religions, to the original 'neighborhood of God,' to the sacred nearness of the thousand-year-old contemplators of heavenly revelations—to India and Palestine. . . ."[50]

7. Bakunin (1814-1876)

There is a literary theory that Dostoevsky's "possessed" Stav- 000 rogin is a fictionized portrait of Bakunin. The author of this hypothesis, L. Grossman, accumulated extremely interesting proofs for his discovery. I shall not enter into an analysis of this theory, but it is quite true that the moral labyrinths of Bakunin's life and political revolutionary career lend themselves very well to this comparison. Bakunin's biographers made great efforts to explain and justify by political Machiavellianism Bakunin's rampant attitude towards Nicholas I and Alexander II, and his behavior in Siberia, which was morally paradoxical to say the least. Therefore, there is no doubt that the ideological prestige of Bakunin's political activities as well as of his writings is strongly contaminated by his very doubtful personality. His *Confession* and his letter to Alexander II surpassed the repentence of the Decembrists, the agony of Chaadaev, and the yielding of Dostoevsky. His infatuation for Murav'ev-Amursky and the role he played in the Irkutsk society are not less astonishing. However, he has his 186* place and an important one in the development of Slavophil and Panslavistic ideas. Bakunin represents a kind of revolutionary Panslavism, but in this field of his political conceptions one may find the same inconsistency that characterized his moral attitude.

National and Slav feelings as well as feelings of sympathy for 186* Poland had been awakened in him by Lelewel, famous Polish his- 829 torian and geographer, radical democrat and member of the Rev- 648 olutionary Government of 1830-31, during their meeting in Brus-

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[50] Grossman, p. 213.

186* sels. Lelewel "told him about the primitive democratic Polish
● 829 municipality, about the agrarian Slavic collectivity, about broth-
648 erly institutions and customs distorted later by the class structure
and the enslavement of people which came from the West. At that time he conceived a new goal for himself which was "a Russian revolution and a republican federation of all Slavic lands, and the establishment of one indivisible Slavic republic, federative only as regards administration, and politically centralized."[51] At that time, under the influence of western European populism and socialism on one side and, on the other, of his intimate contacts with the Polish emigration in Paris, Bakunin started to crystallize his own Russian populist and revolutionary ideas. The first manifestation of these crystallized ideas took place in Paris in 1847 when he delivered his famous Polish speech at the commemoration of the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31. In this speech he attacked Nicholas I, he asserted that the Russian and Polish nations must be reconciled, that both were paying for the discord introduced by Russian autocracy, and that the Russian revolution would bring freedom to both nations. He said that this task could be realized only through the Russian-Polish alliance: without the liberation of Poland, Russian freedom could not be born. And finally he called for the liberation of all Slavic nations in order to bring about the final collapse of despotism in Europe.

186* A little more complicated was the atmosphere of the Slavic
668 Congress in Prague, in which he took part and delivered several
[575] speeches. At that Congress, as we know, Palacký advocated the
idea of a Slavic federation with Austria in which the Czechs would play the dominant role. This idea was not popular among other Slavs, and the atmosphere of the Congress was not at all encouraging.

Bakunin first of all stressed the fact that Russia, by enslaving Poland and especially by giving a part of her to the Germans—the main enemies of the Slavic race—tore herself away from Slavnin's manifesto by saying that "Russian revolutionism is, in its consequences for Poland, similar to Russian despotism."[54] 186* 668

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[51] J. Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 161-162; cf. also V. Polonsky, *M. A. Bakunin*, vol. I, Gos. Izd., 1925, pp. 155 156.

I shall not enter the further complication of his relations with the Poles, the details of his self-imposed activities in the Polish Insurrection of 1863, nor the mutual deceptions between himself and Poland.

After the Polish Insurrection the Panslavic conceptions played a less important role in the second part of his life with the exception of his program for the Slavic section of the International in Zürich in 1872.[55]

8. Herzen (1812-1870)

Herzen also has some ties with Dostoevsky and these ties are to be found in his critique of the West and in his enthusiasm for the Russian village community which, as we know, was one of the chief objects of admiration of the Muscovite Slavophils though they first heard of it from the German Haxthausen who in 1845 published his work on his travels in Russia. Herzen's cult of the Russian peasant, his populism, made of him a precursor of *narodnichestvo.* 186* 829 ●

That evolution was not quite simple—Herzen, before his trip to Europe and stay there, was one of the most enthusiastic Russian Westerners, and he very often opposed the Muscovite Slavophils. His stay in Europe changed his opinions, and there he became one of the most violent fighters against *l'esprit bourgeois* of the Western civilization. The conception of the dying Western civilization became a kind of obsession with him and against these constantly drawn pictures of the chaos, agony, and disease of Europe suddenly arose in the mind of this former Westerner his Russian and even Slavophil messianism. To Chaadaev's formula that the past of Russia is empty, the present unbearable, and that she has no future, Herzen replied that the "past of the Russian

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[54] Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 412.

[55] Cf. Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, and E. H. Carr, *M. Bakunin*, London, 1937.

186* people [illegible] dark; its present is terrible, but it has rights to the
● 829 future." And he filled that future first of all with the hope that Russia would avoid the poison of Western Philistinism. "Philistinism—this is the last word of civilization, based on the absolute autocracy of property." Russia, by the fact that she knew only communal property, had indeed every possibility of avoiding the poisonous influences of the West.

Certainly Herzen's disgust for European Philistinism was in some degree justified, but the *esprit bourgeois* does not exhaust the content of the Western civilization. It is amazing to see how quickly that former Russian Westerner lost his psychological inclination toward Europe—toward the lights of European thought—toward the intellectual energy of Europe, its philosophy, arts, science, traditions of freedom.

In addition, Herzen had a deep belief in the essentially revolutionary mind of the Russians. "The thinking Russian is the most independent man in the world. What can stop him? Respect for the past? But what is the starting point of the history of modern Russia, if not the negation of nationality and tradition? On the other hand, the past of the Western nations has only a didactic value for us. We in no way consider ourselves the executors of their will. We share your doubts, but your faith does not warm us. We share your hatreds, but we do not understand your attachment to the heritage of your ancestors; we are too oppressed, too unhappy to be satisfied with half-freedom. You are bound by scruples, you are stopped by reservations of mind, we have no scruples, no reservations, we are lacking only in power."[36]

We have here a kind of combination of Chaadaev's pessimism
186* and the Muscovite Slavophils' optimism. The essential idea of
829 Herzen, a very Slavophil and very Russian idea, was that "the
177 western fruit will ripen in the Slavic world." Kucharzewski,
whom I quote, very justly states: "The West produces thoughts,
Russia utilizes them; to the West is alloted the task of creating, to

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[36] Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 395-396.

Russia—the role of leadership among future mankind, with the 186*
help of the ripe fruits of the work of other nations."[87] 809●

When dealing with Herzen as well as with Tyutchev and Dos- 177
toevsky—but I think with Herzen even more than with the latter, one is really amazed to see how well and deeply he knew Europe. The more astonishing is, then, that lack of attachment and love for European tradition. They understand everything, but they love nothing.

All these thoughts were developed in Herzen's work *From the Other Shore* (1849), in his letter to Michelet, and a little later, in 1854, in his letter to Riberol, editor of the review *L'Homme*, and in his letter to Linton, editor of the *English Republic*. In this last publication he develops his Panslavic system in connection with the Crimean War. He states that Poland was the one Slavic country who preserved her independence. "Only Poland remained independent and strong, but this because she was less Slavic than the other nations, she was Catholic, and Catholicism is a flagrant contradiction of the Slavic genius. Hence Poland preserved independence by weakening her racial ties and by coming nearer to the Western states."

One must not, forget however, that in 1863 and in 1864, as I mentioned before, Herzen in his *Kolokol* published the most penetrating articles filled with great sympathy and admiration for Poland and the Poles.[88] He greets the Crimean War as "the beginning of a Slavic era, the Slavs will raise the banner of Socialism, and Constantinople will be the capital of the united Slavs. . . . Constantinople is one real capital of the united Slavs, it is the Rome of the Eastern Church, the center of all Slavo-Greeks—Byzantium, surrounded by a Slavic-Hellenic population . . . In any case this war is the *introduzione maestosa e marziale* of the Slavic world into universal history and at the same time *una marcia funebre* of the old world."[89]

[87] *Op. cit.*, p. 397.

[88] Lednicki, W.: "Russian-Polish Cultural Relations," *New Europe*, 1944.

[89] Kucharzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-400.

186* 829 177

Yes, Herzen was certainly one of the most brilliant and penetrating singers of the Russian requiem for Europe, but even in this he was a pupil of the Europeans—of the Saint-Simonists, Fourier, Cabet, and Proudhon, who violently criticized contemporary European civilization. They did for Herzen what later in the seventies Renan did for Strakhov. Strakhov filled his book *The Struggle with the West in Our Literature* with Renan's criticism. But Renan did even more—he suggested some ideas to the Russians which they didn't forget. Strakhov quotes one of them: "There still exists in the world a reserve of barbarian forces, which are almost all in the hands of Russia. As long as the civilized nations conserve their solid organization, the role of these barbarians will be almost null; but without doubt, if (from which God preserve us!) an epidemic of selfishness and anarchy brings our western states to destruction, the barbarians will accomplish their duty, which consists in raising the many forces in spoiled civilizations, in producing the vivifying current of instinct which was lost when reflection destroyed subordination, to show that readiness to sacrifice one's life for faithfulness to one's sovereign (a deed which a democrat considers low and absurd) is a source of power and leads to the possession of the world."[60]

The case of Herzen is particularly eloquent: it shows how demoralizing were the Slavophil and Panslavistic conceptions if a man of Herzen's caliber, Europeanism, and superior generosity could find himself in such a moral and spiritual impass.

186* 829 539

The ultimate expression of this eastern Messianism suggested by the Russian Westerners is to be found in the *Scythians*, a poetical message which Alexander Blok addressed to the West: "Now rejoicing, now sorrowing, now flowing with black blood, she (Russia) looks at you with hatred and with love. . . . We love everything—the heat of cold numbers and the gift of divine visions; everything appeals to us—the perspicacious Gallic thought and the gloomy German genius. . . . We remember everything—the hell of Parisian streets and the refreshing coolness of Venice,

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[60] Strakhov, *Bor'ba s zapadom v nashey literature*, St. Petersburg, 1882, vol. I, p. 324.

the distant aroma of the lemon groves, and the smoky buildings 186*
in Cologne. . . . We love the body, the taste and the color of it, and 829 ●
its oppressive deadly odor. . . . Is it our fault if your skeleton 539
cracks in our heavy, soft paws?"

9. Reactions Among the Slavs Toward Panslavic Conceptions

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the Southern Slavs 186*
attracted no great attention from the world. However, after the 175
Russian-Turkish wars of the time of Catherine II they began to move more distinctly on the political stage of Europe, as Pypin justly says.[61] The fight of Serbia for her independence, the fight of the Montenegrians against the Turks and their resistance against the French (I am still following Pypin), Illyria established by Napoleon—all this revealed the existence of energetic Slavic elements in the Near East. To this should be added facts as Vuk Karadžić's collection of popular songs in which the deeds of Serbian national heroes were glorified. The fights of the Croatians against the Hungarians, the Russian intervention in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the part which Russia took in the liberation of Serbia, all created an atmosphere in which the Panslavistic conceptions could, of course, count on a sympathetic reaction. However, as far as the final results are concerned, Russian Panslavism was not at all successful even among the Southern Slavs. The Croatians, who in the forties when fighting against the Hungarians were dreaming of Slavic unity, very soon abandoned these dreams and looked more and more toward the West for help against Turkey. The Serbs in spite of their religious ties with Russia were returning closer and closer to the traditions of Obradović and of Vuk Karadžić and his reform which brought the Serbian cultural development away from Russian influences, and to conceptions of a national state, and of the building of a national culture. Russia's tactless approaches to Serbia, the Rus-

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[61] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

However, the really first classical manifestation of Slavophilism in Poland, a manifestation which, by the way, preceded the Muscovite Slavophil school, is to be found in Stanislaw Staszic's *Thoughts on the Political Equilibrium of Europe*, written in 1815. It is a work in which Staszic dealt with the problem of the future of Europe, Russia and Poland. He was aware of the catastrophe threatening contemporary civilization, he saw a possibility for the regeneration of mankind through the Slavs. His views of the three main European races, the Romanic, Teutonic and Slavic, led him to the conclusion that only the last of them was destined to bring about such a regeneration; the Romanic nations had, he held, become exhausted by the controversies which originated in the separation of the state from the church. The Germans, on the other hand, had lost their moral unity owing to their sectarianism, which was based on their "excessive inclination for metaphysics." He further emphasized "their indomitable spirit of conquest and their lust for cruelty, which would always have made lasting peace impossible in the world." The Slavic races were developing intensely; owing to their primitive culture they had suffered less from calamities, their inner union was always durable and they were supported by their "religious unity, which for the most part was blended with the secular power." Among the Slavic nations he gave the first place to Russians whose geographical position rendered them more secure and impregnable than the Poles, and whose Orthodox Church enjoyed a higher type of religion, harmoniously blending, as it did, the secular and ecclesiastical forces. At the same time he attributed great importance to the War of 1812 which Russia "made into a Slavic war," thus showing to the world her inexhaustible power. Poland, in her turn, was destined to reveal that idea of unity which would have been realized by Russia had she overcome the political temptation which had beset the German emperors, for such ambitions would only result "in wars between brethren and in bloodshed." Staszic might be indeed considered the precursor of the Muscovite Slavophils; a still nearer approach to them may be found in the article published by

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186* of the Slavs from foreign influence. The imperialistic Russian tendencies were only an expression of the principle of defense

829 and of reaction against invasion. He thought that "the archangel of independence seemed to have left old Poland forever; there was, however, some future for the ancient Polish nation if it could be dissolved with no matter how great pain and suffering into Russo-Slavism." He looked with particular sympathy on the Orthodox Church, he thought it much superior to Protestantism, which was split into fragments, and to Catholicism. He considered that the Orthodox tenets depended on a sincere faith in Christ and on tradition. Gurowski considered even that the Polish language when compared to the Russian revealed its decadence and senility. He suggested substituting in Poland the Russian language for the Polish—this to be preceded by the introduction of the Slavic language in order to make the change less drastic.

The views of the second Polish Panslavist of the same period, Waclaw Jablonowski, were very similar. A disappointed monarchist, a pessimist in his views on Poland's future, a man who suffered from a nervous disease, he came to the same conclusion—that the only genuinely Slavic current was that of the East, the Russian and Asiatic, which incorporated the deepest tribal characteristics of the Slavs, who had come from Asia, and belonged to the Asiatic system by their character, their political tendencies and their commercial connections. The views show some likeness to the so-called Eurasian doctrine which appeared among the Russian emigrants between the last two World Wars. Jablonowski was very aggressive. In a French book propagating the idea of a Slavic-Russian empire under the leadership of the Tsar with a capital in Kiev, he suggests the organization of Slavic movements in the Balkans and an invasion of the West: "This movement might very easily coincide with some decisive step in the eastern question. A small army corps may cross the Danube and support movements arising on the other side. Europe, Germany and France, will utter a great cry; the latter will perhaps be obliged to break her alliance. That will be the culmination of slavism of a special order, which would consist of grouping the different Slavic nations under the sceptre of the Romanovs as protected powers. This thought appears from the beginning to the end in the long Panslavist epos of the Slovak poet Kollár under the title *Slávy Dcera*. The poet visualizes the peoples as united to form a sort of Colossus modeled on the Babylonian Colossus of the Bible. Russia forms its head, Poland its heart, Bohemia and Illyria are its hands and feet. It would be imprudent to contest what the ideas have of the seductive and the dangerous, one must indeed recognize the exxistence of a Russian Panslavism, only one may deny its Slavic character and that it ever could possess the eympathy of any independent Slav." 000 186* 829 ● 538

C. Robert stresses another important point when speaking about the activities of the "great protector" among the Danubian and Adriatic Slavs. He would protect them on the condition that they would never follow the example of Serbia and show any pretension for a distinct national existence. "Let one look through the history of these Russian protectorates since the protectorate has been exercised over the last kings of Poland and Georgia to those which the tsar exercises at the present time over the Serbian and Moldavian-Wallachian principalities and over the crumbling Persian empire. One will see that these various protectorates have always had and still have as a unique aim to prevent the protected nations from rising from their humiliation and being reborn to independence."[87] More than that, the same C. Robert observed that during the upheavals in Cracow and Galicia Russia constantly played the role of an ally of Germany.[88] 000

On the other hand from time to time, as we may see not only in the brilliant articles of Marx but also in the extremely interesting recent publications of the Soviet scholar Tarle connected with the Crimean War, the tsardom was ready to utilize the Panslavic conceptions when they appeared advantageous for it. It is quite true, for instance, that for Nicholas I it was not easy to combine his 186* 648

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[87] *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1846, pp. 472-473.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 479.

186* 648 to pursue their proper course. An exit from this dilemma did, however, exist and was discovered by the Westerners. Characteristically enough, the author of the manifesto by which the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov proclaimed Poland's independence, Professor Milyukov, was one of the most brilliant critics of the Slavophil and Panslavistic doctrines. His collaborator in this field was a Pole, Alexander Lednicki, who also never had any tendencies toward the Slavophil fancies but from the beginning to the end of his life remained faithful to his European orientation.

But perhaps the most edifying Russian example of the overcoming of nationalism and chauvinism by Christianism and humanitarianism is to be found in the "Polish story" of Tolstoy—in the touching tribute paid to the Polish martyrdom which truly inspired this great Russian writer.[32]

13. "Facies hippocratica"

186* ●829 648 After this rapid course through the thoughts of so many Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak and other writers and politicians, one unavoidable conclusion is that practically all of them, in spite of their political conflicts, ideological contradictions, and national antagonisms, agreed on one point—the recognition of the moral weakness and lack of moral dignity of Europe. Of course their approaches, motives, points of view, and goals were different. The Russians stated the moral decrepitude of Europe in a more or less speculative way. The Muscovite Slavophils could, after all, take an attitude of indifference and disinterestedness towards Europe. Russia could separate herself from the West and build a life independent from Europe. The Russian Panslavists could try to take advantage of the weakness of Europe for the realization of their Russian imperialistic views. The other Slavs, and especially the Poles, were in a different situation—for them the di-

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[32] W. Lednicki, *Quelque aspects du nationalisme et du christianisme chez Tolstoi*, Cracow-Paris, 1935.

lemma, Europe—Russia, was not a question of speculation—it 186*
was a question of life or death. What did Europe give to the 829
Poles? Every day of their life was a day of betrayal by Europe 648
of those ideals which Poles considered Polish ideals because of the very fact they were European. This is the main item of the Polish political texts of that period; and perhaps the most eloquent and at the same time tragic expression of these feelings is to be found in the famous message of the Polish National Government of August 15, 1831 addressed to its Western agents: "Truth, seen whole, has appeared before our eyes. We no longer count on the support of the great powers, who could and who would not, who still can and who will not, save us. We can no longer place any faith in the promises which they have made to us and which they belie by their conduct. . . . England and France, then, would not have employed us for the occasion except as an instrument fit to serve the course of their interests. England would not have lulled us with a few illusions except in order to have one more method of establishing the independence of Belgium. And France would not have made promises to us except to win a majority in the Chambers. Will faith, then be wholly banished from cabinets, and the words of a French and English minister be nothing but worthless farthings? . . . If France and England abandon us today and fail to justify the hopes that they have aroused, our ruin will have been brought about, not by the fury of Russia, or the hostility of Prussia, or the indifference of Austria, but by the self-styled sympathy shown us by France and England. . . . If the cabinets lack the courage to help us, let them at least possess enough dignity to acknowledge their barbaric indifference toward our cause. And if they have ignored the duty imposed on them by prudence, morality, and humanity, the Poles will know how to follow him who prescribes to them the sanctity of their rights and the love of their country. . . ."[88]

For Poland was facing not only the loss of her independence but a complete change of her historical mission. For centuries

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[88] W. Lednicki, *Life and Culture of Poland*, pp. 212-213.

186* she was considered the *antemurale christianitatis*, the rampart of
● 829 Western civilization. An absorption by Russia within the frames
648 of a Panslavistic conception would mean that Poland would become an anti-Western rampart. This is what Count Valerian Krasiński stressed already in 1848, foreseeing the present Polish catastrophe; Krasiński wrote: "If however the Poles will see that they have no chance of receiving from other nations and particularly from the Germans, the necessary assistance for the recovery of their country's independence, and that those nations in granting them some advantages, have no other object in view, than to make use of them as a bugbear to frighten Russia, in order to prevent the consolidation of the internal strength of that country by an intimate union of its Slavonic elements, being themselves ready to sacrifice the Poles as soon as their interests may demand it. If such a conviction becomes prevalent amongst the Poles, and there can be no doubt that it is rapidly spreading, what will then remain to them except cordially to unite with the Russians and to become, from a barrier between Russia and the rest of Europe, the vanguard of the Slavonic race against western Europe and Germany in particular."[94]

000 There was perhaps some consolation in the fact that the Poles, Russians, and the Slavs in general were not alone in their pessimistic critique of Europe. The Polish catastrophe, which absorbed the Poles and became a test case for all conceptions of Slavic union, was not the single factor that shook all European life in 1830-31 and in 1863. The French Revolution inaugurated a long period of upheavals and perturbations—revolutions, wars were following one after the other and the thunder of social turmoils was constantly menacing Europe during the whole 19th century. Have I to mention here the piercing voices expressing despair and "Weltschmerz," the voices of Chateaubriand, Byron, Alfred de Musset, Alfred de Vigny, and so many others as far as the "period of transition," to use Krasiński's formula, is concerned? Have I to recall the pessimism of H. Taine, the indig-

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[94] Valerian Krasinski, *Panslavism and Germanism*, London, 1848, pp. 218-219.

186* ings, manifestations, and commemorations in America; in June
668 1942 such meetings and congresses took place in New York, in
Pittsburgh, in Detroit, in Kansas, in Cleveland, in San Francisco,
575 in Oakland, and also in Canada, Argentina, etc., organized by local Slavic committees. These organizations in America and in other countries represent ramifications of the Moscow center; and at each meeting they manifested this relationship by sending addresses and telegrams not only to the Panslavic committee in Moscow but to Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, and so on. Around the Muscovite center were organized during the war all kinds of Slavic national committees and unions of patriots at the head of which one could find the members of the Panslavic committee in Moscow. These committees and unions were nuclei from which originated the "democratic governments" imposed by Russia to the Slavic and non-Slavic countries (similar committees were organized for Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria) which found themselves in the sphere of Russia's influence.

[208] For the task of propaganda of these Panslavic ideas of union and fraternity of the Slavs under the protection of Soviet Russia and under her cultural leadership there has been established a monthly review under the title *The Slavs*, published in Moscow in Russian.

186* It is paradoxical enough that if one takes different Soviet encyc-
● 829 lopedias one may find a radical refutation of Panslavic con-
651 ceptions; the Panslavism of the 19th century has been always qualified there as a bourgeois imperialistic doctrine. It would be very difficult, however, to find any salient difference between the Panslavistic imperialistic conceptions of Tsarist Russia, as far as their essence is concerned, and the Panslavistic policy of the Soviets, even though their motives and ultimate goals are not identical. In order to save appearances the official Soviet press still stresses that difference; so N. Leonidov in his articles *The New Phase in Slav History* published in *New Times* in Moscow in September, 1946, said: "The Russian people never identified themselves with the imperialistic chauvinistic Panslavism of the

186* monarchists." "The slanderous talk about new Panslavism is part of an anti-Soviet campaign."[95]

● 824 656 Of course there are differences. The Russian tsarist government used to change from time to time its attitude toward the doctrines of the Muscovite Slavophils and those of the Panslavists. All depended on the international situation. Besides, in spite of its Machiavellian policy the tsarist government was still bound by precepts of international and public law as well as by international public opinion, and because of that its Russianizing methods and proceedings were still in a certain degree moderated. Therefore in some cases there appeared a divergence of views between the representatives of the government and the most chauvinistic, aggressive representatives of Russian Panslavism as, for instances, the famous apologist of the Russification of Poland—Katkov. Anyhow the Slavophils and Panslavists at that time represented a free, independent initiative. From time to time they even found themselves under a governmental observation that was not very benevolent to them, especially when their Panslavic enthusiasm was bringing harm to the Russian government in its relation with neighboring countries.

186* 656 It is obvious that the present situation from this point of view is completely different. Everyone knows that there is no room and no possibility for any individual free political initiative under the rule of the *Politburo*. The whole present Panslavic movement has been organized by the Soviet government, and people who are taking part in it are agents of that government. In the beginning the aim was to organize Slavic elements for the fight against Fascism and Hitlerism, against Germany; the unspeakable German atrocities greatly encouraged these activities. Such is the aspect of the first years of the publication *The Slavs*. We find there articles dealing mostly with war events, with German crimes, or with the military history of Russia, articles glorifying great Russian generals like Kutuzov, Suvorov, great Russian tsars or princes like Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, some articles

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[95] Quoted from "Degeneration of Panslavism" by George C. Guins. The article has not yet appeared, but the author has kindly permitted me to use it.